

JPRS-UWE-90-008
27 JULY 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

***WORLD ECONOMY &
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS***

No 4, April 1990

Soviet Union

WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 4, April 1990

JPRS-UWE-90-008

CONTENTS

27 July 1990

[The following are selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

English Summary of Major Articles [pp 158-159]	1
The Need for a New Vision of Lenin's Legacy [Yu. A. Krasin; pp 5-15]	2
Postconfrontational Prospects of the United Nations Organization [V. Petrovskiy; pp 16-24]	8
Authoritarian Regimes in Tropical Africa [E. Lebedeva; pp 48-60]	14
The Third World's Prospects for Progress [E. Ye. Obminskiy and B. I. Slavnyy; pp 72-85]	22
Where is Eastern Europe Headed? [L. Shevtsova; pp 86-105]	31
Product Specialization of Union Republics Compared [A. Grigoryev; pp 135-138]	48
Book on Milton Friedman Reviewed [A. Khandruev; pp 143-145]	51
Review of Book on International Barter [S. Diykov; pp 148-150]	53
Book on French Nuclear Strategy Reviewed [S. Chugrov; pp 150-152]	55
List of Books Recently Published [p 153]	57
Articles in MEMO Not Translated [pp 1-2]	58
Publication Data	
[<i>MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA</i> No 4, Apr 90]	58

English Summary of Major Articles

904M0011A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 158-159

[Text] Y. Krasin in the article "Lenin's Legacy: the Need of a New View" argues that on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the most prominent political thinker and statesman, coinciding with the drastic changes in the world, it is quite natural to try to reassess his historical role. For decades Lenin's name was used to sanction authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes. The crash of those systems in Eastern Europe and the crisis of the Soviet society have resulted in attempts to deny any historical value of Lenin's ideas, to consider Stalinist model of socialism as their natural sequence and to look for the roots of the modern crisis not in Stalinism, but in Lenin's theory. For such purpose oversimplified, Stalinized stereotypes of Leninism are used. Lenin should be defended; yet it could not be done by means of the obsolete dogmas; a new approach and demythologization is required to understand the real place and value of Lenin's personality and his legacy in modern history.

In author's opinion it is counter-productive to try to judge Lenin's ideas leaving out of account the historical context and his own evolution, looking in his early works for the embryos of all his ideas of the later period, using fragments of his thoughts and sentences to justify any political course. To understand Lenin's theory and practice, his evolution as a thinker and politician is only possible in connection with the dynamics of social environment he lived in. Krasin tries to trace the evolution of Lenin's views in changing political and economical conditions, to explain some inevitable for a certain moment, but nowadays unacceptable statements and attitudes. Confrontational political culture of the early monopolistic capitalism dominated theory and practice of the early socialist society; now it is being replaced by the new political culture of consensus. Lenin's legacy is still working: not its part, reflecting specifics of the historical conditions of the beginning of the 20th century, but its methodology, the revolutionary approach to the changing reality. Lenin's legacy should be valued not as Holy Script, but as an important part of Marxist thought, not obliterating or excluding other parts and branches of the latter.

V. Petrovsky in the article "Postconfrontational Prospects of UNO" points out that the Soviet-American initiative fixed in UN resolution 44/21 was the first instance of cooperation between the superpowers in support of this unique international organization. The USA and USSR reached a new stage of their UN activities: the stage of "parallel constructiveness," making Soviet-American dialogue an intrinsic part of the international dialogue. Instead of confrontation, mutual understanding and cooperation should form the base of the new world order. International relations can be directed toward evolutionary and stable ways, excluding dangerous developments for peace and security. The

UNO, instead of being a means to express different countries' irreconcilable points of view, is becoming means of interaction in searching for solutions to the most urgent problems.

Some aspects of the contents and consequences of the development of so-called innovative business are discussed in D. Kuzin's article "Practice and Lessons of Contemporary Innovative Business." The author shows the nature, reasons and peculiarities of the innovative business boom in leading capitalist countries in the 1980s and pays particular attention to some problems related to new opportunities and methods of development and utilization of various innovations in close connection with the problems of the improvement of management. The question is virtually a behavioral phenomenon which manifests itself in different social systems and spheres of activity. The author also shows that theoretical grounds for understanding this phenomenon were laid down in the works of the Austro-American economist J. Schumpeter published in the first half of the current century. In conclusion, the author dwells upon several important and useful recommendations for the theory and practice of the socialist economy while emphasizing not only the place of the entrepreneurship of various economic agents, but the strategic role of the state in guaranteeing the functioning of new formations in the economy.

"French Foreign Policy in the Period of 'Cohabitation.'"

A. Kozhemyakov analyzes relations between president and prime minister in a delicate situation brought about by the 1980 election results. To ensure stability of state and political system F. Mitterand and J. Chirac, representing two different and traditionally competing political parties, had to work out new tactics, a new *modus vivendi* completing constitutional statements, not quite clearly defining distribution of power between president, prime minister and parliament, and especially the degree of prime minister's real participation in foreign affairs. Rivalry and cooperation, new functions of old political *gremia* and mechanisms, new interpretations of the old rules and laws, problems of diplomatic contacts originated from bifurcation of governing French foreign policy marked the so-called cohabitation period. On the whole, in spite of all the complications of the period, the necessity for the French to speak with "one voice" and to preserve continuity in its foreign policy prevented more acute collisions, though consensus was not possible. Problems of definition and distribution of powers is of special interest because of the institution of presidential government in the USSR.

The article "Authoritarianism in Africa: Typology, Evolution, Prospects" by E. Lebedeva is devoted to a political dynamics of authoritarianism in countries of Tropical Africa. The author earmarks two trends in the evolution of authoritarianism in the region. The first one symbolizes a consolidation of a special type of the authoritarian regime within the frameworks of which four basic subtypes formed: military, multiparty, one-party and one-party-"semicompetitive" regimes. The

second trend, which became apparent in the fall of the 1970s, shows a downfall of the legitimacy of the most rigid authoritarian structures and methods of ruling (in the first place, military governments and terrorist dictatorships) and rise of one-party "semicompetitive" regimes. In the social aspect, changes in the proportion of subtypes of the authoritarian regime reflected the crisis of a monopoly of ruling groups and their separate factions in particular for political power, a regrouping of these factions and also a growing involvement of the modern strata and groups of a capitalist type into a political process.

The article "Prospects of Progress and the Third World" by E. Obminsky and B. Slavnyi is devoted to the discussion of the role of the human factor and the new thinking for the progress of the mankind and the Third World in particular. The authors contend that the question on goals of progress or the nature of the historical process is one of the central problems of a new thinking, and the movement of the Third World depends not to a small extent upon a new political and scientific thinking in developed countries. But at present neither the East nor the West is ready to respond to the pretensions of the peoples of developing countries concerning an equal citizenship in the world community. The reason is that the formation of the world community lags behind the rise of universalistic aspirations of the masses in the Third World. Changes in the sphere are important because they would supplement national efforts in forming a civil society and would favor the formation of world citizenship. The future of mankind would depend on the extent to which such a process was coordinated with the progress of the economy, the extent to which the trend toward a formation of the world civil society dominated the trends toward a regional, national and other types of isolation.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

The Need for a New Vision of Lenin's Legacy

904M0011B Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 5-15

[Article by Yuriy Andreyevich Krasin, professor; doctor of philosophical sciences; rector, CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute]

[Text] Toward the end of the twentieth century human society finds itself in the flow of changes that are truly unprecedented for their depth and rapidity. The technological revolution is altering the foundation of mankind's social existence, the nature of labor, and man's place in the production process. The social structure of modern societies is undergoing rapid reform; people's entire way of life, their mentality, their psychology are dramatically changing. The world community has encountered most urgent problems that affect the very

foundations of its existence. Faced with this challenge, mankind is probably for the first time in its history beginning to truly realize its common ancestry, to understand that common human values take priority over social-class and national-state differences. Values are being reassessed in depth. The essence and criteria of social progress are being re-thought.

It is not surprising in this situation, at a time when we are observing the 120th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, the greatest political figure and thinker of the twentieth century, we reflect anew on his historical role and make corrections in the evaluation of his ideological legacy. Heated debates have once again broken out concerning these questions. The peripeteia of perestroika in the USSR and the dramatic events in Eastern Europe make them particularly urgent. After all, the authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes that were firmly established there for many years were hallowed with the name of Lenin. Naturally, their rapid decline, side by side with the crisis state of Soviet society, have generated doubt and even confusion in people's minds. There is a clearly expressed attempt to cancel out the historical significance of Lenin's ideas, to prove the hopelessness of the views of socialism that stem from them, of the avenues of its formation and development.

Such is the inevitable reaction to many years of attempts to dogmatize Lenin, to place him above time, to transform his ideas into incontestable canons suitable for all contingencies in life. Such is the reaction to the vulgarized model of Leninism that has been artificially created as an apology for the authoritarian-bureaucratic socialism that is presently leaving the arena of history. Lenin's critics are trying to equate his legacy with this distorted Stalinist model. This was specifically the thrust of the conception expounded by Z. Brzezinski in his recent book "The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century." The author unequivocally concludes that the causes of the crisis afflicting socialism today are rooted not in Stalinism but in Lenin's ideas. In his opinion, only the total rejection of Lenin's legacy can guarantee the success of Soviet society's perestroika.

Based on half-truths and criticism of simplistic stereotypes of Leninism, we are called upon to break the threads of historical continuity with the ideas of the Russian revolution accumulated in the Lenin legacy. As if there had been no great breakthrough in the new direction of history. But this cannot be done if we blindly defend yesterday's dogmas. There must be a new view of Lenin that accords with the new realities, with the prospective development of socialism. Only in this way can we rid ourselves of tendentious ideological mythology and understand the real place of Lenin and his legacy in modern history.

This difficult work requires basic methodological positions based on the Marxist understanding of social development. Let us express several ideas on this score that do not by any means claim to be the ultimate truth.

The author has a different intention: to engage in a serious discussion of age-old questions.

The Evolution of Leninist Views

For more than a quarter century, all the wealth of historical experience of the first decades of the twentieth century was concentrated in the creative laboratory of Leninist thought and was conceptualized and refined from Marxist positions. It was the experience of the most profound revolutionary changes of the new era in world history. The development of Leninist ideas reflected large-scale change in social development of that time: capitalism's entry into the monopolistic stage of development, the intensification of its contradictions, the imperialist world war, the rise of the labor movement, the breakthrough to socialism in October 1917, the civil war in Russia, the difficult search for the path of socialist development. Social practice, saturated with significant events and compressed in time, has unceasingly given powerful impetus to Lenin's theoretical thought, and has held it in constant creative tension. In the relatively brief period of time separating Lenin's early works from his political testament, his views underwent a considerable evolution and absorbed the diversity of the historical experience of the revolutionary age.

Lenin is therefore extraordinarily many-sided. This was, incidentally frequently speculated upon later by those who took citations in Lenin's works out of historical context to justify any political course. This many-sidedness demands that Lenin's ideas be correlated with concrete conditions and does not permit them to be used as a frozen summary of immutable normative postulates. Lenin's legacy of ideas can be understood only in their development, in close relationship to the dynamics of the social environment in which he lived and acted, with the state and activity of sociopolitical forces in Russia and in the world arena.

This approach is now recognized in theory. There have been appreciable changes in the assessment of Lenin's legacy from this point of view. It can be said that we have left the primitive ideological preformism, according to which all [of Lenin's] later ideas were contained in embryonic form in his early works. It only remained to concretize and reveal them in their application to the new conditions. We are also departing little by little from the Talmudic quotation of Lenin's works for the purpose of justifying the current political situation.

In recent years we have come to understand the total importance of historical method in evaluating Lenin's ideas regarding socialism. Much of what Lenin said about socialism in the period preceding the October Revolution did not stand up to the test of practice. To the contrary, the living experience of socialist construction generated new ideas that qualitatively altered Lenin's ideas about socialism and, it can even be said, laid the cornerstone of a new conception that was liberated from the illusions and confusion of the preceding period.

It is known that before the October Revolution, Lenin shared the then dominant view among Marxists of the socialist socialization of production as the universal statization [*ogosudarstvenizatsiya*] of property. On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote about the "transformation of all citizens into workers and employees of one big 'syndicate,' specifically: of the entire state and the total subordination of all work of this syndicate to the state."¹ And even after the revolution, in 1918, Lenin continued to proceed from the task of "making every citizen a member of a single nation-wide, or rather, statewide, cooperative."² Like many Marxists of that time, Lenin shared the illusion that there would be no commodity production and money under socialism.

However, attempts to build socialism on the basis of such views soon contradicted reality and defined the evolution of Lenin's views of socialism. In the process of elaborating the conception of the New Economic Policy and reflecting on the sociopolitical mechanisms of development of socialist society, Lenin freed himself of many illusions and even posed the question of changing the entire viewpoint regarding socialism. The objective need for market relations as a way of comparing the exchange of the results of labor in the system of production relations of burgeoning socialist society was recognized. Lenin concluded that solely on the basis of highly developed market relations can there be that which comprises the fundamental basis of socialism: the association of free producers, co-owners and co-administrators of socialist property, and the community of free civilized cooperatives. Thoroughly considering the entire significance of state levers for the social regulation of the production and distribution of products, in the last years of his life Lenin keenly recognized the paramount importance of democratic control of the state system, which demanded the intensive development of democracy from below, democratic self-government, and the involvement of the masses in all spheres of public life. These ideas are specifically the dominant theme of Lenin's political testament.

In recent years much has been done to perceive Lenin's ideas in their development rather than in static formulas. But by no means everything has been done. "Residual" dogmatism, the attempt to reduce the content of Lenin's political philosophy to long-standing stereotypes that formed as a result of the absolutization of ideas relating to very definite and specific conditions of a given period in the country's political life, is still very strong. This is clearly exemplified by the rigid model of the new type of party that was created on the basis of Lenin's early work "What is to be Done?" This work critically analyzes the theory of spontaneity of the labor movement and argues the necessity of introducing social consciousness into it. The vanguard party was called upon to perform the function of linking the revolutionary party to the labor movement. This is its *raison d'être*.

These Leninist principles were entirely appropriate for the state of the labor movement at the beginning of the

twentieth century. On the eve of the oncoming revolutionary period, it needed to re-define its class tasks and fundamental objectives. The need was felt for a revolutionary vanguard party capable of becoming the brains of the mass movement. This need was especially keen in Russia where the high pitch of class contradictions combined with economic and cultural backwardness that imparted a predominantly spontaneous nature to the mass movement. The revolutionary breakthrough in the direction of socialism was possible only through the inculcation of social consciousness in the labor movement from without, through the political leadership of the vanguard Marxist party.

Universal significance was later attached to the model of the vanguard party that concentrated within itself the conscious beginning of the labor movement, that was bonded by strict discipline and a centralized structure. The new type of party came to be regarded as the guardian of the truth capable, if not excluding all spontaneity from the labor movement, then at any rate of overcoming it and subjecting the movement to its will. These views clashed with the basic principles of the Marxist understanding of socialism. As we know, the founders of Marxism emphasized that socialism to them was not a state that was forced upon reality, was not an ideal with which it should conform, but was a real historical movement. The elevation of the type of party that corresponded to the entirely concrete conditions of the revolutionary period at the beginning of the twentieth century to the rank of a universal model contained the danger of a voluntarist approach to the very mode of realization of the socialist idea. This approach was graphically expressed in a slogan of the period following the October Revolution: "We shall drive mankind to happiness with an iron hand!"

Such a view is just one step removed from the view of the party as an order of swordbearers in which obedience reigns while the interpretation of the truth is concentrated at the very top of the hierarchical ladder. And this step was taken by Stalin who, on the basis of an expansive and non-historical interpretation of Leninist principles, designed a model of a messianic vanguard party that was placed above the mass movement and that became the nucleus of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system.

It is noteworthy that Lenin himself usually correlated the party's ideological function with the state of the mass movement and emphasized the need to train it on the basis of its own political experience. He noted: the party expresses the people's thinking. Naturally, the party connects the most aware, thinking part of a class. But the matter does not boil down to the one-sided inculcation of awareness into the labor movement. There is interaction. The experience of mass movement teaches the party and becomes the source of ideas as to where development is going and the nature of the forms of social relations that are born. The higher the general level of movement, the more it nurtures the ideology of the party and its theoretical activity.

Present activity convincingly suggests that the realization of the goals of democratic and humane socialism requires a progressive political party that substantially differs from the stereotype of the vanguard policy that formed in the social consciousness during the Stalinist years and that was unjustifiably presented as a "Leninist-type party." A party that is liberated of the pretensions of infallibility and political monopolism, that is the crucible for smelting and conceptualizing the historical experience of mass creativity, is responsive to the needs of democratic and humane socialism. Such a party cannot and should not be monolithic. Its constant interaction with society's different strata and the continuous pulsation of theoretical thought within the party presupposes the existence and comparison of different points of view and different political platforms within the framework of democratic unity.

An unprejudiced reading of Lenin, unencumbered by successive tendentious interpretations, most obviously shows that we still have to attentively analyze the evolution of Leninist views in all their complexity and contradictoriness with the dynamics of economic conditions, the succession of historical stages, the alternation of periods of political struggle and ideological disputes in the stormy history of the Russian revolution, and the international labor movement. There is need for total historical truth without any embellishment and attempts at modernization. Only then is it possible to understand the true meaning of every Leninist principle in the context of the real historical process, and not subjective intentions, to find ideological substantiation and justification for social and political experiments carried out at another time and under different conditions. It is undialectical and amoral to tear the living tissue of development of Lenin's thought asunder for the sake of ideological convenience. Historical method in the approach to Lenin is essential to determine what part of his rich ideological legacy sank into oblivion together with the unique historical situation and what part retains significance for understanding the realities of the end of the twentieth century.

On the historical evaluation of Leninism

The name of Lenin is inseparable from the Great October Socialist Revolution—a pivotal event in world history. This also determines the scale by which its enormous contribution to Marxist theory and policy is measured. This contribution is undeniable. Leninism was and continues to be the great theoretical and practical attainment of the world liberation movement. There is something else that changes: our vision of the scale of the assessment of Lenin's legacy. It seemed at first that the Great October Revolution was the beginning of the world revolution that in a foreseeable historical period would be victorious throughout the world. Now, however, toward the end of the century, the naivete of such views is theoretically recognized. The transition of human society to socialism is a much longer and more complex process that was previously believed. The October Socialist Revolution was the first act in a

historical drama that has embraced a very long period of time, in the course of which human civilization has undergone qualitative change. The conditions of realization of socialist goals are also being transformed.

Lenin, like other historical figures, was a man of his times. The important thing was not only and not so much that he, like all people could be confused, could make mistakes, and could entertain illusions that he himself more than once subsequently critically analyzed starting with criticism of the program of off-cuts [areas cut off from peasant holdings and taken over by members of the gentry] in the sphere of agrarian policy and ending with the reexamination of a number of fundamental postulates regarding the conception of socialism. The most important thing is that Lenin's legacy reflected features and tendencies of a certain historical period that could be called the period of early monopoly capitalism. It was characterized by abrupt changes in economic and social structures, by the dramatic intensification of social-class and interimperialist contradictions, by a high degree of political instability, and by the growth of the revolutionary mood of the masses. Class interrelations were dominated by the political culture of confrontationalism. In Russia, semi-serfdom modes of mass exploitation and despotic forms of political power were also superimposed on these features.

Confrontational culture became the dominant feature of the first breach of the capitalist system. And since this breach was perceived as the beginning of the impending demise of the entire capitalist system, certain specific features of the early model of socialist revolution were interpreted as its general laws. This was probably manifested most graphically in the exaggeration of the role of violence, in the broad interpretation of the sense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. First expressed by Marx and Engels, this idea had a very definite content: the need for revolutionary dictatorship, i. e., the political dominance of the proletariat for a relatively brief period of transition characterized by highly intense class struggle. In Lenin's works, the dictatorship of the proletariat acquired the meaning of the main idea of Marxism, of the most important criterion of revolutionary character. This idea truly reflected the conditions of the rise of the revolutionary movement in the period of early monopoly capitalism when a real chance for a socialist breakthrough opened up. However, the idea, which is true for certain historical conditions, was elevated to the rank of a general regularity of socialist revolution and assumed the form of a general formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat as authority that is not bound by any laws and that is supported by violence.³

Naturally, in the general context of the development of Lenin's thought, it is clear that he was talking about bourgeois legality which justifies violence against the masses. Many statements by Lenin show that he favored the painstaking development of a system of socialist legality and its unconditional observance. Nevertheless, the expansive sense of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat generated the real possibility of using it to

justify the tyranny of power and violence that contradicted the idea of socialism. This circumstance played its role in the affirmation of Stalinist despotism and subsequently in the ideological substantiation of mass repressions in the '30s and later years.

What has been said does not mean agreement with the statement that the totalitarian essence of Stalinism inevitably stemmed from Lenin's ideas. It must not be forgotten that Lenin's ideas concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat reflected the specific conditions of the period of intensive class struggle that he believed would culminate in the victory of world revolution in the near future. But when toward the end of his life he began to realize that the transition to socialism would be a prolonged period of history, his theoretical searching took an obvious turn toward the study of democratic mechanisms of development of Soviet society and the party itself. Unfortunately, the time that remained to Lenin did not allow him to make a detailed substantiation of this turn and the ideas expressed by him on this score have not been properly understood and assessed. The party was dominated by the inertia of conventional ideas that grew upon the soil of confrontational political culture and that became the flesh and blood of party ideology.

The narrow understanding of democracy became the reverse side of the expansive interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was merely viewed as a political form of the state and hence as something that would die away together with the dying away of the state. Attention was focused on the class essence of bourgeois democracy as formal democracy that is a coverup for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. These views once again reflected the realities of acute class confrontation inherent in the period of early monopoly capitalism. The realities of that time, but not of the entire period in which socialism formed. Only today have we become aware of the content and significance of the general human values that are embodied in the democratic attainments of the labor movement: in the practice of the rule-of-law state of capitalist society, the continuity of the relationship between these attainments and democracy in socialist society. It would seem that the restrictive understanding of the nature of democracy and the absolutization of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat prevented Soviet society from making the painless and timely transition from civil war to civil peace and promoted the affirmation of the authoritarian-bureaucratic variant of state socialism in our country.

The political culture of confrontationalism characteristic of the period of early monopoly capitalism left its stamp on the entire social consciousness of the newborn society of early socialism: the primacy of the party-class approach to philosophy, the principle of *partiynost* [party spirit] in art and literature, and intolerance of religion which, as we have now become convinced, also has positive functions of its own in the area of culture and morality.

Lenin departed from life at a time when the historical limits of the political culture of class confrontationalism, within the traditions of which his views had formed and developed, were just beginning to be discovered. He noted the first signs of change, reacted to them, but did not succeed in attaching the necessary determinacy to the turn that was noted in the development of theoretical thought. Work in this direction was not continued after Lenin. To the contrary, the canonization of Lenin's legacy in the traditions of confrontational culture began without any serious consideration of the deep reflections that were contained in his political testament.

The understanding of the historical framework of the political culture in which Leninism was born provides a new reference system for evaluating the ideological dispute between Lenin and Kautskiy. Of course, at the time of dramatic escalation of the struggle for power in the Russian revolution, in the maturation of the European revolutionary situation Kautskiy's centrist conception, his illusions about the peaceful acquisition of power by the working class through parliamentary procedures, and the possibility of class reconciliation were a serious hindrance to the realization of the practical tasks of the Russian revolution, for the development of international solidarity of the working class of West European countries with it. The sharp polemical tone and uncompromising nature of Lenin's dispute with Kautskiy are understandable from this point of view. However within the framework of present ideas about the transition of human society to socialism, we cannot fail to see that Kautskiy viewed the underestimation of the significance of democratic values and institutions in bourgeois society as a real danger to the labor movement and the struggle for socialism.

In the broader system of historical coordinates embracing the entire present century, it is evidently also appropriate to raise the question of the new evaluation of E. Bernstein, who in our literature has been removed from the Marxist tradition and is viewed exclusively as an object for refuting revisionism. Bernstein's unique "renaissance" in the West is not by chance. In the long run, his ideas reflected certain substantive trends in the economic and sociopolitical development of capitalism in the twentieth century.

Lenin's strong point as a political thinker was that he always kept his finger on the pulse of practical politics. His theoretical thought developed in close relationship with the practice of the labor movement and reacted sensitively to its urgent needs. At an abrupt turn in history, Lenin precisely detected signs of approaching revolutionary shocks and adequately formulated and substantiated the tasks of the labor movement under the new conditions. In this respect, Lenin was right about Bernstein who did not understand the specifics of the conditions of the revolutionary period and therefore could not answer the questions raised by political practice. On the threshold of the revolutionary era, he had no chance whatsoever of winning in Marxist ideological discussions. Unlike Lenin, he was the type of thinker

who was far removed from practical politics and who concentrated on the analysis of the trends that were born in the bowels of society, but that still did not determine its development in the near future.

Bernstein went against the current in the face of oncoming revolutionary changes, the inevitability of which he did not understand. He objectively hindered the labor movement and was rejected by it. Nevertheless, Bernstein saw earlier than others the potential, very substantive consequences that trends in social development that were just beginning to emerge might portend for the socialist movement. He pointed out the possibility of the serious modification of capitalism and noted that changes in the social structure of capitalist society lead not to the polarization of classes but to the growth of the share of the middle class, and expressed the idea that class dictatorship originates on the soil of insufficiently developed political culture. Bernstein warned against socialist socialization that rejects the principle of "personal economic responsibility of all administrative units and of all citizens that are of age." Bernstein wrote that without ramified self-government based on this principle, "the so-called appropriation of the means of production would have as its probable consequence only the boundless expenditure of the productive forces, senseless experimentation, and aimless violence."⁴

Of course Bernstein's conclusions were for the most part the result of abstract theorizing. It is difficult to imagine that many of his predictions would be realized if it were not for the powerful impetus that the world community would receive as a result of revolutionary shocks at the beginning of the century, the significance of which Bernstein did not evaluate and which he opposed. Nevertheless, Bernstein should be assigned his appropriate place in the overall context of development of twentieth century socialist thought.

At the beginning of the century it would hardly have been possible to foresee the entire complexity and contradictoriness of mankind's transition to socialist forms of societal organization. Lenin and the Bolshevik party created by him found the basic direction of activity for that time, which opened up the prospect for a revolutionary breakthrough toward socialist goals. In this direction, Leninism was organically inscribed in the history of the socialist movement and through its experience illuminated the need and legitimacy of other socialist currents. The birth and realization of the modern conception of socialism depends on their constructive comparison, interaction, and possibly, creative synthesis. Such is today's vision of the historical framework of the evaluation of Lenin's legacy.

Toward Marxism in the 21st century

No one doubts today that there is a need to purge Leninism of various kinds of Stalinist and dogmatic stratifications. Today, much is written about the "return to the sources," and the "new reading of Lenin." All this is true. And this must be done. But there must be

movement forward, not backward: appeals to return to primordial Leninism must not be allowed to conceal mental laziness in the investigation of today's difficult problems. Ready-made solutions to them cannot be found in Lenin's works. This requires intensive mental work, the analysis of present, frequently very extraordinary realities, the elaboration of the modern theory of socialism and avenues of making the transition to it.

A profound qualitative jump in the development of civilization is taking place before our very eyes. I can be said most definitely that we are still not aware of its basic parameters and that we still do not comprehend its consequences sufficiently completely. In Western literature, much is written about the "postindustrial society," "postcivilization," and the "technocratic society." Profound qualitative changes in social life are emphasized. M. S. Gorbachev's well-known speech at the United Nations Organization in December 1988 explicitly raised the question of contradictions and limits of traditional industrial civilization, of the search for a fundamentally new avenue of social progress that would make it possible to preserve mankind's habitat, to ward off countless threats, and to democratize all world order. The contours of this new, more developed type of civilization are as yet seen in most general outline. This direction opens up broad vistas for creatively active Marxist theoretical thought.

The prospect for the socialist transformation of society is also seen differently from this point of view. We realize today that the formation of socialism is a worldwide process that is not limited to the boundaries of socialist countries. It is unfolding in unique forms in both the developed capitalist and developing countries. On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote about the elements of socialism that were born in the bowels of state-monopoly capitalism. The matter has gone significantly farther in our time. There is every reason to say that modern capitalist society, which no longer fits the classical definition of capitalism, is forming whole blocks, units, and mechanisms of socialist social structures in the economy, in the sphere of social security, and even in the political superstructure. The irresistible attraction of progressive social forces for socialist ideals is also seen in the developing countries. All these processes require conceptualization in theoretical models that simply had no analogue in the past.

Problems of state socialism that has formed in our country also require in-depth theoretical study. The ongoing restructuring of Soviet society means the search for avenues of transition from the model of early socialism deformed during the long years of Stalinism and stagnation to another model that meets the demands of modern technological and cultural progress. Cumulative experience convinces us that socialism as a higher type of organization of society is affirmed not as a result of the simple destruction of capitalism, but as a result of overcoming it on the basis of general civilizational attainments: the high level of the productive forces, a developed market, mechanisms for regulating the

market, an integrated system of harmonious economic relations. Marx spoke of the "self-negation" of the bourgeois economy as the end result of its gradual expansion.⁵ The forced volitional elimination of capitalist relations transforms socialism into an unwieldy administrative-state framework, in which real socialist content is emasculated.

A new political culture that is replacing confrontational culture and is already dominating in modern complex societies holds fundamental significance for revealing the political content of the formation of socialism. This is the culture of consensus. To an ever increasing degree it determines the norms governing the interrelations of classes and sociopolitical forces, and forms the political environment of their activity. While consensus, which forms on the basis of compromise and consent, does not eliminate social and class contradictions and confrontation, the latter is realized in civilized forms. It includes both the struggle for the consensus of the majority of the people and within the majority itself—the struggle for the content and orientation of its political platform.

The political culture of consensus is to an every increasing degree being included in the interrelations of social systems in the international arena. The integrity of the many-sided and contradictory world stimulates the diffusion of the new political thinking. Deeply rooted in the social consciousness is the conclusion that the confrontation of social systems is inadmissible because it means the death of human society. However this is not enough. The urgency of today's global problems attests to the fact that the world community is faced with the necessity of organizing the close interaction, co-development and co-creativity of all countries and peoples. Such a type of interstate and international relations does not fit the conventional concept of peaceful coexistence. There is need for new concepts that adequately reflect the newly born world realities.

Life also confronts technical thought with the question of developing the model of the future. The technological revolution has opened up truly unlimited possibilities for technical progress. What kind of social system will permit the most effective use of its fruits in the interests of society and every person? There is a watershed between neoliberalism and the socialist movement in the bitter ideological and political struggle over this question. Neoliberalism was the first to respond to the challenge of the technological revolution and achieved notable economic results. They are the argument for the thesis of the "end of ideology," the purported absolute victory of the liberal world view over all others. However the economic effectiveness of the neoliberal course is based on constraints on the social attainments of the working people, on the ignoring of social equality and social justice.

The neoliberal model of the social system that infringes the rights of the weak who are pushed to the curbside of public life is encountering growing resistance. The idea of the democratic alternative to neoliberalism acquires

an ever wider range of supporters. The basic sense of the democratic alternative is to develop a model of future society that combines high economic effectiveness with social justice, with the creation of conditions for the all-round development and self-expression of each individual in the community of free people united by the collectivist interrelations of associated producers. This direction opens up the prospect for socialist thought and the socialist movement.

The end of our century is not very similar to its beginning. The world has changed beyond recognition. Entirely new problems have appeared and the old problems look different. There is also fundamental change in the Marxist world view. Does this mean that the Leninist legacy has become the domain of historians? No, it is also at work today. Not the part that reflects the features of the social and historical situation at the beginning of the present century, but rather the part that expresses the principles of Marxist methodology and the revolutionary approach to altered reality. In this part, Marxism always remains Marxism. And there is no need to focus attention on a hyphen to denote a historical stage in its development. The term Marxism-Leninism was introduced into circulation at a time when, in contradiction to the spirit of Leninist ideas, it was necessary to make the Marxist world view fit the Procrustean bed of apologies for authoritarian-bureaucratic practices in state socialism. When we use this term today, we necessarily narrow the content of Marxism and exclude other Marxist currents from it. An artificial barrier is also erected in relations between Marxists and other directions of socialist thought that for various reasons do not accept the theory and practice of Leninism. In a situation of intensive spiritual and ideological interaction of different socialist forces, such a barrier can only hinder the creative development of Marxist theory.

The modern view of the Leninist ideological legacy ultimately demands consistent historical method in the broadest sense of the word. It is important to admit that there are not and never have been philosophical systems that stand outside the historical process, that do not experience its determining influence. Any system of ideas is born of its time and expresses very definite trends in social development under certain specific conditions. While giving Lenin's creative genius its due, we should view him not as the Christ of Marxist religion but as the classic of Marxist reason. He represented the generation of Marxists that was distinguished by its boundless faith in the power of the socialist consciousness, in its ability to remake the world along rational and just lines. Only historical practice could evaluate these designs.

The great German philosopher I. Kant set himself the task of making a critique of "pure reason." In the best traditions of the Age of Enlightenment, he believed in the power of human reason, but did not want to clarify the limits to its potential. I. Kant's critique of pure reason was theoretical; history's critique was practical in respect of socialist consciousness. In the decades that

have elapsed since October 1917, the real boundaries of its potential and its dependence on actual historical conditions have been defined. Practice has returned us to the initial premise of Marx and Engels that socialism is not an ideal but a real historical movement. Socialism is soberly assessing its experience and potential and is coming out onto a new launching pad on the threshold of the third millennium.

Upon encountering the new realities, Marxist theory today is experiencing a real revolution that is more significant and on a larger scale than what took place at the beginning of the 20th century and that was connected with the name and ideas of Lenin. This revolution means that Marxist thought, after long zigzags and wanderings, is returning to the bosom of world culture, to common human values, to the high road of civilization. The historical place of Lenin and Leninism in the development of theoretical thought and practical politics of the 20th century should also be defined in this broad system of coordinates.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 33, p 97.

2. Ibid., Vol 36, p 161.

3. Ibid., Vol 37, p 245.

4. Ed. Bernshteyn, "Usloviya i vozmozhnosti sotsializma i zadachi sotsial-demokratii" [Conditions of Socialism's Potential and the Tasks of Social Democracy], St. Petersburg, 1906, p 171.

5. See K. Marks and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Part II, p 222.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1990

Postconfrontational Prospects of the United Nations Organization

904M0011C Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 16-24

[Article by Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, professor, doctor of historical sciences, deputy minister of USSR foreign affairs]

[Text] Looking with interest at the mosaic of recent UN happenings, I would like to single out 15 November 1989 in particular. On that day Resolution 44/21 "The Strengthening of International Peace, Security and International Cooperation in all its Aspects in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization" was adopted consensually at the initiative of the USSR and the USA at a plenary session of the General Assembly.

What is the significance of the Soviet-American initiative? For the first time in the entire history of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States came out jointly in support of this unique organization. The resolution, which was drafted on the basis of two-way efforts of the two great powers became their common contribution to the strengthening of the UN and hence was their common success. The decision-making method is also important. Even though the resolution draft was initially proposed by the Soviet Union and the USA, it was open to the participation of others from the very beginning. It was coauthored by 41 other countries and was supported by the entire world community. This essentially affirmed the UN Charter's initial conception of collective actions of the organization's members in the interest of supporting and strengthening international peace and security.

We immediately emphasize that it would be basically wrong to view the resolution as a certain "closed" agreement between the USSR and the USA involving only their interests. After all, the times are still fresh in the memory of many when the actions of Moscow and Washington, in the period of detente in the '70s, for example, developed primarily on a bilateral basis.

Now matters are completely different. The very fact that this initiative was submitted (even though it came as something of a surprise to many) specifically indicates that the USSR and USA have rejected such an approach. The joint action is also significant in the fact that it symbolizes the beginning of the qualitatively new stage in the activity of the USSR and USA in the UN: the stage of parallel constructivism. In other words, it makes the Soviet-American dialogue an international dialogue.

The substantive aspect of the resolution is no less important. Action of this type marks the end to confrontation in the UN. The habit of making pronouncements for effect in the activity of the organization, of engaging in propaganda battles, and of cultivating political intolerance has become a thing of the past. The stereotype that one side automatically rejects out of hand all of the other side's proposals is disappearing. The UN is entering the postconfrontational period: a period in which a new international order based on mutual understanding and mutual creativity is being established. It is not by chance that a large number of other documents, in particular, two important international conventions on a humanitarian plane—the rights of children and the struggle against mercenariness—were also consensually adopted already at the 44th Session.

The character of change in the material and nonmaterial life of civilization that is taking place before the very eyes of the present generation is without precedent. The rapid scientific-technical progress of recent years, the takeoff of computerized information processing and the creation of a single world information space, the trend toward the interpenetration of economic mechanisms,

toward regional and global integration, the growing gap in the levels of development of individual countries—all this is overturning set ideas concerning the present and the future. Transformations are also accelerating in the political sphere. People's minds are gripped by the idea of freedom and democracy, the supremacy of law, free choice and responsible behavior of states. Nations, nationalities, and peoples are becoming more active. An international community is forming in the true sense of the word. Anyone who does not find convincing answers to the challenges of time that affect the very basis of human existence, be it in the economic, political, humanitarian, or any other sphere, will find himself on the roadside of world civilization.

Consequently the point at issue now is not merely security, but security in all its aspects and manifestations. Resolution 44/21 adequately reflects this demand. From its text, it follows that peace, security, and cooperation are inseparable. The combination of these three concepts is not by chance, it is a substantive characteristic of the new international relations that are forming.

The UN Charter regards the maintenance of international peace and security as a central task. The integrated understanding of true security is especially important today. It is characterized not simply by the absence of the negative features—war, i. e., the state of peace, but also by the existence of reliable positive guarantees of the non-application of force, by the creation of all-round conditions for peaceful development. The recognition of such an integrated, multi-aspect character of security presupposes the multifaceted, all-embracing approach to its realization.

From Resolution 44/21 it also follows that under the new conditions, **cooperation** becomes the only possible direction of actions by states. Accordingly, for the first time it becomes possible on the scale of all civilization and on the basis of the UN Charter to direct the development of international relations to an **evolutionary road** where the stormy natural changes that are taking place in the world would fit within the framework of stability, would not break the existing structures, and would not become a threat to peace and security. Cooperation as a sporadic manifestation is making the transition to a qualitatively higher level of co-creativity and co-development. It objectively meets the needs of the peaceful period that is opening up in international relations, that is characterized not by the negative but by the positive interconnectedness of the efforts of nations to secure optimal external conditions for their development.

It is for this very reason that the resolution poses the goal of mobilizing the efforts of nations to multiply practical work to ensure peace and security in all their aspects through cooperation. The search for lasting security through power-based rivalry is unthinkable today. UN member nations have unequivocally declared themselves in favor of achieving security in the new world only through political means, i. e., through consultation

and cooperation within the framework of the UN, in all its organs without exception.

Finally, it follows from the resolution that peace, security and cooperation are viewed as a **single system** based on the UN Charter. This is a recognition of the objective regularities of the modern world which for all its diversity is becoming increasingly integrated and interdependent. Our civilization is a functioning system, the components of which cannot be disturbed without detriment to the operation of the entire mechanism. It is impossible to secure peace on a selective basis, for example, in an individual region, without concern for peace in other places. The close relationship between national and international security is becoming increasingly apparent: national security can be reliably protected only within the framework of global security, when the lesser security of any country becomes disadvantageous to others because it results in the destabilization of the general situation. In an interdependent system, progress in some society that is partitioned off from others by artificial borders and ideological fences, is factually impossible.

From Resolution 44/21 it follows that the system of peace, security and cooperation must be **based on the authority and potential of the UN**. In the past, when its work was in large measure deformed, the organization was predominantly a **tribune** that member nations could use to express its own—frequently uncompromising—point of view. Today, however, the UN is becoming a **tribune with a new quality**. Delegates to the UN speak not for the sake of polemics, not for the sake of delivering accusatory speeches, but for the sake of the interaction of all states, for the sake of ensuring the practical orientation of the decisions. As J. Perez de Cuellar noted in his very substantive report on the work of the UN (Document A/44/1), "the attempt to enlist support for the world organization is stronger today than at any time in its history." One cannot but share the secretary general's satisfaction over the "rebirth of confidence in the principle of multilateralism and its implementers."

Pacta sunt servanda. The task of securing the complete and universal implementation of the UN Charter is doubly important today. These are not merely words, they are also a statement that has profound sense and significance. Nations in the past have frequently "picked" certain provisions out of the Charter while closing their eyes to its other parts. In the new, postconfrontational world, the UN Charter must be observed according to the letter and spirit in all of its articles, must be the foundation of all international actions of the various countries.

Such a foundation is needed today as never before. The world is changing so rapidly and frequently so unpredictably that this foundation is essential. (Some politicians say, not without foundation: in the Cold War times, they found life simpler because even though the world was balanced on the brink of a "hot" war, paradoxical though it might seem, it seemed more reliable and stable). Today there can be changes in any region. Resolution 44/21 was

specifically aimed at promoting the stability of the international system in the process of change through the UN.

The Soviet Union and the United States and all UN member nations discerned the urgency, the importance, the criticality of the moment. They came to the unanimous opinion that unconditional respect for the UN Charter, its goals and principles, should become the reference point of their actions. That is, that they should strictly follow the road that was the result of the careful weighing of the balance of interests of all countries that drew up the Charter during the period when they truly cooperated, during the years of struggle against fascism. In addition to this, it is essential to develop the UN itself, to renew relations between its participants based on the consideration of more and more new realities in the world process.

II

The direct joint search for solutions of entirely specific, tangible matters on the agenda at all levels of international interaction is becoming decisive today.

The Soviet-American INF Treaty became a genuine breakthrough in the military-political sphere. It became the first treaty which, through the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons, confirmed the indivisibility of universal security.

The construction of the new model of security can and should mean not the buildup of weapons but rather their destruction. The results of the meeting of Soviet and U.S. leaders on Malta suggest that the basic positions of the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons will be coordinated by the next stage in their dialogue: in the second half of June 1990. The treaty can then be prepared for signing in the next few months. The present year, 1990, must become a year in which agreement is reached in the Vienna talks on conventional arms and armed forces reduction. In Geneva work is almost complete on a convention prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons.

Basic new categories are emerging in the disarmament conception. Companion measures such as verification [kontrol] and openness are acquiring special significance. Verification must be very strict, reliable, and must ensure the full confidence of all participants in agreements. What is more, the transition to multilateral measures, the growing complexity of their substance, and the need to involve foreign military bases on the territory of third countries in the verification sphere raise the role of international control, especially under the aegis of the UN.

At the same time, openness and glasnost are disarmament's "philosopher's stone" that makes it possible to transform military confrontation into agreements to scale down confrontation. The publication of military doctrines and military budgets of nations, their comparison, and in general the establishment of agreed-upon

standards of maximum "transparency" of military activity are becoming especially timely. The Soviet Union will take an active part in work that will begin in this direction in the UN Disarmament Commission in 1990. We believe that the new peace must be based not on military, including nuclear, deterrence, but on political-legal, transparent, and verification deterrence relying on the authority and potential of the UN.

With the cutback in military potential, the economic measurement of disarmament is concretized and the principle of disarmament for development is filled with material content. At the international level, resources must be freed up for reducing military programs; part of them must be used to help the poorest countries and to solve global problems. This will unquestionably be facilitated by the UN's examination of the conversion of military production, including scientific research and the exchange of knowhow.

We are convinced that **disarmament is a systems-forming factor** in the construction of a new kind of peace. Politically, morally, and economically the universal transition to rational defensive sufficiency is capable of giving colossal impetus to positive processes in all other spheres of human society.

III

However, security in all its aspects is more and more beginning to feel the effect of nonmilitary factors such as the creation of a healthy environment, stable economic development, human rights, and the freedom of information. This list could be continued. More and more transnational problems are appearing on the UN agenda.

The **prevention of ecospasm** is placed on a par with the prevention of war. It is now clear to everyone that nuclear conflict would immediately result in the destruction of mankind. The UN Secretary General's recent study of "nuclear winter" presented additional substantiation of this. However the approaching ecological catastrophe can lead to similar results. Their only difference is their gradualness. Therefore the urgency of extraordinary nature conservation measures on a planet-wide scale so that mankind would not only sustain irreparable losses, but would also avoid new destabilizing factors in the development of the international situation is becoming increasingly obvious.

There is growing understanding that the area of **humanitarian cooperation** and the protection of human rights must above all be exempted from confrontation. Here the entire democratic community has common goals that are recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in international pacts on human rights. Everyone is confronted with the task of raising the internal practice of every country to the level of recognized international standards. The development of efforts in such a new and sensitive area as **information** has been raised to a new level.

Problems that were previously within the purely internal national jurisdictions are now being advanced to the forefront of international discussions. A special session of the General Assembly **on the fight against narcotics** and the Assembly's approval of a decision to include the UN in the effort to **prevent international terrorism** show that the world community is not indifferent to these threats.

Thus, today there is an urgent need for efforts in all directions of international security. This is the most important facet of the all-encompassing approach. Not coordination, not the accumulation of problems, but their resolution simultaneously and in parallel in every concrete sphere. Such an approach corresponds to the task of harmonization of international relations, the strengthening of national solidarity and international stability that does not preclude social and other changes on the basis of multivariant development.

IV

The proposal made by the Soviet Union and other countries 4 years ago to establish a **comprehensive international security system**—a proposal that was subsequently concretized and developed by M. S. Gorbachev in his speeches to the UN in 1987 and 1988—can be considered the inauguration of the new thinking in UN affairs. The USSR has repeatedly spoken out for the construction of a new world based on the authority and potential of the United Nations Organization.

It can be said that these initiatives have achieved their goal: the initiation of a broad democratic dialogue on ways and traditions of forming comprehensive security, on raising the role of the United Nations Organization and ultimately reducing this dialogue to a common denominator. And this was done in a 4-year time frame. If we consider that the Cold War lasted more than 40 years, this is not a very long time.

Comparison of the proposals on comprehensive security with Resolution 44/21 immediately reveals differences in their verbal form. But their substance and basic provisions coincide for the most part. Formerly, primary emphasis was on the need to unify nations' efforts to form a comprehensive security system; the resolution also raised the question of strengthening the system of peace and security. The thesis of a comprehensive approach was advanced; now, another expression has been found: the "multifaceted approach" (it is probably more precise). In other words, the substance is the same, but the language is pleasing to all UN member nations.

The discussions brought to light a number of areas of agreement that clearly indicate immediate directions of more intensive multilateral activity. Among them: the strengthening of the UN's principal organs, the increased potential for UN peacekeeping operations, raising the role of international law, and the activation of the World Court mechanism. The point is to stimulate the collective search for ways and means of increasing the UN's

effectiveness through the total, non-selective implementation of the provisions of the organization's charter and the active use of its mechanisms and procedures. A real prospect also opens up for the concentration of the UN's efforts on preventive diplomacy, on the development of its capacity to adopt effective measures to prevent the escalation of disagreements into conflicts.

In sum the UN is presently going through its renaissance. This point has been made by its secretary general and representatives of all member nations. It can be said without exaggeration that for the first time since 1945, the organization has once again begun to operate under external conditions comparable with those that confronted the nations that founded it. In other words, the tendency toward dialogue, to resolve problems through negotiation, mansidedness, and legal order must predominate over military-power approaches and the orientation toward onesided actions. Energetically joining in worldwide modernization processes, the UN is now becoming their powerful accelerator.

V

A universal instrument was also noted: the solution of problems by political methods, by cooperative means, and the orientation toward the attainment of the balance of interests. In the search for the harmonization of interests, parliamentary diplomacy, which means renouncing obsolete stereotypical thinking, high culture of dialogue at the tribune, and the persistent search for solutions behind the scenes, acquires special significance. Applicable to the UN, there must be preliminary consultation in all organs without exception and the balancing of interests.

We are convinced that a world, that breaks with a philosophy of enmity and confrontation, becomes more balanced, mature, and wiser. We can no longer tolerate any manifestations of national egocentrism, imperial ways, and obsession in any form. Only policy that is oriented toward the consolidation of the international community, that promotes its survival and development is in everyone's interests today.

The rejection of militaristic solutions and the demilitarization of thinking in general are required to make the transition to the platform of political approaches, to the use of negotiating mechanisms, and supremacy of law.

While in the past century political categories had theatrical parallels (the international stage, actors and performers on the stage, the curtain, etc.), concepts borrowed from the military lexicon such as offensive, front, breakthrough, etc., came into use in the 20th century. Now, however, there is an urgent need—perestroika has clearly shown this—for the new, fresh language of diplomacy that reflects creative values that are common to all and that operates with the categories of national and state interests.

The principle of universality of membership in the UN and international organizations connected with it is also

seen differently today. The UN system has become a unique ramified mechanism of interaction among nations that has a substantial influence on any country's foreign and internal political course. Totally equal participation in UN activity is in keeping with the interest of the entire world community in finding multifaceted approaches to strengthening the system of peace, security and cooperation and the long-term interest of every participant in international intercourse. "Be tolerant and live together in peace with one another like good neighbors"—this phrase from the preamble to the UN Charter logically prefaces the Charter's provision that all peace-loving countries may become members of the organization. Today's task of forming a prolonged period of mankind's peaceful development is all the more inseparable from the realization of the universality of the UN in fact, from overcoming the legacy of the Cold War and colonial and racial oppression.

It is also necessary to secure the active participation of all basic groups of countries in the UN. The nonalignment movement is an important force and its voice must be heard in full measure not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council. A special role now belongs to social, nongovernmental organizations that must operate in close contact with the UN by securing a continuous channel of communications with the broadest masses of the population of different countries.

The most effective path of progressive development of international organizations is the **consensus approach** to the greatest possible number of problems under discussion. This is also confirmed by the positive results of the 44th Session of the General Assembly. It was not by chance that there was a larger number of resolutions coordinated at the session as a result of the merger of several drafts initially submitted by different authors. In other words, the very culture of conducting international affairs acquires a new quality. There is increasing willingness to consider the arguments of the other side, to take them into account in redefining one's position.

Of course, it still remains for politicians to formulate a "consensus about consensus." But it is already obvious to us that consensus with respect to legal status occupies a special status in the instrumentation of multilateral forums. With regard to its effectiveness it differs from the recommendations and—by virtue of the moral authority of the world community behind it—draws closer to decisions that must mandatorily be carried out. It is for this very reason that it is always important to extend consensus both to the period when a document is drafted and when it is being implemented. We see in consensus a means of responsible behavior of states, a guarantee of the interests of all, that opened up the possibility for the participation of one and all in the most important decisions. The veto right in the Security Council now looks different through the prism of consensus—it now has a positive quality and forces the Council's members to reach agreement among themselves.

VI

Naturally, this dramatic turn does not come easily. There are still many difficulties on the road to the UN's rebirth. It is impossible to get rid of the past instantaneously. One still feels recurrences of power politics, of the bipolar vision of the world which affects the actions of many countries inside and outside the UN.

Self-purification is required to eliminate outmoded stereotypes. There is need for the critical reinterpretation of the experience of the past and the creation of conditions that would preclude the repetition of past mistakes. In the Soviet Union since April 1985 we have evaluated the history of our activity in the UN specifically from this point of view. We see that we, too, sometimes yielded to the temptation of power approaches that were previously dominant in the organization and made its contribution to reducing the effectiveness of the UN in the preceding stage. Diplomatic imperatives must now include the sober assessment of dominant moods in the UN, dialogue with the entire spectrum of world political forces, the understanding that we do not and cannot have opponents in addressing the problems that confront all mankind, that there are only allies and partners.

But we do not claim a monopoly on self-purification. All countries, especially nuclear powers that a permanent members of the Security Council, must critically analyze their past policy, correct it where necessary, and project this analysis to the future. Today, like yesterday, the will of the UN cannot be ignored.

The capacity for and willingness to engage in self-criticism is only one of the components of truly modern policy. Everyone's efforts are needed to consolidate the radical breakthrough in world affairs and to create guarantees of the irreversibility of positive change. The cumulative effect of the combined actions of peoples, countries, blocs and groupings of countries, East and West, North and South is required.

It is also important to bring about change in the style of international relations. Messianic approaches and the pose of the master who teaches others are ineffective today. But if they are accompanied by power pressure, such actions are unacceptable and dangerous. No, a mature and wise civilization needs not the prescriptions of one side, but collective efforts in the spirit of a fundamentally new internationalism that is responsible and free of double standards.

As never before, the postconfrontational epoch requires the **intellectual conduct of world affairs**. The period of co-creativity and co-development in our view presents a real challenge to politicians and diplomats. After all, finding a multifaceted approach for the solution of problems confronting mankind is an extremely complex problem that cannot be in any way be compared with the simplistic scenarios of the Cold War period. It demands constant labor, creative initiative, and a great deal of common sense of the participants. And the final common goal—to change the entire picture of the world

qualitatively on the basis of cooperation—cannot be compared in its significance with the previously dominant interests of individual countries and blocs.

The road to this goal is long; after all, adaptation to altered realities is always difficult. But there is hope in the fact that the dialogue has already made it possible to identify a number of connecting links in the comprehensive approach to security. They are: the demilitarization of the thinking and behavior of countries, the democratization and humanization of international deideologization of international relations.

The fragility of the modern world in the face of man-made means of destruction places on the agenda the urgent need for demilitarization—not only the gradual reduction of arms and progress toward the elimination of mass destruction weapons, but also the liberation of thinking from military stereotypes. Mankind must finally reject war as a means of resolving international political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes.

The democratization of international life means the elimination of all manner of "clubs of the chosen" and the participation of one and all in the decision-making process. It is closely connected with the humanization of international relations since human measurement presently acquires special significance as the goal and means of attaining a secure peace. A nuclear-free, non-violent world is at the same time also a just world. One of the functions of the human factor in politics is to strengthen the moral principle of the latter. The new thinking affirms that man is worthy of a better fate than being the hostage to nuclear weapons. His life and political position determines more and more the future direction of international relations and the way problems will be addressed.

The elimination of ideological barriers from cooperation becomes the prerequisite to the organization of cooperation along new lines. The primacy of the law and respect for human rights and society's progress in general are inseparable from the deideologization of international relations, from nations' renunciation of claims to know the "absolute truth." Of course this does not mean the renunciation of their own views and convictions. The fundamental right of peoples to choose their own path of development is indisputable. The right of man (recorded in generally recognized international documents) to the freedom of conscience and convictions is equally inalienable. The reference is to the inadmissibility of making clashes of ideological views into a battlefield between countries. Principles of general human morality must be implemented by the power of a country's own example and experience through its foreign and domestic policy.

Deideologization in multilateral interaction is the conscious rejection of ideologized approaches to cooperative mechanisms; the elimination of artificial politization of the activity of the UN and its specialized institutions; the concentration of their attention on the performance of

specific tasks in accordance with their competence; and the increased professionalization of their activity.

The multifaceted, comprehensive approach also requires heightened attention to the management of the organization itself which acquires acute critical meaning. The task here is to make optimal use of its financial and material resources, to coordinate and rationalize the activity of international organizations, to exclude duplication and parallelism.

The postconfrontational period demands practical actions. Only unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions can confer the certainty that the system of peace, security and cooperation defined in the UN Charter will become a reliable obstacle against the return to confrontation. At the same time, it will guarantee that the 21st century will be noteworthy for its new approach to the development of our civilization as a unified whole on the basis of the synthesis of all the best that has been attained by mankind.

The exemplary social system in the third millennium will be characterized more by the synthesis of positive experience and the UN is called upon to become a forum for the development of this process. Synthesis creates progressive standards that can be used in all countries to create rule-of-law states and civilian societies. On the one hand, synthesis means a new culture in an integrated and interdependent world that rejects omnivorousness and all-forgiveness that casts off such "vyvekhi" of civilization as fascism and racism, and does not accept oppression and violence. On the other hand, it means culture that is based on tolerance and a plurality of variants, on the recognition of the right of different ideological and political views to exist regardless of whether they are supported by the majority or the minority at the given time.

...

The '90s must unquestionably become a time of change, a time of entry into a period of peace. They must also be a stage of purposeful efforts of the world community to create guarantees of stability and of the irreversibility of positive innovations. Not everything is simple in the world. Nor is everything simple in the UN debates. It will take considerable work to transfer Resolution 44/21 to the plane of practical accomplishments for the entire spectrum of the organization's activity. After all, the adoption of this resolution is not an end in itself. The sense of it is to give impetus to the further deepening of dialogue, to the concretization of interactions, to stimulating concerted specific actions by the nations.

In our view the main thing is that the resolution to strengthen international peace, security and cooperation is one more step in the dialogue about a qualitatively new, postconfrontational world order based on the UN Charter.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Authoritarian Regimes in Tropical Africa

904M0011D Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 48-60

[Article by Eleonora Yevgenyevna Lebedeva, candidate of historical sciences; senior scientific associate: "Authoritarianism in Africa: Typology, Evolution, Perspectives"]

[Text] The formation of national statehood in African countries has been accompanied by the affirmation of authoritarian forms of political government. This obviously natural phenomenon in the given stage of development of African society stems primarily from sociocultural and political traditions that nurture the statist inclinations of many politicians who view strong state power virtually as the only instrument for resolving the complex problems of economic modernization and for achieving national and social integration. However, the fact that authoritarianism is historically "given" to a certain extent does not mean that it does not take different forms. Nor does it presuppose the absence of political dynamics within its framework and hence it does not eliminate the question of prospective political democracy in this region of the world.

I

The evolution of authoritarianism in Tropical Africa in the postcolonial period is, conditionally speaking, marked by two tendencies: an ascending tendency and a descending tendency. The first found expression in the formation of a special type of authoritarian regime (for all the diversity of its types and all the differences in the sociopolitical orientation of African countries); the second was expressed in the mounting crisis (since the end of the '70s) of its severest forms.

Authoritarianism in Africa, notwithstanding the total dissonance of the socioeconomic, political, and ideological orientations of countries on the continent—actual as well as declared orientations—possesses a number of common and at the same time radical features. Thus the decisive positions in the system of power—whether capitalism-oriented countries or countries that have opted for the noncapitalist path of development—have been occupied by ruling groups that wield state power, personify state property, and perform key public functions. Of course, there are significant differences between countries: in the "makeup" of the factions within the aggregate of the ruling groups and the character of the interrelations between them, in the positions of the ruling groups as a special social formation, vis-a-vis exploiter strata and classes (the national and foreign bourgeoisie, landowners, etc.), the middle class, and the working masses. These differences and even the oppositeness of sociopolitical orientation within the

ruling groups nevertheless does not eliminate the commonness of certain of their most important features, specifically the striving to direct the course of social development, to regulate the character of social relations, to restrict competition in the political sphere, and to use the monopoly of state power in their corporate interests.

All this could not fail to lead to a similar result in differently oriented countries of Tropical Africa—to deep crisis in relations between the state (and its social personifier) and society. The masses everywhere have been deprived of the possibility of becoming the subject of policy even in countries where the ruling groups—in accordance with their ideological principles—have sincerely tried to involve the masses in the political process. Moreover, it is specifically in these countries that the ruling groups, using their organizational-management functions, have in fact been transformed into the “real aggregate owner of social (legal) means of production with all the attendant consequences,” such as the “transformation of the state from a public institution into a corporate organization based on the combination of political and economic power,”¹ the suppression of already weak elements of civilian society by the state, etc.

In other words, when we speak about authoritarianism in the countries of Tropical Africa, we should be thinking of their entire totality regardless of sociopolitical and ideological orientations. Even though the present article is based on an analysis of material on African countries with a capitalist orientation, its conclusions would also appear to be applicable—with certain corrections and qualifications—to countries with a socialist orientation.

II

The authoritarian type of political regime that is dominant on the African continent presupposes the concentration of executive and often legislative power as well in the hands of the head of state and the *de facto* deprivation of the parliament (if one exists) of the prerogative of overseeing state policy. The real political power mechanism is subordinate to the ruling “political clan” that uses antidemocratic methods of wielding power. These methods characteristically combine direct violence with ideological and sociopolitical manipulation based on the relations of clientelism. Under the conditions of an authoritarian regime, the institutionalization of political opposition is extremely complex (to the contrary, the attempt is made to suppress it). Only in rare cases, are elements of regulated competition permitted in the political sphere at the same time that the ruling party retains its monopoly on power.

Four major subtypes of regimes—military, one-party, one-party “semicompetitive,” and multi-party—have formed within the framework of the authoritarian type (for all the diversity of forms of authoritarianism in African countries). They differ in such parameters as the level of institutional prerequisites to the population's

political participation, the disposition of sociopolitical forces, and the methods of exercising power. There have been serious changes in the correlation of the indicated subtypes since the late '70s. The field of activity of military regimes has narrowed sharply and the number of one-party regimes has declined. At the same time, there has been a clear trend toward expanding the circle of countries in which one-party regimes of the “semi-competitive” type are approved. All this attests to the formation of the second—descending—tendency in the evolution of authoritarianism in African countries that is manifested primarily in the crisis of military regimes.

III

Western researchers estimate that there have been 68 successful military coups in the independent countries of Africa (including North Africa) since 1960 and that military regimes on the average were in power 1 year out of 3. Only 18 countries out of 49 escaped military regimes. In the others, half of the entire period of independent existence was under the dominance of the army.² In the '60s and '70s it was specifically the army that was the basic carrier of authoritarianism in capitalistically oriented African countries. The entry of the military into the political arena was a manifestation of the crisis of civil sociopolitical structures, was an attempt to overcome permanent internal political instability. The given function of military coups continued into the '80s even though it lost its decisive significance.

It must be emphasized that the military who carried out coups d'état were as a rule not a tool in the hands of various sociopolitical forces.³ The army itself became a dominant sociopolitical force “that followed a course corresponding to one or another trend of social development.”⁴ As a rule, the army's top brass that took the reins of power directly into its hands, was the bearer of capitalistically-oriented development. The affirmation of the military in the sphere of political leadership was accompanied by the abolition or suspension of the constitution, by the liquidation of parliament and political parties; by the concentration of legislative power in the hands of a military council consisting primarily of senior officers; by the prohibition or establishment of much tighter controls over trade unions and other social organizations. At the same time, the military occasionally shared executive power with the top civilian bureaucracy.

In the '60s and '70s the military were chiefly oriented toward strict, administrative, and occasionally forcible methods of wielding power. Terrorist dictatorship, which counted on explicit violence as the main form of realization of the power of representatives of an extremely narrow circle of the military and bureaucratic hierarchy and flouted the interests of all other social strata and groups, became the extreme expression of the military autocracy.

Persecution and attempts to destroy ethnic groups, which were the basis of the former regime or opposition

forces, forcible and large-scale Islamization, *inter alia* if Islamic officers came to power, were characteristic features of military dictatorship. The activity of terrorist military dictatorships resulted not only in the extreme isolation of the top leadership from society, but also in the progressive degradation of the entire social mechanism. Under these conditions, the increasing activity of ethnoregional, regional, religious, and political opposition, which frequently had outside support, led to the disappearance of this odious form of authoritarian power in the late '70s. The fall of the terrorist military dictatorship of I. Amin in Uganda in 1979 can serve as the most vivid example.

The number of military regimes has declined sharply to date. Nigeria—the largest country on the continent—has once again embarked on the road to civilian government. Military regimes of the '80s model are trying to use paternalistic-clientele methods of political leadership; to create for themselves mass social support or even for the attainment of a national consensus especially within the framework of the dominant social and political forces. To be sure, the latter task is hardly realistic since the very emergence of military regimes specifically attests to the predominance of disintegrative processes at the top, while the establishment of a monopoly on power by the military faction of ruling groups means the direct suppression or elimination of all other factions. Side by side with the sharp decline in the legitimacy of the "coarser" forms of authoritarianism in African societies, a substantial impact on military regimes has been exerted by political traditions inherited from earlier civilian party-political systems. In number of countries, the political elite that formed during those years, while possessing the experience of political struggle and state government and even though removed from power, presented a potential threat to the military. Nor could the latter take into account the opposition of the local bourgeoisie that could not defend its interests in the framework of the bourgeois-democratic process. This opposition has grown as its positions strengthened in the national economy.

Under these conditions, the military, while addressing the problem of consolidating and legitimizing their power, tried to restrict the activity of the potential opposition through their work in the local organs of self-government which were proclaimed to be the principal link in economic and social restructuring (Mauritania). In Niger, President Kountche tried to create a kind of counterweight to these forces in the person of chiefs and rural youth and placed his stake on the rebirth of traditional structures, in particular the traditional forms of youth organization. Attempts were observed by military leaders to build a so-called system of functional neocorporate representation, i. e., non-party organizations and groupings uniting people sharing the same occupation or dedication to a specific interest. The process of government-controlled formation of an authoritarian neocorporate system took on palpable form in Nigeria after the fall of the "second republic" in 1983.

The attempt to enlist the support of the potential opposition or at least to neutralize its activity was occasioned by growing discord within the military leadership itself.⁵ The instability of military regimes in African countries with a capitalist orientation was also the result of the fact that most of them lacked constructive socioeconomic development programs and a mobilizing ideology. All these factors seriously limited the possibility of military regimes to exist for a long time as a type of authoritarianism. G. I. Mirskiy was right when he wrote that "purely military regimes cannot be viable in developing countries for any considerable period of time: the problems confronting these countries are too great and pressing. Military regimes have to change, i. e., become social regimes with a mass base, political organization, and ideology or retire from the scene."⁶

IV

Many military regimes, in Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Sudan, Togo, and Mali, for example, became civilian one-party regimes in the first two decades of independent development. Thus by the end of the '70s, this second subtype of authoritarian regime, which was based on "primordial" civilian one-party regimes (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, etc.), became the predominant one on the African continent. This process is entirely in keeping with the views of the new ruling groups that the one-party system accords to the greatest degree with the task of forcing economic modernization and the national-state integration of countries that are characterized by structural fragmentation, the lack of a formed civilian society and strong system that could be the direct basis of the state.⁷

All countries with one-party regimes have adopted constitutions (that as a rule establish the one-party principle) and have the basic institutions of a modern political system: an elected parliament, a ruling party, trade unions, youth, women's and other social organizations. Moreover, a number of countries (Togo, Zaire, and others) have proclaimed the supremacy of the party over state institutions. Legislation in some of these countries allows the freedom of association. However it has been practically impossible to exercise this constitutional right.

Soviet political scientists comparing the legislation of capitalist-oriented African countries with Western legislation concluded that "here constitutional law strengthens the basis of the activity of the party not only as an institution in the political system, as political organizations participating in the activity of the state mechanism, but also as an integral part of it."⁸

The single party is assigned the function of acting as a "drive belt" between the state and the masses, a "feedback" function, and the function of politically educating the masses. Hence the significance that has been attached to the formulation of the party's ideological platform. Many political-ideological conceptions of one-party regimes use the idea of the "specifics" of the

national path of development that is distinct from socialism and capitalism (Cameroon, Zaire, Togo); others proclaim the socialist choice and interpret it very broadly and indeterminately (Kenya, Zambia). Statements that the state is "above classes," about cooperation between classes as the "driving force" behind social development accompany the idea of the "all-people's character" of the ruling party. Ideology has become one of the effective methods of realizing state power within the framework of this subtype of authoritarian regimes.

The interaction of the mass consciousness with ideology is also specific here. "...When the practical impact of ideology is intensified on the basis of the identification of the value orientations of the masses with the leader, but the idea or principle must be personified in order to become a mass force, the spiritual-value basis for the creation of "patron parties" is formed."⁹ In the eyes of the masses, the political leader becomes the personification of the system and hence dedication to him becomes loyalty to the ruling regime. Under these conditions, ideological manipulation is an important factor in strengthening his legitimacy and in the attainment of a national consensus. Value orientations of this type reflect the dominance of social relations of the "patron-client" type in African countries.

Modern political clientelism is a complex phenomenon that has many levels. In the present article we are interested in only those aspects that are connected with the functioning of the sociopolitical mass control mechanism and with the political participation of the masses. In this regard, clientelism is more or less personal relations between individuals or groups of individuals based on the exchange of resources (economic or power-related) that the patron possesses and on the (political) loyalty of the clients. Clientelism in modern Africa is essentially the extension of ethnic, regional, religious, clan, family-kinship and similar relations to the political sphere.

Investigating the power mechanism in Africa, a number of Western scholars, in particular, S. N. Eisenstadt, N. Kasfir, T. Kallagi, and D. F. Medar¹⁰ justly point to the discrepancy between the modern form of the state and the traditionalist "logic" of its functioning: "In the patrimonial state, there is no sharp distinction between public and private spheres...Patronage, especially where there is easy access to public wealth, is the decisive instrument in the establishment of class dominance."¹¹ The ruling groups try to use clientelism to politically consolidate the "top echelon," to weaken the opposition, and to prevent the masses from developing political self-awareness. The survival and subsequent transformation of individual elements of traditional political culture, in particular, clientelism, are connected with the needs of the political leadership. Within the framework of the "power-masses" system of relations, the ruling circles assign clientelism the role of an important or even decisive link in social control and the political participation of the population and use it as a stabilizer.

However, clientelism can effectively perform this role only if the ruling groups are monolithic to a certain degree, if there is a certain measure of consensus among them regarding the regime's goals and orientation and the methods of its activity. Otherwise it becomes a divisive and destabilizing factor, as has repeatedly been the case in the political life of African countries. The level of the social and political maturity of the working people is also of great significance because it is precisely this that determines what the working people prefer in protecting their interests: the methods of class struggle or patron-client relations. Thus the identification of the dynamics of clientelism with social classes and nations that are in the process of formation makes it possible to correctly determine its place in the political process and in the power-wielding mechanism.

The ruling groups in most African countries with a capitalist orientation regard parliaments, parties, trade unions, and other social organizations as a means of creating a network of client relations that form their power base. In countries with one-party regimes, the ruling party outwardly has a type of powerful mass organization (that frequently includes all or most of the adult population); its ideological character and leading role in social development are declared. In actual fact, the modern facade conceals the mechanism of internal party relations that is based on patron-client relations. The organizational structure of such parties, the procedure for promoting their leaders, and internal party discipline are based on authoritarian principles. They are essentially a pyramid of clans, with a leader that acts as a unifying force at its apex.

The ruling "presidential" clan forms around the party leader who is at the same time the chief of state and the head of the government. It is an informal association of professional politicians who occupy key positions in the party and state apparatuses. The basis of the clan's structure-forming element is the system of personal relations between its leader and its members, which is based primarily on ethnic, regional, or familial-kinship communality as well as on the communality of political and business interests. This has been manifested in purest form in Burundi where the ruling clans that formed around presidents Micombero, and later, Bagaza consisted of representatives of the Tutsi ethnic group. The presidential clans of M. Nguema and his successor in Equatorial Guinea included members of a single family.¹² The directing, organizing and mobilizing role in the sociopolitical development of African countries belongs specifically to this informal institution. The decisive positions of the "presidential clan" in the sphere of political leadership pushes the problem of the supremacy of party or state into the background in countries with one-party regimes.

The creation of unified trade union centers, that have become a *de facto* or even formal integral part (on a par with youth and women's associations) of the ruling parties is a natural consequence of the restriction of

political pluralism. Their leadership is usually incorporated into the ruling groups.

The party, or more precisely, its leadership takes a direct part in forming the parliament because only those party members whose candidacy has been approved by the president or the highest party organ may run for parliament. Such a system and, as a rule the existence of quite a high property qualification, impose social and political constraints on the institutionalized political participation of the population. As a result, parliament becomes an organ that represents the ruling groups as well as the local bourgeoisie and part of the middle class associated with them. Parliament, like the party, becomes the arena of confrontation between factions of the ruling groups that form along functional, occupational, ethnoregional, and other lines. At the same time, the institution of strong presidential power (the concentration of all executive and occasionally legislative power as well in the hands of the president) in these countries greatly limits the parliament's potential for influencing the formulation of state policy.

The trend toward the consolidation of ruling groups was either prevalent or in evidence in most African countries with authoritarian civilian regimes in the '80s. This trend was dominant in a number of countries with "primordial" civilian regimes (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Cameroon, Malawi, Zambia). The most vivid evidence of this was the relative political stability that was not disrupted by coups d'état. The influence of technocrats and of some of the bureaucracy connected with state enterprise increased in the ruling groups in these countries. The political role of the military has always been negligible here. The strengthening of ties between different factions of the ruling groups was accompanied by the expansion of their cooperation with foreign and local capital even though certain contradictions continued to exist within the ruling groups and between them and other exploitative owners.

In a number of countries with military regimes that have been transformed into civilian regimes (Togo, Rwanda, etc.), where the army remained a most important sociopolitical force and a support for authority, the consolidation of the "top echelons" is only gaining momentum. Nevertheless, there has been evolution in this direction in the last one-and-one-half decades. In Equatorial Guinea under M. Nguema, in the Central African Republic under Bokassa, and in the Sudan under Numayri, the ruling regimes degenerated into terrorist dictatorships. Their only internal support has been part of the army or a militarized-type party (MESAN in the CAR).

Within the framework of one party regimes, the masses continue to be excluded from the political decision-making process notwithstanding the dramatic expansion of institutional prerequisites to political participation compared with what existed during the military regimes. In part this situation was explained by the specifics of the political culture of the "top echelons" and the "lower

levels." Western political scientists disagree on the nature of traditional mass political culture. Some believe that the authoritarianism of traditional power is fixed in the people's memory. Others, to the contrary, emphasize its nonauthoritarian, diffuse character and conclude that modern political institutions in the light of trends toward the concentration of power "are turning their back on African traditions."¹³ In our view, the domination of the mobilization type of political participation of the masses as opposed to voluntary and politically aware participation is largely the result of the mass mentality's continuing view that relations with the powers that be are of the "patron-client" type. The political culture of the ruling groups are more highly stratified. Their main components are: (1) elements of traditional culture, specifically paternalism, the rejection of legal opposition as an institution; (2) norms of the colonial-bureaucratic variant of European political culture with its reliance on authoritarian forms of state power; and (3) certain elements in the modern political culture of developed capitalist countries. Nor can we fail to note the influence of the experience of state construction in socialist countries (above all, the USSR and the People's Republic of China)—the affirmation of the administrative-command system, the one-party system, and the "statization" of social organizations. At the same time, the character of government institutions in most countries on the continent hinders the development of active, voluntary, conscious political action by the masses. It can be said that they have parliaments but no parliamentarianism in the bourgeois-democratic understanding of this term. After all, basic elements of the modern political system (political parties, legislative assemblies, elections) transferred to African soil have been subjected to substantial transformation, have been rethought and transformed into a *de facto* shell that conceals traditional and untraditional social ties.

V

Capitalist-oriented African countries have been trying to democratize political life since the late '70s. Middle strata (students, pupils, white-collar workers, the intelligentsia) with the active support of the national bourgeoisie as well as part of the working masses and those in marginal categories.

The already mentioned collapse of odious terrorist dictatorships and the trend toward a decline in the number of military regimes have become the most obvious manifestation and result of the discrepancy between the mechanism of political government and the needs of African society. What is more, in Nigeria, Ghana, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), the military have not only restored civilian rule, but have also sanctioned multi-party regimes. This was the result of the specifics of the array of sociopolitical forces in this group of countries in the late '70s. On the one hand, there was an approximate equilibrium between the military and the civilian opposition in these countries. On the other hand, within the opposition, especially in the former party-political elite there was a bitter confrontation that had a basically

ethnic, regional, and clan coloring and that at the same time reflected the opposition of various social-group interests.

Under these conditions, the army either shared power with civilian factions (Upper Volta) or remained an influential pressure force. At the same time factionalism in the ranks of the civilian elite was institutionalized in the form of a multi-party political system. It was assumed that the multi-party mechanism at the new level of political evolution would make it possible to balance the interests of the opposing sides and thereby eliminate the roots of the constant power crisis. However this did not happen: political pluralism soon became a fiction that was transformed into the *de facto* monopoly of the ruling party (Nigeria) or the army (Upper Volta), or led to the total disorganization of the political and state mechanism (Ghana). The army has returned to power again. Thus the existence of antiauthoritarian trends in sociopolitical life does not by any means guarantee the departure of one of the main carriers of authoritarianism—the military—from the political arena. Notwithstanding the reduction in the number of countries headed by "governments in khaki," the role of the military in Africa remains very appreciable. The experience of the political development of African countries shows that even after the transfer of state power to civilians, the army continues to support the government or to be an influential and powerful pressure group. It frequently becomes possibly the only factor that makes it possible to avert political chaos in the nation.

The affirmation of multi-party regimes as a way of "eliminating" the crisis of authoritarian structures, proposed by the ruling groups under the conditions of the stepped-up struggle for the democratization of social life and the sharp deterioration of the economic situation, is connected not only with the specific array of the sociopolitical forces. A certain role in the choice of this variant of development has also been played by other factors, for example, in Senegal—the tradition of the population's political participation and Western pressure through international political organizations, especially the Socialist International. To be sure, the Senegalese multi-party model, like the Botswanan and Gambian model, is characterized by the total domination of the ruling party and by the absence of any chance for the opposition not only to come to power through elections but also to correct government activity to any serious degree. The opposition in these countries is extremely weak and fragmented and therefore it is allowed to exist. Creating the appearance of a counterweight to power, even though the sometimes complicate the position of the ruling circles, they nevertheless serve as a legal safety valve. However the mass unrest in Dakar because of dissatisfaction with the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1988, the declaration of a national state of emergency, and the use of the army to suppress disorders showed that these "games" can get out of the control of the government and the opposition if the lower levels join in.

Attempts by the ruling groups to retain their monopoly on power by introducing the multi-party political system remain as yet few, ineffective, and unattractive to the ruling circles in most African countries. These circles believe not without foundation that in the present stage of sociopolitical development of countries in Tropical Africa, political pluralism can only mean the institutionalization of ethnic, regional, clan, and religious contradictions, become the implement of their activation, and hence an obstacle to national integration and a stimulator of political instability. To be sure, it is obvious that even in one-party countries, the ruling party supports the interests and positions of certain tribes to the detriment of others and there is no evidence that the a one-party regime will be more effective in strengthening national unity.

VI

Another way of eliminating the crisis of authoritarian political structures—the establishment of "semicompetitive" one-party political systems—appears much more effective to the expanding number of ruling groups. Countries with highly different experience of party-state construction have established this type of systems. In Zambia and Kenya they have replaced multi-party political systems; in the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon, they were the result of the transformation of one-party regimes. Evolving in this direction were not only the previously mentioned "primordial" civilian regimes (for not very long in Sierra Leone—1967-1968—the army was in power), but also transformed military regimes in Burundi (before 1987), Rwanda, Togo, the CAR, where the army remains the decisive political force.

The introduction of elections with alternative candidates to the representative organs of power at all levels with the exception of the presidency is a distinguishing feature of one-party political systems of the "semicompetitive" type. The electoral process in this group of countries is also characterized the selection and nomination of parliamentary deputies. Elections to the national assembly are of a two-stage nature. Candidates are initially screened within the framework of the ruling parties. Even though they formally represent mass organizations and embrace the great majority of the population, a very insignificant percentage of the citizens consciously belong to them. According to P. E. Ollawa, in Zambia United National Independence Party activists (who regularly confirm their membership in the party and who perform a certain work) comprised no more than four percent of the population.¹⁴ However candidate deputies are preliminarily screened from an even smaller group of party functionaries. In Sierra Leone, for example, the right to nominate candidates is enjoyed by the party's local executive organs each of which numbers approximately 30 persons and includes a deputy from the parliament of the old convocation, a supreme chief, an elder, and other functionaries. They select a maximum of three candidates by secret ballot and send this list with an indication of the number of votes to be

registered with the highest party organ. Any candidate may be eliminated by this organ or by the president personally (in Malawi, for example) if his activity as a parliamentarian "presents a threat to state interests."

Some Soviet scholars believe that the nomination and especially the registration of candidates are the decisive stage in the formation of parliament. All subsequent phases of the electoral process (the election campaign, voting, tallying the results) are of a formal nature in countries with a capitalist orientation, with the exception of countries with a multi-party system.¹⁹ It is possible to agree only partially with this assessment. The first stage of candidate screening within the party framework guarantees the continued domination of the highest party and state bureaucracy in the parliament since internal party relations are based on patron-client ties. Regular parliamentary elections in Kenya and Zambia in the '70s and '80s invariably demonstrate the fact that more than half of the deputies are members of the UNIP Central Committee and the Kenya African National Union Executive Council, ministers, assistant ministers, and other representatives of the upper echelon of the state apparatus. The first "semicompetitive" elections of 1980 in the Ivory Coast in 1980 confirmed this trend. According to T. D. Bakari, "67 percent of the deputies are state officials and 32 percent of them represent the private sector, having begun their career in the state sector."¹⁸ For a considerable percent of the candidates from the ruling elite in Zambia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Malawi, the first stage of the elections becomes the final stage because election law in English-speaking countries provides that if one candidate is nominated in a one-mandate district, he is automatically considered to have been elected to parliament without voting. The president is also vested with the constitutional right to appoint some of the deputies. Thus in Sierra Leone in 1982—36.5 percent of the candidates became deputies of the national assembly without going through the general election procedure; in Kenya in 1988—34 percent, including the president and half of his cabinet.¹⁹ At the same time, the great majority of the candidates that are "screened" by the highest party organ participate in the elections as alternates. The rotation of deputies as a result of these elections is very considerable. New people were victorious in 30 out of 53 districts in Sierra Leone in 1982.¹⁸ The situation was similar for 46 out of 78 districts in the 1986 elections. In the Western Region, only 2 out of 12 parliamentarians were reelected; in the Northern Region, new people were elected in 20 out of 34 districts. In the 1986 elections, four ministers and several veteran politicians in previous administrations of S. Stevens, the former president of Sierra Leone, lost their seats. Sixty percent of the Kenyan parliament is replaced every 5 years²⁰; 80 percent of the Ivory Coast national assembly was replaced in the 1980 elections compared with 63 percent in 1985.²¹

The question that naturally arises here is: does rotation reduce to the renovation of the deputy corps or does it carry with it changes in the array of sociopolitical forces

in the parliament? The decisive consideration here is not so much the deputy's social affiliation as whose interests—the interests of his own social group, his own interests, or the interests of the ruling circles—he represents. In our view, the procedure for forming the highest executive organs in these countries has only produced certain changes in the makeup of the highest institutions of power by performing the very important functions of purging and strengthening authoritarian systems while preserving the political hegemony of the ruling groups.

"Semicompetitive" elections have entirely justified their purpose of "not allowing the voters to choose between political alternatives or elites, but rather to co-opt new people into the ruling elite and to confirm the legality of this elite and its methods of government in the eyes of public opinion."²² In the absence of reliable and comparable data on deputies and their parliamentary activity, the validity of this conclusion is confirmed by a number of considerations. First, the very mechanism of "semicompetitive" elections ensures, as shown above, the predictability of the results from the standpoint of the ruling groups' retention of key positions in parliament. Second, the formation of representative institutions in African countries serves in practice and—what is very important—is perceived at the level of both the elitist and mass consciousness as the institutionalization of patron-client relations. This means that "semicompetitive" elections permit the masses to elect their representatives with a certain degree of freedom within the framework of the patron-client structure and thus serve to legitimize the regime. At the same time, parliamentarians entering this system of "representative clientelism" (to use the apt expression of D. F. Luke) accept certain rules of the game since obtaining and retaining a deputy seat, and hence the privileges that go with it, depend to a much greater degree on the favor of patrons (the president and his entourage) than on the voters. After all, within the framework of the policy of eliminating the crisis of authoritarian structures, the introduction of limited rivalry in parliamentary and municipal elections has been accompanied by the ruling political clans' adoption of measures to overcome the functional atrophy of the ruling parties and to strengthen their control over the party and state mechanism.

The problem is that there is also an ancillary effect of political rivalry even if limited, within the framework of election campaigns, that is clearly undesirable to the ruling circles. This gives impetus to the growth of the political self-awareness of considerable segments of society. As N. Chazan correctly notes, even though the results of elections in most cases do not adequately reflect either the content of pre-election discussions or the directions of public opinion; nevertheless, these elections themselves—even with restrictions—"provide the possibility for crystallization of ideas, approaches, views, and political forces."²³ At the same time, the deputies, especially the "backbenchers," cannot entirely ignore the interests of the lower link of the client chain—the masses who are concerned that those they have

ected are becoming part of the exploiter elite. Under these conditions, the ruling clans, trying to strengthen their control over the most important links of the party-state mechanism, have continuously modified the structure and makeup of the executive organs of the ruling parties given the growing trend toward the merger of the highest links of the party and state apparatuses. In 1980 the Ivory Coast abolished the post of secretary general of the Democratic Party; at the same time the politburo formed a nine-person executive committee that included former presidential assistants from the "old guard" and several young intellectuals—former leaders of student opposition organizations. The size of the politburo membership was reduced from 68 to 32 persons. In 1986, the executive committee was expanded from 9 to 13 persons. Moreover, all of them were ministers. Twenty-five ministers were members of the politburo. Some of the others occupied posts at another level in the party hierarchy.²⁴

The new procedure for electing party functionaries and the primary screening of candidate deputies to the National Assembly within the framework of KANU, the ruling party, became an important instrument for exercising tighter control over the party machine and the electoral process in the hands of the ruling political clan in Kenya. The secret ballot was replaced by a system of "alignment" of supporters around a candidate or his picture. This unique system of open voting, which was introduced under the pretext of combating the "vote-buying" system, in fact meant the isolation of members of the opposition in party ranks and the suppression of dissent. This was the purpose behind the creation of the KANU disciplinary committee which meted out punishment for the public expression of disagreement with government policy, especially during parliamentary debate. "Critics" were temporarily expelled from the party and thus automatically lost their parliamentary mandate. However the continuation of the practice of alternativeless elections of the president of the nation—the true wielder of power—is the main guarantee that the positions of the ruling political clan and hence the regime itself will be preserved.

...

The formation and transformation of the four subtypes of authoritarian regimes, which we have identified on the basis of the criteria of degree of development of institutional prerequisites to the political participation of the population, the array of sociopolitical forces and the methods of wielding power reflect the political dynamics of authoritarianism in the countries of Tropical Africa. The evolution of forms of organization of power attests to the virtually total discreditation of the most rigid authoritarian structures and methods of political leadership. On a broader plane, we can speak of the crisis of monopoly of ruling groups and especially individual factions (especially the military) on political power, which presupposes the emergence of new forms and methods of the ruling circles' maneuvering within the framework of authoritarian regimes, the potential of which in our view is still far from exhausted.

In this connection, the formation of one-party regimes of the "semi-competitive" type under the conditions of modern Africa, like multi-party constructions, can hardly be considered in terms of the progressive development of democracy in the Western, bourgeois-democratic sense. However we should not underestimate the importance of the very fact of the formation of institutional prerequisites to the political participation of the masses, which legitimizes the regime inside and outside the country and which creates favorable soil for the struggle for the democratization of public life. What is more, the expansion of the group of one-party "semi-competitive" and multi-party regimes indicates the involvement of modern strata and groups of the capitalist type in the political process, which converts political democracy—not without the influence of democratic changes in various regions of the world—from an abstract concept into a real battle slogan for the considerable sociopolitical forces in African countries.

Footnotes

1. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremennom mire. Puti revolyutsionnogo protsesssa" [Developing Countries in the Modern World. Avenues of Revolutionary Process]. Moscow, 1986, pp 68, 69.
2. "The Military of African Politics," Washington-New York, 1987, p 1.
3. See G. I. Mirskiy, "Authoritarianism and Military Power in the Third World," MEMO, No 7, 1989).
4. Ibid., p 46.
5. Concerning the reasons for these disagreements, see G. I. Mirskiy, Op. cit.
6. G. I. Mirskiy, "Tretiy mir: obshchestvo, vlast, armiya" [The Third World: Society, Authority, the Army]. Moscow, 1976, p 273.
7. "Evolutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [The Evolution of Eastern Societies: The Synthesis of the Traditional and the Contemporary]. Moscow, 1984, p 272.
8. "Partiya v politicheskoy sisteme" [The Party in the Political System]. Moscow, 1983, pp 37-38.
9. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany ...," pp 84-85.
10. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-patrimonialism," London, 1973; "Private Patronage and Public Power," New York, 1982; "State and Class in Africa," New York, 1984; "Pouvoir," Paris, 1983, No 25.
11. "State and Class in Africa," pp 14, 17.
12. "Private Patronage and Public Power," p 177.
13. "Aux urnes l'Afrique. Elections et pouvoirs en Afrique Noire," Paris, 1978, p 237.

14. P. E. Ollawa, "Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development," Devon, 1979, p. 395.

15. "Gosudarstvo v stranakh kapitalisticheskoy oriyentatsii" [The State in Countries With a Capitalist Orientation], Moscow, 1982, p. 185.

16. T. D. Bakari, "Cote d'Ivoire: Logique de recrutement politique et changements eventuels a la tete de l'Etat" (LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, Paris, 1985, No. 237/238, p. 22).

17. Computed on the basis of: JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS, London, 1985, No. 1, Vol. XXIII, pp. 30, 36; "Africa South of the Sahara, 1989," London, 1988, p. 586.

18. JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS, 1985, No. 1, Vol. XXIII, p. 36.

19. WEST AFRICA, London, 1986, No. 3588, pp. 1197, 1198.

20. THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 1988, No. 1, Vol. 10, p. 55; "Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote d'Ivoire," Paris, 1982, p. 67.

21. Computed on the basis of: "Africa South of the Sahara," London, 1987.

22. "Aux urnes l'Afrique. Elections et pouvoirs en Afrique Noire," p. 120.

23. JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS, 1979, No. 2, Vol. 17, p. 147.

24. "Africa South of the Sahara, 1980-81," p. 120, *ibid.*, 1981-82, p. 125; WEST AFRICA, 1986, No. 3694, p. 1515.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1990

The Third World's Prospects for Progress

904M0011E Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No. 4, Apr. 90 (signed for press 15 Mar. 90) pp. 72-85

[Article by Ernest Yevgenyevich Obninskiy, doctor of economic sciences, professor, deputy minister of USSR Foreign Affairs, and Boris Isaakovich Slavnyy, candidate of economic sciences, laboratory head, USSR Academy of Sciences International Labor Movement Institute]

[Text] Social progress is conventionally viewed as a mechanism for bringing social conditions into line with demands for the development of production. And even though the list of indicators comprising the degree of society's progress has changed over time, the very principle of man's subordination to factors external to him has remained the same. At the same time, a certain hierarchy of contradictions (classes, the two systems,

center and periphery, intraimperialist [mezhimperialisticheskiye]) is absolutized within the framework of this type of thinking and the contradictions themselves are treated in a Manichean spirit as the struggle of two antagonistic poles.

One of the central points of the new thinking is the question of the goals of progress or, more precisely, the meaning of historical progress. It requires, in particular, pondering such a fact as the erosion of the monopoly of the national state in the Third World in its role as social intermediary between the masses and world politics.¹ The degree to which the given process can be coordinated with the demand for economic development, the degree to which the tendency toward forming a civilian world society predominate over the tendency toward isolation—regional, ethnic, civilizational [tsivilizatsionnaya], religious, etc.—will determine the future of mankind.

I

As we know, the ascension of the masses to the political level was made possible by the destruction of traditional class structures, which in turn was largely the result of the peoples' liberation struggle against colonizers and the social and economic changes that followed in its wake. Millions, tens and hundreds of millions of people in the Third World have left the countryside for the city. While their way of life and mode of employment have changed, the people themselves have remained largely the same. In their new social situation, they are trying—sometimes consciously but more often unconsciously—to realize the ideas and ideals that carry the charge of the justice that the people have traditionally aspired to for centuries and millennia.

These aspirations are by no means always compatible with progress and frequently contradict it: It is for this very reason that the liberation of the masses from the oppression of the traditional exploiters and their emergence from historical non-existence free a considerable potential of traditionalism and antiprogress. Thus, the masses' aspiration to the new does not necessarily free them from their subjugation to the forces of the past. More precisely, this process does occur, but at a slow pace. The predominant situation is that the energy of individual trail-blazers is absorbed by the aggregate pressure from the masses. Nevertheless, mankind's movement toward progress today would be impossible without these masses, without their ascension to a higher level, without their becoming both outwardly and inwardly free.

Today's world appears to be emerging from the age of selective progress that was the lot of individuals, classes, societies, countries, and even individual regions or continents on the planet. In this connection, there arises the very important problem of the shortage of reserves of historical time necessary for individual societies or more precisely for masses within the framework of these societies so that the masses might come to universal

values through exceptionally independent, "distinctive" efforts without depriving themselves of anything, and without becoming if only in part someone else.

In other words, modern reality demonstrates, first, the incomparably timelier, formative role of man and the human masses vis-a-vis the objective conditions of development, and, second, the crisis of former undervalued conceptions of social progress which became the consequence of the non-coincidence of the actual process of development with a certain prototype or paradigm.

II

The non-coincidence of economic growth and development can be pointed out first of all. The generally accepted paradigm until quite recently viewed economic growth as its locomotive; today, however, the limited, far from satisfactory social results of economic growth have called this paradigm into question. In any case, economic growth is not having the same effect on society that the analogous process had at one time on society in Western countries.

We can approach this fact from different angles: either by confining ourselves to an external statement of fact or by trying to get to the bottom of it. Externally it would appear that population growth had nullified all the successes resulting from economic and sociopolitical development. Thus, the "exodus" of the population from the countryside to the city on a grandiose scale did not reduce rural overpopulation to any appreciable degree: the absolute size of the rural population continues to rise and the problem of landless peasants (especially in South Asia) is worsening. At the same time, urbanization has been accompanied by the creation of the urban sector which, even though it reproduces features of the original and traditional, is essentially on a new economic, social, and political plane.¹

Population growth in the economic sphere has devalued the significance of such worldwide changes as the industrialization of the Third World and the unprecedented redistribution of jobs in world material production (primarily in the manufacturing industry) in favor of the developing countries. This process did not lead to a reduction in the gap in the levels of per capita income between the two groups of countries (what is more, it continued to increase), nor did it create conditions for solving the employment problem (unemployment, including hidden unemployment, is on the rise everywhere). Finally, the colossal expansion of mass education has not eradicated illiteracy (it has even increased in absolute terms), nor have advances in medicine reduced the levels of population morbidity and mortality.

Nor has the scale of mass hunger been reduced, particularly in regions where there are wars and natural disasters, while the extension of traditional economic practices to new territory leads to the degradation of the environment—and this does not take into account the

ecological consequences of expanding modern economic activity, the development of new territory, roadbuilding, etc.

The negative connection between development and demography is seen most graphically in the youth problem. Everywhere in today's world, youth is economically and socially the most vulnerable part of society: youth is the first to feel the results of the activity of the older generations, at the same time that it is not sufficiently integrated into society and does not feel proper respect for its institutions. As was the case in the past, youth is not reconciled to its fate. It strives for the immediate, radical resolution of all problems. Hence its inclination toward revolution, toward the destruction of the existing order. Third World youth comprise approximately 60 percent of the population (including 40 percent under 15 years of age).

The present increase in the activity level of mass traditionalist (fundamentalist) and left-wing radical movements in the developing countries is in large measure connected with this status of youth. Political extremism and terrorism are only the external expression of growing social tension.

III

We believe that the disparity between economic growth and development is more deeply rooted in the social constraints on the broad use of machines in Third World countries. These machines are used purely instrumentally (instrumentally), as the ready fruits of progress, as a result, such a premise of machines as the sociocultural (and not only technical and economic) legacy of Western peoples does not have its civilizing impact.

Technocrats in the developing countries had hoped that imported technology would have a civilizing and disciplining influence on local workers. In the words of N. A. Berdyayev (who was one of the first to take note of this phenomenon), these people viewed the machines or systems of machines transferred to the new conditions as a primary phenomenon and man as an epiphenomenon. In other words, machines are the active part of the production system and man is the passive part.² These hopes were not destined to come true: the operation of imported machinery in the new place was considerably less effective than in the developed countries, i.e., it was not machinery that adapted and subordinated man to itself, but man that adapted and subordinated the machinery to himself. This, it seems to us, is the explanation for the modest results that have derived from the transfer of entire machine complexes to the Third World. The machine has not changed people not because it functions poorly by itself (and not because it conceals some clever design of the transnational corporations [TNC's], as A. Emmanuel suggests³), but because this machine is a means of mechanization of live labor, but is not live labor itself. The Third World shows that the machine—contrary to the forecasts of futurologists—is not eliminating man from production, that the greatest

success is achieved where development strategy emphasizes man rather than the machine. Moreover, local, unskilled man. And he has proven that he can compete in the world labor markets. In the given instance, the reference is to the group of so-called new industrial countries, that include a number of countries in the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.⁵

IV

A more general reason why economic growth does not coincide with development is that the economic growth mechanism increasingly goes beyond the national framework. The predominant situation today is one in which problems in the functioning of this mechanism arise outside rather than within the national economy. Moreover, the state—as the basic agent of development—lacks the regulatory means appropriate to the scale of these problems. This is in part explained by the imperfect nature of the principles upon which countries in the world economy base their relations.

If we try to separate form from content in the world economy phenomenon, it becomes obvious that content steadily evolves from the sum of national economies that are connected to a single and increasingly integrated system through foreign trade. Form, however, remains unchanged and even though flows of resources no longer stop at state borders, the very fact of political independence of individual parts of world economic space, which are independent states, also influences the content of world economic processes. The point is that the world economy functions today as a system of interstate relations which ideally reaches equilibrium only when individual participating states are capable of balancing their production potential with their market potential, their demand with their supply. However it is practically impossible to attain this in reality: the role of individual countries as purchasers of goods produced by other countries may exceed their role as producers (naturally, we are referring to their role in the framework of the world system as a whole, rather than within the framework of bilateral relations).

Countries whose economy is both a producing and a consuming economy is opposed in the same system by producing countries that lack the potential to balance the development of production with the adequate development of their internal market. We refer to developing countries that have embarked on the path of active involvement of the human factor in their economy. They are usually countries with a poor population that are pursuing an active strategy of industrial development based on participation in the international division of labor. Their natural advantage in the international division of labor is their cheap manpower, which attracts investors, makes it possible to expand production, but at the same time creates a marketing problem.

In order to hold back rising costs and consequently to preserve attractiveness to capital investors, the government in these countries is forced to restrict the growth of

wages and social spending (in particular, subsidies adjusting the purchasing power of the poorest strata under the conditions of the very rapid growth of prices—this is the situation in Latin America, for example). But the very same strategy of development makes production entirely dependent on foreign markets. The specter of mercantilism in economic policy—economize inside, sell outside the nation—is again reviving as in the times of A. Smith. Until recently, the practical sense of the IMF recommendations that countries heavily in debt “tighten their belts” and work harder to improve the state’s financial condition specifically boiled down to this.

But the financial position of individual countries is connected not only with the level of national production, but also with their production potential; this depends to a greater degree on the country’s status in external markets. The latter, however, is frequently determined by special relations between the producing country and the country that purchases its products. The USA, which today accounts for one-sixth of world imports and over one-third of exports of manufactured goods from the developing countries, occupies an exceptional place among countries that purchase exports. For example, Taiwan’s economic successes in the last few years have in large measure been due to special relations between that territory and the USA.

At the same time, the development of many Third World countries that have a very powerful industrial potential is extremely uneven: periods of very high growth corresponding to highly active conditions in the world market are followed by periods of sharp recession. This characterizes the development of Latin American countries as well as such countries as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and ASEAN countries. Industrial growth in the Philippines and Singapore between 1984 and 1988, for example, ranged from plus 10 percent to minus 10 percent annually.⁶

There is a vicious circle in the development of these countries and in the world economy as a whole. They are afraid of implementing measures to increase the capacity of their internal market. At the same time, the world economy will be threatened with recession if the USA really begins to pursue a policy of liquidating its deficit balance of payments. Socialist International representatives believe that the application of conventional deflationary policy in such cases may result in a \$100-billion decline in world demand. Such a turn of events will most probably be reflected in the economic and financial position of a number of “new industrial countries,” for example, Brazil where this may result in the collapse of democratic institutions and in genuine social catastrophe.

A blow against society’s democratic institutions by politicized mass movements thus becomes potentially possible as a result of the near-sighted position of political and social forces in Western countries who speak out at international forums as champions of democracy.

human rights, the free development of nations, etc. But through their economic policy they objectively promote the victory of antiprogressive, reactionary forces in the Third World. Mankind has regrettably still not learned how to draw lessons from the past and to do this when the events are still continuing rather than when they are complete and a new stage of development has begun, vis-a-vis which, as Hegel believed, all wisdom that has been attained is essentially useless.

V

It is our conviction that the internal, substantive aspect of the given problem of potential historical failures in the present stage of development of the world economy is determined by the special role of the state in the development process. On the one hand, the state performs functions that are connected with the realization of the ideals of modernization: the building of a modern economy with modern social institutions. On the other hand, it is something more. Its nature cannot be understood entirely on the basis of the need to address problems of development. Behind it is the enormous tradition of eastern despotism. In other words, the interpretation of the state in its purely rationalistic aspect—as an agent of development—is insufficient in our view; the attempt to shed light on its second, “nocturnal” or archaic, nature will make it possible to better see the real meaning of many events in the world.

The fact that the state does not cope very well with the role of principal agent of economic modernization, that its intervention in the economy is frequently “incompetent and destructive”⁷ is admitted today by both scholars and politicians. It is gradually becoming a commonplace in publicistics. However, under the real conditions of development, at a time when civilian society has not yet formed, but economic changes plunge society into a state of permanent crisis, the state is the only force that is capable of supporting the integrity of all society.⁸

Historians—especially advocates of the conception of the “Asiatic mode of production”—are appreciably expand our vision of the problem when they write that the state in the present Third World has since ancient times comprised the superstructure over the primordial state, that its mission consisted in “coupling producers to the means of production...each time anew, with the aid of the volitional principle.”⁹ It would seem the time has come to take the next step and to admit that the state is performing a similar role even today, but that this time it is based not on traditional structures but on the masses that are the product of the disintegration of these structures.

The masses consist of individual people who have lost the traditional forms of social integration and who have not been included in the new forms. Essentially each of these people is alone and is united with others only through the fact that he belongs to the same state. The explanation of the marginalization phenomenon lies specifically in this one-sided dependence on the state, i.

e., in the dramatic strengthening of vertical social relations and the weakening of horizontal relations.¹⁰

The step forward we are calling for must consist in changing the view of the role of the state in the East: It does not merely couple producers to the means of production, it unifies people into a society. People are aware of their social ties not through the economy but specifically by the fact of belonging to the same state; this fact in turn means that the state is an important component of their social personality, of their collective “we.” This point does not relate directly to the level of development of the productive forces: it is possible to imagine a society in which civic ties between people are absent notwithstanding the high level of economic development and, to the contrary, a society with a low level of economic development in which relations between people are of an exceptionally social, civic nature, while there is no state whatsoever (for example, Iceland in the age of sagas).

In evaluating the present role of the state in the Third World, it would evidently be more correct to speak not about the absence of civilian society, but about the impossibility of abstracting it from the state.¹¹ This is important because it helps us to understand the logic of present development: society in the Third World develops not as the raising of certain independent structures and the elimination of the state by them, but as the reciprocal gradual differentiation of these two principles, which is for the good of not only society, but also the state itself: it ceases to be blamed for all failures and to be expected to produce materials. Thus, the modernization of the state and the formation of civilian society are based on the same process: the weakening of vertical relations and the creation and strengthening of horizontal relations. The weakening of vertical relations means that the masses acquire independence of the state.

There is a slightly different interpretation of the given process in the Third World, specifically as the synthesis of the traditional and the contemporary (this point of view has been most vividly formulated by N. A. Simoniya). This means that in order to assimilate the realities of modern social life, local society dresses them in traditional forms, makes them close and familiar in order to assimilate them more successfully. The assimilation of modern reality and adaptation to it are the content of the process according to this view.

From our point of view, the process develops differently: the inception of traditional communities everywhere in the Third World in a new—predominantly urban—social environment attests not only to the tenacity of traditional stereotypes and their resistance to the new. It seems to us that the sense of progress is that the masses gradually begin to become emancipated from their one-sided relationship with the state. This one-sidedness consists in the fact that the masses think of themselves only as a part of the state. The polarization of new communities indicates that the masses are trying to realize themselves in new systems of coordinates: the

Shiites—that they are not Sunnites; the Sikhs—that they are not Hindus; the Ibos and Yorubans—that they are not Fulanis and not Hausas, etc. The reverse side of such an “upsurge of nationalism and separatism” is the separation of a group from the amorphous multitude that is oriented toward participation only in the state. There may also be such a turn of events that friction between communities will lead to the real growth of nationalism and mutual intolerance. However no small role here is as a rule played by the awkward policy of the state itself. We recall once again Hegel's thought: problems should be addressed before they have matured and not after reality has changed its essence and this essence must be discovered anew.

The archaic nature of the sources of the processes at work in the mass mentality and the interaction of these processes (and profound discrepancies between them at the same time) together with what we call the “demands of development” or “social progress”—all this compels us to speak about the crisis of the traditional consciousness. K. Marx wrote: “If the question is examined in ideal terms, the disintegration of a certain form of consciousness would be sufficient to kill an entire epoch. In real terms, however, this limit to consciousness corresponds to a certain level of development of the material productive forces...”¹² This comment sheds light on the subsequent action program: the important thing is not to try to persuade the masses that their perception of reality is inadequate, but rather to attempt to understand just where this level in the development of the productive forces that poses the real limit to the crisis of consciousness is.¹³

Crisis phenomena in the mass consciousness today is to a certain degree based on the contradictory role that the state plays in the development process. Within the nation and in the foreign economic sphere, the state functions on two different planes: internally, it plays the part of a certain integrating nucleus of the social system, its “focal point of solidarity” for the masses that make up the majority of the population of the developing countries; externally, the state functions as a juridical person that takes out loans in world financial markets and guarantees the performance of the obligations it assumes. These planes have a contradictory impact on one another: the state's access to external sources of resources bolsters its authority in the eyes of the masses, but the state's attempt to bolster its authority by turning to foreign financial sources undermines its ability to perform its external obligations. The incongruity of these two functions of state is obvious and what looks like corruption¹⁴ and ineffectiveness to the observer may basically be the result of an entirely substantiated and reasoned foreign policy line.

The state's political course bears the clear stamp of the contradictions that result from the crisis of the traditional consciousness. It is very difficult if at all possible to coordinate in this course modern elements connected with the need to adapt to the demands of economic development, with the traditional elements that are

determined by the necessity of preserving the support of the masses. Hence the main feature of many political programs expressing the strategy of development. It consists in the absence of a clearly defined boundary between the desired and the real, between action to establish the new order and action to restore the ancient, primordial order.¹⁵ This is ultimately because the mass consciousness does not distinguish between the sphere of bliss in the world beyond and the sphere that is subject to the laws of this world.¹⁶

VI

These properties of the mass consciousness are refracted in the discussion that has been in progress in the scientific community of the developing countries for two decades. This discussion concerns role and place in the development of such factors as the state and the market, planning and the law of value, and finally, resource distribution and commodity-monetary relations. The conservative position on this question opposes the radical position. The liberal approach tries to find a middle road between the two extreme points of view. Developing in parallel to theoretical disputes is a discussion among various groups in society: people's Marxism here is frequently on the same side of the barricades as people's fundamentalism with both of them calling for a social system in which commodity-monetary relations are inoperative. Only for Marxism, this system belongs to the future¹⁷, while for fundamentalism it belongs to the past.

The participation of the developing countries in the world market and their place in the international division of labor are problems that are debated still more keenly in the society of these countries. There has developed a scientific tradition of regarding the world economy as a superpowerful force that stands above people and is hostile to them and that therefore deserves to be totally destroyed. Such feelings have intensified appreciably in connection with increasing foreign indebtedness. Thus Latin American trade union conferences on the debt problem have sharply criticized all debt regulation plans advanced by experts, scientists and politicians close to the IMF and the IBRD.

Some of the most radical debt resolution programs proposed by Western politicians essentially involve converting the indebtedness of the developing countries into shares of existing enterprises (capitalization of loans). In such a case, the lending banks would sustain considerable losses—25 percent or more, but the payment of the corresponding sums would be guaranteed regardless of the debtor country's foreign trade balance. The leaders of the continent's trade union associations evaluated this program as an encroachment by foreign capital on the sovereignty of people that threatened to usurp power over enterprises, mines, land, and other national wealth. As a responsive measure, they advanced the idea of an international tribunal to fix blame for foreign debt. While the free-ride mentality can easily be discerned in this maximalist position, it at the same time also attests

to the formation of a special psychological complex in the mass mentality in these countries that could be defined as a claim to world citizenship. Not being recognized in this capacity by the developed world, the masses in the Third World lay claim to the share of the world's concern for their problems that can be really expressed only by unified mankind that moreover recognizes the need for such unification.

The capitalization of loans would hardly seem to lead to a solution of the debt problem: the production potential of the developing countries would be intensified (as a result of the transfer of considerable resources from state hands to the hands of businessmen who have connections with foreign capital), but the market problem would become still more acute at the same time. It is important to take the following step to solve this problem: to raise not only the level of supply but also the level of demand, especially for consumer goods produced by the developing countries.

VII

It is our conviction that developing society is confronted with the problem of developing not the market in general (or, for example, the world market), but specifically the internal market, and it cannot be resolved if this society denies that the market has any significant role in the development process. For all those countries in which a civic society has not historically formed, the market performs a special mission not only in the economic but in the social sphere as well. The market draws people into mutually advantageous relations that are determined not by their place in the state hierarchy or their affiliation with some traditional community. The market demystifies social relations by graphically demonstrating to people their objective interest in one another and in establishing long-term, regular, and equal relations with one another. Market relations oppose the hostile isolation of human groups and the retention of special class or *nomenklatura* privileges by any groups.¹⁸ Thus the market offers people the most obvious, natural model of relations that moreover grows out of their own everyday practice and that is not forced on them from above.¹⁹

There is also one more important circumstance: the economic progress that has been realized in the world economy in recent decades is to a considerable degree determined by raising the role not of natural factors of live labor, but especially social, historical factors.²⁰ The latter is once again connected with the development of the market, this time, the world market. As we know, this change has meant advancing the human factor in the production process to the forefront and the relative retreat of "physical" capital. Unlike the preceding period, scientific-technical progress is now in no small measure associated with the growth of investment per worker and its content. The creation and transfer of information is becoming more and more appreciable. At

the same time, the significance of material production is diminishing. It is increasingly shifting from the center to the periphery.

The modern role of information systems in the world economy is determined by its scale and by the complexity of internal interrelations: commercial, technological, and financial chains connect enterprises that are situated at different points on the earth. The complexity of the spatial location of production complexes is aggravated by time interrelationships, by the influence of past decisions on the future, by the difficulty of foreseeing tomorrow's problems. Thus, indeterminacy and risk increase in the system in proportion to its growth and mounting complexity. It appears that these features are the result of the complexity of the given system rather than the expression of its formational quality (attributes of capitalism). Information is used to counteract the growth of indeterminacy: it coordinates flows of money, goods, services, labor power, and technology; it determines rules coupling labor power to the means of production and the siting of new enterprises. This information ultimately characterizes specifically market and commercial conditions in different regions of today's world. However, its possession confers significant advantages, but it is very costly to obtain.

Economic reality in which information plays such an important part is significantly more subject to the influence of subjective factors²¹, including psychological, individual or collective factors, than the influence that classical political economy calls "average social conditions of production." To a certain degree, this is a new reality that is created before our eyes. Not only the lay mentality but the scientific mentality as well has difficulty becoming accustomed to it. After all, under the conditions that are characteristic of this reality, the economic activity that recently evoked the greatest respect is devalued today and conversely that which was previously treated as speculation or at best as activity that did not create material values, today acquires high status and attracts the best minds.²²

While it is difficult for the masses in the Third World to accept these changes, there are many countries in which millions of people have on the whole accepted the working and living conditions that are determined by the market and the law of value. And it is all the more dangerous when these countries are in a most vulnerable position due not so much to the miscalculations of their leaders and the poor quality of labor of workers and employers as the imperfections that are immanent in the world economy.

It is for this very reason that the factors emanating from the state market that lie outside the regulatory potential of the state have a contradictory influence on the economy and society of the developing countries. On the one hand, the world market has made it possible for these countries to activate those resources, especially human resources, that would otherwise lie idle, while it does not make it possible for the developing countries to

realize their inherent advantages. To put it simply, it does not allow them to earn as much as they should. This contradictoriness specifically explains the reaction of society in the developing countries to the exposure of their vulnerability to impulses emanating from the world market: it gives much to these countries, but it is highly injurious to them at the same time.

VIII

In our opinion, world demand should be redistributed in favor of the population of a number of developing countries or more precisely of raising its purchasing power; the reference is to countries in which there has been an increase in the level of activity of the social forces that is favorable from the standpoint of present demands of development (this means the recognition of the laws of the market as obvious and natural). The realization of this idea would be a manifestation of the social approach to the participation of the given countries in world economic relations on a worldwide scale; it would make it easier to draw peripheral but potentially dynamic links of the world system in the process of real reforms and thereby lay the foundation for bridging the gap between center and periphery. This would also graphically confirm the supremacy of the general idea of humanity over group, class, and national narrowness.

As noted in the economic declaration of the group of 77, the lack of an international consensus on development problems is adversely affecting aid policy. This is manifested in particular in the dominance of considerations, primarily military-strategic and geopolitical, that are incidental to the goals of development. Thus, American aid to the "big five" (Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines) is almost entirely of strategic importance for the USA. Changes in the world situation in recent years are unquestionably beginning to influence this policy; in the U. S. Congress, there are voices calling for the revision of its priorities, for its reorientation toward Eastern European countries where democratization processes have been more active of late, toward Panama, and toward other countries. There is also discussion of such a variant as the diversion of some of the current military resources to economic aid.

However, locating resources and determining where to send them are not the only problem. It is important to reach international consensus on directing aid for the development of both production and consumption, thereby additionally stimulating the growth of production. As we know, such a policy is actively pursued in the developed countries. It is one of the cornerstones of the doctrine of neoliberalism. The agents of this policy today are not the state, but institutions of civilian society, organs of self-government, associations of consumers, citizens' associations, etc.

Even in some rapidly progressing Third World countries, there are still vast sectors of the population that do not participate either in modern production or in modern consumption. These people consequently do not feel

themselves to be citizens. This is especially dangerous when youth is in this situation. If the national and world community does not turn its face to these people, if it does not interest them in addressing social problems, society's future prospects will be fragile and illusory. An example of what can happen to entire continents is suggested to us by Colombia where the cocaine Mafia, according to G.-G. Markes, has succeeded in winning enormous masses of the poor over to its side.

The proposed approach is based on the view of mankind as a consumer society. But this means that mankind in world civilian society opposes the world community of producers as the whole and its parts. It is very important that the masses in the Third World feel the world economy's interest in them as consumers. This would be proof that they are not only citizens of their country, but that they are also part of "socialized mankind."²³ It must be added that the world economy would also benefit from this, not only in terms of reducing the social threat by these masses but also with an eye to providing it with an adequate social base: only mankind can create a market for the world economy.

The social democrats have within the national framework advanced the essentially Keynesian conception of redistribution of effective demand to all society and have implemented it in practice. This conception, known as the "welfare state," was the ideological formulation of the social strategy of state-monopoly capitalism during the time when social democrats were in power in the West. Today ideologues and political leaders of the Socialist International are espousing a neo-Keynesian conception of development of the world economy, primarily bearing in mind the solution of the foreign debt problem of developing countries by inflationary (Keynesian) means. At the same time, they criticize the present methods used by the IMF to address this problem as deflationary (conservative).

As is known, there is a certain social practice behind the social democratic idea. The following conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the experience of conceptualizing this practice: world or international state substitutes staffed by civil servants will be required for the redistribution of world demand. The latter will take resources from countries having a surplus of them and give them to countries lacking in resources. In other words, in this idea one can see a manifestation of bureaucratic, departmental thinking that expresses one of the contradictions of the Western liberal mentality: this mentality sees the creation of a civilian society as its ultimate goal, but the national state (or its world analogue) remains its means.

The experience of recent decades has shown that the distribution of international aid along state lines is ineffective—this aid disappears in to the "black holes" of corruption and bureaucratic extravagance. In a short time the distribution of resources in the form of credit will lead to a new round in the worsening debt problem.

At the same time, without international aid the developing countries will hardly be able to extricate themselves from economic stagnation and divert the threat of social catastrophe from themselves and from world civilization.

Voluntary social activity of the developed countries could become the alternative to the international mechanism of redistribution of world demand. Today, however, other sentiments are dominant: Western public opinion is opposed to expanding aid for the needs of development. It nurtures substantiated doubts regarding the ability of Third World countries to benefit from the advantages they are able to derive from negotiating with representatives of the developed Western countries, particularly on the liberalization of debt repayment terms.²⁴ Finally, hostility toward migrants from the developing countries is on the rise. Of late, the openly negative position toward migrants is beginning to be expressed in organized political forms, and this at a time when the economy of developed countries is making widespread use of migrant labor.

...

Thus the Third World's movement toward progress today depends in no small measure on changes in social consciousness in the developed countries, especially in the area of political and scientific thought. This also applies to our country where political thinking has significantly anticipated the scientific aspects of the demands of development. Soviet science is gradually overcoming its characteristic absolutization of contradictions between the two systems and is correspondingly departing from the reduction of the content of development processes in individual countries to these contradictions [sic]. This tendency is positive since it promotes the lowering of the role of *a priori*, or to put it directly, unscientific ideological premises in cognition.

The correction of the uniform system of phases of development for local specifics has become a manifestation of this tendency: depending on a given society's distance from the centers of world capitalism and the forms in which capitalism is introduced in the local environment, this society can be classified as a secondary or tertiary model of evolution.²⁵

Recognition of the new role of the human factor in development remains a problem both for political and scientific thinking. The difficulty is not to declare the ideal social order to be the end goal of development, but to take man as he is—a "spontaneous historical subject"—as the reference point. This would lead scientists and politicians to repudiate many obsolete views and above all the understanding of the features of the present historical moment. One of these features connected with man in the developing world or more precisely with his collective, mass consciousness, consists in the following: **the universalization of this consciousness is surpassing its rationalization.** This is also manifested in the demands

that are made, e. g., by trade union associations in Latin American countries on the world community.

Foremost among these demands are quite standard motives that were colored, as we have already mentioned, with free-ride sentiments. But the given circumstance should not keep us from seeing signs of the new thinking included in them. We refer to implied but not clearly expressed claims to equal citizenship in the world community. Today neither the East nor the West are ready to truly respond to this type of claim. Instead of this, peoples of the developing countries are advised to either work better or to institute radical reforms. There is one reason here: **the formation of the world community is lagging behind the rising universalist aspirations of the masses in the Third World.** Changes in this area are important because they could through the world economy be very useful in supplementing national efforts to create a civilian society and in the event of success would promote the formation of world citizenship.

Footnotes

1. "The human factor is now reaching the political level not as a remote and more or less spontaneous result of the life and activity of the masses and their intentions. It is digging into world affairs directly" (PRAVDA, 5 November 1987).

2. "The difference between modern and traditional...increasingly loses its determinacy as the traditional sector is supplied with different technology: Food, services, small enterprises—this is what is usually included in this sector" ("1985 Report on the World Social Situation," UN, No 7, 1987, p 73).

3. This situation is timely today as well. For example, a still more rigid position is occupied by A. P. Kolontayev, who considers man a subordinate element in the "man-machine" system. According to his view, a machine is a system of means for the mechanization of labor; in the East, it is the aggregate of natural production conditions. See A. P. Kolontayev, *The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Machine Stage of Production in the Developing Countries* ("Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i razvivayushchiesya strany" [Scientific-Technical Progress and the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1976).

4. Radical theory initially did not view the coupling of man and machine in the Third World as a problem. The idea of non-equivalent exchange was that the same machines were in operation both in the center and in the periphery, but the people who operate them are paid differently. In his 1981 book, A. Emmanuel approaches this problem in a different way: he admits that poor use is made of modern machine technology in the developing countries. He believes the reason to be that this machinery is "underdeveloped" and that this is in keeping with the ultimate goals of the TNC's (See A. Emmanuel, "Technologie appropriée ou technologie sous-développée," Paris, 1981).

5. These countries have also gone farther than others in the democratization of internal life which has in particular led to the equalization of income structure in society. To the contrary, countries that have specialized in the exporting of raw materials (the sale of their mineral, soil, and climatic wealth to foreign countries) had an extremely uneven system of income distribution and rigid social stratification (G. F. Papanek, "Lectures on Development Strategy, Growth, Equity and Political Process in Southern Asia," Islamabad, 1986, p. 27).

6. "Economic and Social Survey of Asia and Pacific, 1988," Bangkok, 1989, p. 13.

7. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsialnyi progress" [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress], Moscow, 1983, p. 5/9.

8. "National governments and leaders try to compensate the lack of a common, binding, cementing civic life with political life introduced from above," writes N. A. Simoniya. "The important thing here is not the will or willfulness of these governments and leaders, but the existing objective need for such compensation" ("Evolutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [The Evolution of Eastern Societies: Synthesis of Traditional and Contemporary], Moscow, 1984, p. 274).

9. G. S. Kiselev, "The East and Feudalism" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No. 4, 1988, p. 73).

10. See Ye. N. Starikov, "Marginals..." (ZNAMYA, No. 10, 1989).

11. See L. B. Alayev, "Formational Features of Feudalism and the East" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No. 3, 1987, p. 89). The author states that feudalism in the West differs from feudalism in the East not by social structures, but by the degree of "economization of this formation" (p. 79).

12. K. Marks and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol. 46, Part II, p. 33.

13. The "economization" of the mass consciousness, its perception of the demands of development of the economy and market relations as "self-evident natural laws" as a rule attests to the attainment of the given level (Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 747).

14. Corruption in the usual sense of the word is also very widespread in the Third World, but in the given instance we are concerned not with it, but with the economically ineffective if socially justified policy of using borrowed funds to bribe the masses. This policy in many countries is a necessary element in the general strategy of development.

15. G. Myrdal noted that agrarian reform in South Asia was simultaneously perceived as pursuing the goal of establishing private ownership of land and as a "policy aimed at the restoration of the original class—peasant

landowners who had lost their rights in the initial period of British land reforms" (G. Myrdal, "Sovremennyye problemy 'tretyego mira' [Modern Problems in the Third World], Moscow, 1972, p. 483).

16. "Aspirations that freely soared or were directed toward the world beyond suddenly acquired significance in this world and began to be perceived as realizable here and now and filled social actions with particular virulent force" (K. Mangeym, "Ideologiya i utopiya" [Ideology and Utopia], USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, Moscow, 1976, Part II, p. 29).

17. This is also a timely question for our science. N. A. Simoniya believes that the founders of Marxism-Leninism viewed the idea of the dying away of the state, commodity-monetary relations, the law of value, etc., only in a "theoretical model of developed socialist society (the first phase of the communist formation)" (N. A. Simoniya, "Avenues of Social Progress and the Revolutionary Movement in the East. Report," LATORTORNYE TETRADE ION PRI TSK KPSS, Moscow, No. 9, 1989, p. 7). The experience of history has shown that the masses, both in Russia and in the East, have taken this idea literally. In this connection, it is appropriate to recall Hegel's formula that the future is the subject not of knowledge but of hopes and fears.

18. "Free enterprise and competition are indissolubly connected. Therefore in the absence of the latter, the former penetrates the atmosphere of privilege" (R. Prebish, The System and the Social Structure of Latin America, "Latin American Radicalism," New York, 1969, pp. 33-34).

19. The discussion supposedly centers on the creation of conditions for the development of civilian society. However today there are not sufficient grounds for the conclusion that the market brings civilian society along with it. The experience of history shows that the market developed in Western countries on the civilian that existed there; in the East, on the other hand, a high level of development of commodity-monetary relations was attained in a number of instances without any developed civilian society whatsoever (in imperial China, for example).

The development of the state in the West also had civilian society as its prerequisite. Therefore, retreat by the state there was equivalent to progress by civilian society. In the Third World, where the civic aspirations of the masses are concentrated in the state, the retreat or weakening of the latter results not in civic progress but in social chaos (as in modern Colombia, for example). The development of spontaneous social forces liberated from the influence of the state does not automatically acquire a civic orientation. When the ideology of these forces is not connected to tradition (i. e., is not religious, tribal, communal, or nationalistic), it may be criminal, but it will not in any way be civic.

20. "Productive forces of labor—both social forces that have developed historically and those that are conditioned by nature itself..." (K. Marks and F. Engels, "Sochineniya," Vol 23, p 524.

21. Subjective factors refer to the mediation of impulses from the mass consumer psychology by the market and their transfer to production. It is not simply the consideration of these impulses but to a certain degree the subordination of production to them that underlies the changes that have taken place in the world economy in the last decade. Our science, as a reflection of our social practice, frequently does not see this basis. It is bewitched by the technical or material-physical aspect of changes, as something that is objectively given, that can be felt with one's hands. But we in this way are not only shutting ourselves off from understanding the most important—social—aspect of what is happening, but we also incorrectly evaluate the general direction of development of the world situation. For example, G. K. Shirokov sees the driving force in economic relations between West and East to lie primarily in the fact that the West feels the need for certain elements of expenditure—raw materials, energy, semifactured goods—that the East supplies. But this need today is less than it was yesterday. The author draws the conclusion that the developing countries today are more and more being "squeezed out" of the world economy and the centers of world capitalism are focusing on relations with one another. See G. K. Shirokov's remarks at the roundtable on "Modern Capitalism and the Developing World: Character and Prospective Relations" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1988).

22. Several hundred thousand bank employees working in the City create a more sizable part of Britain's national income than millions of its workers in the manufacturing industry.

23. K. Marks and F. Engels, Op. cit., Vol 42, p 266.

24. The fear is expressed, for example, that the easing of the terms of debt repayment might impel countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico toward a policy of autarky, high taxes, nationalization of property of foreign investors, and planned development (see THE ECONOMIST, 14-21 May 1988, p 17).

25. See "Evolutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [Evolution of Eastern Societies: The Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern].

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Where is Eastern Europe Headed?

904M0011F Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 86-105

[Article by Liliya Fedorovna Shevtsova, candidate of historical sciences; sector head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System]

[Text]

1. The Essence of Sudden Social Change

In 1989 there were events in Eastern Europe that political scientists and historians will turn to for a long time to come. And this is understandable. After all, these events have fundamentally changed not only the fate of individual countries and regions, but also views of socialism, of the future world order, and the future avenues of social progress. The consequences of the East European revolution still have not revealed themselves entirely: some of them will become evident only in the future. But even now there are grounds for comparing this revolution—considering its significance for all Europe, its global significance, and its consequences—with the Great French Revolution of 1789, with the peoples' spring of 1948, with the October Revolution of 1917, and with the advent of people's democracies in the '40s.

To be sure, people's revolutions in the past were under leftist banners. The present events in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, are connected with the declining prestige of leftist forces and this makes them especially complex, contradictory and dramatic.

The masses that took to the streets in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania drew the line on the existence of administrative, statist socialism that in some places assumed the form of rigid feudal tyranny. We note, however, that these actions for all their outward unexpectedness were to a certain degree already prepared by events of an entirely peaceful nature that took place in other countries somewhat earlier. We are thinking of a whole series of attempts undertaken in Hungary, Poland, and in part in Yugoslavia and China, to rebuild authoritarian socialism. These attempts ultimately ended in failure. But they had their effect and made it possible for the most part to put an end to the hopes that still existed (and that still survive in certain circles even today) for renewing the old system without repudiating its basic principles. Mass actions at the end of the '80s dashed these delusions.

Of course we cannot deny the usefulness and feasibility of intrasystemic reforms (i. e., reforms that are carried out within the framework of a certain social system and that are directed toward its reform rather than its destruction) in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, or China. In preceding stages of history, these reforms produced a

certain effect that in some cases improved the well-being of society and helped to neutralize social conflicts. However all efforts to revive administrative-authoritarian institutions through them either became detached or deformed. Reformist attempts even intensified society's development along crisis lines—they led to the deregulation of the old mechanisms, but did not create anything to take their place. This obviously proves the truth of the argument that there are limits to the existence of certain social systems and that when these limits are reached they lose their capacity for development and can only work to the detriment of their environment. In all socialist countries, including countries that were instituting reforms, social tensions intensified at the end of the '80s and there were signs of anarchy and unmanageability. The very idea of reform under socialism was discredited. Various social strata began to doubt the possibility of renewing it and even to doubt the possibility of creating another just and democratic system. There was a catastrophic decline in mass confidence in the ruling parties.

Explosive material had accumulated in countries that tried to avoid reforms: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. The deeper dangerous diseases were driven inward, the more likely their unexpected and stormy outburst became.

In the light of the events that occurred initially in the GDR and that touched off a wave of explosions in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, it became clear that the existing system could no longer get by without partial restructuring. The gradual, evolutionary transition to a new social system also became impossible. The complete, immediate dismantling of all old institutions and the formation of a qualitatively new social order based on different principles and norms became the most urgent task on the agenda. Some time ago, many reformers in East European countries were keenly interested in the question of how to make the transition to the new system—all at once or gradually? There were many debates about how opposing forms should coexist and how to implement reforms without disrupting society's stability. Theoretically these problems have not been resolved. The events in most countries were rapid and occasionally surprising to the participants themselves (for example, when V. Havel was in prison, he could hardly have imagined that he would be president of Czechoslovakia half a year later). There was no time for reflection. The foundation and facade of the old building started to collapse before there was a clear-cut design of the new one. Under these conditions, the "revolutionary" countries—the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania—did not escape a diarchy, the emergence of several decision-making centers and even periods of anarchy. In all countries, radical changes at the top were combined with the preservation of the old system at the middle and lower levels. Poland's example is illustrative: as recently as last summer, new supreme organs of executive power formed and began implementing their policy while the old political structure at the lower levels remained, to say

nothing about the economic base. In a word, not a single country has succeeded in making a clean transition to democracy. It began spontaneously in many countries. The course of events in others frustrated all plans by reformers, generating much that was not foreseen. Ultimately all countries have entered a very unstable transitional state in which the old ruling forces have already lost or are losing power, but the institutions created by them have survived, in which the arena has been entered by new forces that have already begun to rule even though they lack legal levers to exert pressure.

How can the events of the late '80s in Eastern Europe be defined? Are they revolution? But if they are, then what kind of revolution? Or are we dealing with a coup? If this question is not answered, it will be difficult not only to understand the present character of development of individual countries but also to predict their future development. Of course it will take a certain amount of time for various as yet indistinct tendencies to finally take shape so that we can make a final evaluation of the events that have taken place. If we discuss the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Romania, they obviously indeed had revolutions that led not only to the fall of the former ruling hierarchy but also opened the road to power for new sociopolitical forces. Bulgaria, where the dictatorial regime of T. Zhivkov fell as a result of actions of the reform-minded group in the top party and state leadership, is in a category of its own. But this very fact evoked phenomena of a revolutionary order in society. But on the whole the reforms in Eastern Europe compel us to rethink traditional views about the character of social reforms, especially about the revolution and reform and about their content. They in particular generate doubt about the justification for the rapid separation of these types of social changes. Let us look, for example, at processes taking place in Hungary and Poland. In these countries, forces that were still radical in the communist parties that were in power at that time steered a course of reform that led to revolutionary change in the social structure of these countries. On the other hand, as we know from history revolutions in most cases have not led to the immediate emergence of a new social order. Let us recall revolutionary events that have already taken place in the leading socialist countries: in the GDR in 1953; in Hungary in 1956; in Poland in 1956, 1970, 1979-1981; and in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. In no country did these revolutions, which were to be sure different in content and form of development, lead to the creation of a new social system.

In world practice, there have also been revolutions that have meant retreat or a halt in social development. More than one revolutionary attempt was required to form different social systems. Revolutions primarily tend to be of a nature that is destructive toward the old order. The creation of the new, however, requires a large number of reforms. East European revolutions were also the first and possibly not even the most decisive step on the road to the formation of more progressive social institutions that is connected with a whole complex of

reform efforts. Today we are obviously witnessing the birth of a new type of social transformation in which revolutionary and reformist elements are intertwined. It is impossible to draw a strict line between them. The more developed a country is on a socioeconomic plane, the less polarized its society is. The stronger the tradition of civic-mindedness, the more basis there is for advancing goals that are revolutionary in content and for accomplishing them by evolutionary methods.

I think, however, that it would be a considerable oversimplification to draw direct parallels between the reformist model in Western society and social reforms in Eastern Europe and in our country. Such attempts are now frequent. But there can be no manner of direct analogies between reform processes in the West and in the East. In Eastern Europe, the world is for the first time seeing the attempt to make the transition from the party-state system of a pseudo-socialistic type to the pluralistic, market organization of society that has never been attempted anywhere before now. In statist socialist society, it is necessary to destroy the old and build new foundations. Reforms in Western society are directed toward improving its qualities. All this compels us to speak of the uniqueness of social changes that are taking place in the East European countries.

Now let us pose the question: what is its nature—people's democratic, socialist, antisocialist, or anticommunist? One encounters different interpretations of the events in Eastern Europe—they are evaluated as the collapse of socialism and communist ideas and as the beginning of the birth of a new model of socialism. The content and orientation of these events can be determined first of all by analyzing the driving social forces and their basic aspirations. Youth, especially student youth, have been the detonator and principal participant in all mass actions in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and subsequently in Bulgaria as well. In this respect, these actions differ in large measure from many protest movements in preceding decades in which the leading role was played by the working class. Workers were the initiators and the principal force behind mass actions back in the early '80s when Solidarity was first born in Poland. We are seeing how social movements are losing their previous class character and are acquiring a broader social base. New social groups are coming to the forefront in them. Their ideological coloring is also changing. The working people previously went into the streets with the slogan "Socialism yes, deformation no!" Now, however, there are many who doubt the possibility of building a just society on the basis of socialist ideas. Only yesterday people for the most part demanded the ouster of the leaders of ruling parties that had discredited themselves. Today the broad masses of society are opposing the leading role of the communist party in general and are refusing to give it their political trust. "We are tired of 'communist experiments'"—this theme resounded during last year's actions and continue to be heard today. It would be a mistake to view them as an attack or provocation by a narrow group of antisocialist

elements. The masses' disappointment with socialist ideals, but above all with their bearers, has assumed mass proportions in all countries, also gripping a sizable part of the working class which has been the communists' traditional stronghold. This fact, too, should be taken into account in the analysis of the revolutions in Eastern Europe. But on the whole there would appear to be grounds for ceasing to view them in entirely ideological terms, i. e., in terms of these revolutions' attitudes toward communist ideals. In such a case, some of them can be viewed as anticommunist even though the mass of rank-and-file communists also took part in them. It would be more accurate to define them from the standpoint of political criteria—as antitotalitarian and democratic. Even though the possibility is not entirely excluded that in a given country in which the traditions of civic-mindedness and the experience of political activism from below are absent, the revolutions that have taken place will boil down to the replacement of authority and political regime while the basic principles of authoritarianism, which may possibly take on a different ideological form, are preserved.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe have been a protest not only against local cults and dictatorships. They have also been society's protest against an artificial system of development that was forced on it, against externally imposed prescriptions for "happiness" that contradicted national and historical traditions and the real interests of individual countries. In the majority of East European countries, statist socialism did not by any means originate spontaneously, but was exported by a stern hand. It remains for historians to reveal the tragedy of the forcible end of the people's democracies and to show the driving forces behind the ultraleft coups that took place everywhere in Eastern Europe. We also bear responsibility for the failure of repeated attempts to reform the administrative system in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though we also recognize that the European countries themselves also had their own faithful advocates of Stalinist ideas, some of whom in their criminal plans and their implementation yield but little to the "father of peoples." There were also certain social groups that were impressed by the very spirit of authoritarianism with an egalitarian orientation. There were also political forces who viewed the system of statist socialism as the most effective way of winning and holding personal power.

The experience of the East European countries shows that the authoritarian-administrative system can be transformed in two ways: peaceful and revolutionary. The former found its embodiment in Poland and Hungary where reform forces in the ruling communist parties themselves initiated movement in the direction of a new social system. The latter—in actions by the masses in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

But nevertheless it was the Polish reformers that were the first to go beyond the framework of the authoritarian system.

As late as 1988 relations between the Polish leadership and Solidarity were in the nature of bitter struggle. Nevertheless the rapid development of crisis events in the country, the declining authority of the Polish United Workers' Party, the failures of economic reform, the increasing dissatisfaction of the masses that was approaching the critical point—all this forced Polish leaders to press their search for ways of preventing an explosion that could have dramatic consequences both for the nation and for the entire region. The Tenth Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee in early 1989 became the turning point. It was specifically here after many hours of stormy debate that W. Jaruzelski and his followers under threat of dismissal reached a decision that was to alter the nation's fate: the voluntary self-restriction of the party and negotiations with Solidarity. To many members of the ruling party, this decision came as a surprise and generated disorientation and even resistance. And this was understandable: after they had spent so many years relentlessly struggling against Solidarity, which was regarded as a counterrevolutionary force, they were suddenly confronted by a 180-degree turn. As M. Rakowski, the erstwhile premier, stated, the plenum's decision also took foreign observers by surprise. One Western statesman said to him anxiously: "I fear you are getting too far ahead of yourself." But the situation in the country was such that there was no time to deliberate, to persuade doubters: it was necessary to think of how to prevent the masses from taking to the streets, how to prevent uncontrollable processes. This required overcoming the old political and ideological barriers.

Subsequent events unfolded at a very fast pace. Roundtable talks with the opposition started in the spring of 1989. Initially, progress was very slow. And this is understandable: sitting face to face were those who had instituted martial law and internment—generals Jaruzelski and Kiszczak—and those who had been in prisons and in hiding in the underground—Walesa, Bujak, Gwiazda and their advisers. Quite a great deal of hostility and mistrust had accumulated and the intervention of a third force, the church through Cardinal J. Glemp, the Polish primate, was necessary so that the sides would take their first step toward drawing closer together. This was a dramatic process that lasted 2 months. From a detached point of view, it would have been possible to expect greater instability, emotion, and reciprocal attacks. But most roundtable participants obviously felt their civic responsibility to the nation which expected agreement rather than reciprocal accusations and haggling. And agreement was reached thereby putting an end to open enmity. Solidarity was recognized as an equal political partner and received 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm as well as the right to participate in the struggle for credential to the second chamber—the Senate. It was resolved that free elections would be held in Poland in 4 years. This was a serious concession on the part of the party, but not to have made it would have meant placing the country on the verge of national catastrophe once again.

The summer elections of 1989 were the next stage. For the first time in a socialist country, they led to the formation of a new authority that included opposition forces. This was a breach of enormous importance that meant the end of the authoritarian system. But to the PUWP, the coup that was made with its assistance and participation proved to be fatal. While the party did indeed receive its previously agreed upon seats in the Sejm, the Senate proved to be entirely in Solidarity's hands. What happened was something that surprised many in Poland and elsewhere: even the army, divisions of internal forces, and even the diplomatic corps voted for Solidarity. It must also be said the the country's leaders, i. e., those who initiated the coup, also suffered defeat. The commentary of certain Polish newspapers on what had happened was: "The victory of the reform—the defeat of the reformers."

We are discussing the Polish experience in greater detail because Polish leftist forces were the first to go beyond the usual scenarios, the first to risk rejecting the monopoly on power and sit down at a roundtable with the opposition. It can be debated today whether this step was merely an element in the tactics of the erstwhile Polish leadership since it was a forced step. It remains a fact that the erstwhile Polish leaders managed to find in themselves the strength to renounce narrow partisan and egoistic interests and to agree to compromise with opposing forces in the name of saving society. It can now be concluded that the consensus that was reached at the time between the erstwhile PUWP and Solidarity was a definite political gain for the leftist forces. It not only helped the country to avert a revolution that would have by no means been as peaceful as in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, but also permitted leftist forces in the given stage to remain in power within the framework of the coalition and to retain the nation's presidency notwithstanding their generally negative performance in the elections. The Polish scenario was subsequently repeated in one form or another in all countries of Eastern Europe. Roundtables of leftist forces and the opposition were held. Everywhere there were attempts by the forces that had until recently been in power and opposition forces to come to an agreement that would ensure the peaceful development of the transitional stage. However in the majority of countries, the communist parties ventured to take this step when it was already too late under pressure from the outside after their weight and influence in society had seriously declined. Under these conditions it was much more difficult for them to secure a place for themselves in the newly forming system of power.

The events in Eastern Europe last year and this year show astonishing synchronousness of the development of individual, entirely dissimilar countries. It is in fact the first time in the history of the world that we are witnessing the almost simultaneous fall of cult regimes in so many countries all at once. Certain common trends in the development of individual countries, in the direction of evolution of the basic forces in them, and even the

dominant processes in the public mentality coincide. At the same time, it would be rash to array all these countries in the same line. Even now, as the old system is abolished, the national, historical, concrete specifics of individual countries are increasingly manifested. Occasionally they begin to determine the uniqueness of new social forms and the tempo of various reforms. Hungary and Poland were the first to undertake the creation of a new system. But the GDR and Czechoslovakia which followed them covered literally in weeks the ground that it took the trailblazers entire years to cover. Considering the higher level of socioeconomic development, the lack of a high degree of social differentiation, certain qualities of social psychology, and traditions of civilian society that remain intact (and in the case of the GDR, the role of the Federal Republic of Germany as well), the possibility is not excluded that these countries will soon move forward in the construction of a new order. Entirely different tasks confront Romania, for example, where the elementary conditions of society's development have been violated. Here one speaks not about reform, but about the need to stabilize the foundations of life. "The country is experiencing chaos," notes S. Brukan, one of the Romanian leaders. "But chaos cannot be reformed."¹ However it is also clear that it is impossible to overcome chaos without eliminating the totalitarian system that caused it.

To what degree are the processes in Eastern Europe characteristic of the development of the community of countries which until recently were commonly called socialist? Are there grounds for speaking of the fall of the system of statist socialism in general? Such an unequivocal conclusion is evidently premature. All countries belonging to the socialist system can, albeit conditionally, be divided into three groups. The foundations of the administrative-authoritarian system have collapsed in the majority of East European countries whether as a result of the confrontation of democratic forces on the one hand and Stalinist or neo-Stalinist forces on the other or in the course of the people's movement. However the future of all these countries cannot be considered to be the same. In most of them there is no total guarantee that the social processes are irreversible. To be sure, there is hardly the possibility of a return to a Stalinist or an even milder, Kadar model of a party state here. But the revival of authoritarian tendencies on another plane even by former opposition forces cannot be absolutely excluded. Another group of countries is trying to bring about moderate restructuring. Some of them are permitting a greater or lesser degree of liberalization of political life and the development of glasnost. Others are trying to create economic incentives without renouncing the traditional principles of party-state power while preserving a rigid ideological framework and striving to prevent "bourgeois distortions" of it. But even in these countries there is a growing contradiction between the old system and the growing new needs of the working people. Last year's events in Tiananmen Square in China are a confirmation of this point. Delay in restructuring processes is intensifying society's crisis

state and is generating conflicts, anarchy and disintegration, as is attested to by the present development of Yugoslavia and indeed the USSR as well. Finally, there are several countries that continue to follow the old road stubbornly without permitting any kind of democratic relaxation whatsoever. The leaders in some of them of late have tried to preserve their personal-power regimes by channeling society's dissatisfaction into the opposite direction, by picturing not only capitalists but also former friends—European countries that are instituting reforms—as the "enemy." It is difficult to measure the internal temperature of these closed societies from the outside. It is therefore not clear when social ferment will reach the critical point in these societies and specifically how the dictatorial regimes will fall—under the pressure of the masses or in the course of a political coup. However there does not appear to be any doubt about the logical end of these regimes evidently in the not so very distant future.

2. The destiny of leftist forces. What awaits them?

Revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 have very obviously shown one thing: the crisis of confidence in the then-ruling communist and labor parties on the part of broad strata of society. The revolutions themselves were, strictly speaking, largely the consequence of this crisis. More or less clear signs of the waning authority of the ruling parties in individual countries surfaced long ago. In the late '80s, these parties and their role in society began to evoke the open dissatisfaction of the working people. The mandatory-coercive character of their activity directly contradicted age-old needs for the emancipation of social life. The deep internal crisis of the ruling parties—ideological chaos among the rank-and-file members, the gulf between them and the party hierarchy, the bureaucratization of the latter, the development of the cult of leaders, corruption and moral degradation among them also became obvious. The ruling parties in some countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria, became an obedient instrument of dictatorial power, which discredited the communist party as an institution in the eyes of the masses for a long time. The last hopes for these parties' capacity for self-renewal have been dispelled. Life itself forced both society and rank-and-file communists to draw a merciless conclusion: the monocentrist party (this type of party is also called a mobilizing, statist, administrative party) is the heart of the authoritarian system and therefore all attempts to destroy the system, without touching the party, are senseless. It was also obvious that party structures became an obstacle to social reform perhaps even despite the aspirations of a considerable part of the communists.

In the course of the tempestuous events of the late '80s, the ruling communist parties in East European countries found themselves isolated in an atmosphere of ever increasing mistrust, rejection, even hostility and in some places even anticommunist hysteria. "Parties did not want to and could not"—thus did one of the party figures characterize the inability of the ruling organizations to

engage in dialogue with the masses that went out into the streets. V. Mohorita, the present leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, sadly stated: "The avalanche of people's indignation ousted the Czechoslovak Communist Party from its throne of administrative leadership in which the party had placed itself but was unable to confirm its right to it through its actions."² The majority of the ruling parties essentially lost their monopoly on power in the course of the popular movements. This was a severe shock to them. The centralist construction that had until recently seemed solid suddenly began disintegrating before their very eyes: the highest party organs and apparatus were paralyzed, lower-echelon structures ceased to operate, and the mass exodus—not of tens but of the hundreds of thousands of members from their ranks—intensified. The Romanian Communist Party, which thoroughly discredited itself in society's eyes by its support of the tyrannical regime of N. Ceausescu, suffered the severest fate. This party essentially ceased to exist and the possibility of its rebirth is quite indeterminate. Similar tendencies in the decline of prestige, in the reduction of party ranks—even in not such devastating forms—also touched leftist parties in Hungary and Poland that had already embarked on the path of reform and that voluntarily renounced the monopoly on power. In the autumn of last year, radical forces in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, being the first to see that the potential of the former party was exhausted, created a new socialist organization. However even this decisive step could no longer halt the narrowing of the positions of leftist forces in the nation.

That which happened in Eastern Europe with organizations that only yesterday were the most influential and—we emphasize—sovereign organizations can be defined as a political defeat even though in some cases it could without exaggeration be called a catastrophe. The question arises: was this process inevitable? Was there perhaps a possibility to halt the communist parties' downward slide at some point? Or are these organizations today really incapable of reforming themselves in time, as many assert and are they doomed? This problem arouses many—Marxists and non-Marxists alike. It cannot be said that the ruling communist parties have no understanding whatsoever of where they are heading, that they are unaware of the consequences of being isolated from the masses, of the danger of being transformed into a conservative force, into a guardian of antidemocratic order. In individual parties, there were forces that understood this threat. Thus in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, they grouped around R. Nyers and I. Pozsgay; in the Polish United Workers' Party—around W. Jaruzelski and M. Rakowski. A. Lilov and M. Mikhaylov, who belonged to the top echelon of the Bulgarian Communist Party, were not afraid to protest against cult tendencies in the BCP. Even in Romania, several figures in the Romanian CP were able to raise their voice of protest against transforming the party into the blind instrument of the will of N. Ceausescu and to publish the notorious "letter of six." In Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia there were repeated

attempts to modernize the party, to sever the umbilical cord connecting it with the state, and to convert it into a political force that would fight for its influence. But all these attempts ended in total failure. The party machine continued to move blindly according to an old course that was programmed decades ago, crushing underfoot or casting aside its own reformers. Some of them, recognizing the futility of their plans for restructuring either remained silent or joined another camp, still others quit the party ranks. It is not without interest that many of the present ideologues of the opposition movements in neighboring countries are former communists who ceased to believe in the potential of the erstwhile parties. Thus, five members of the Polish government who presently represent Solidarity once had red party cards.

Just what were the reasons behind the repeated failures of party reforms? There are evidently several reasons. In most cases the communist reformers were either not strong enough or they did not dare to go beyond the limits of conventional but long outmoded ideas. Perhaps they were unable to relinquish part of themselves and hence could not go all the way. But none of these explanations fully answer the question "why?" Why were the ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe unable to change their clothes that hindered and restricted their own movement? The obvious conclusion is that the problem was that the parties themselves were of a monocratic, statist type that rejected any kind of sweeping reform. This was entirely understandable because this was how the instinct of self-preservation of these organizations and the groups serving them worked to satisfy their internal need for survival even if it is to society's detriment. After all, to modernize the party that we inherited from the past—a party that was an order, a party that was a paramilitary organization—inevitably required the restructuring of its foundations and principles. And this meant one thing: the creation of an essentially new party. Incidentally, the significance of intraparty mechanisms in transforming ruling communist parties into a conservative force, into a supercentralist organization operating according to the drivebelt principle also should not be overestimated. These mechanisms were already a consequence, a derivative. Now we have come to the principal reason, to the source of the rise of statist-type communist parties and of their inevitable decline in the historical future. We refer to the total and absolute monopoly of parties on power that was secured both by the constitution and by the total power of the state. This very fact by itself eliminated the need of ruling parties to struggle for their authority and doomed them to bureaucratization and to alienation from society. Total omnipotence deprives a political organization both of internal impulses and of external sources of self-development with due regard to society's changing needs. This is the bitter truth that today's ruling communist parties have learned belatedly, the hard way, and at too high a price.

But the fact that these parties did not succeed in reforming themselves still does not mean that such a

possibility never existed in the history of real socialism. Let us recall the "Prague spring." How does it differ from the recent "Prague autumn?" First of all in the respect that reformist forces in the Czechoslovak Communist Party headed the movement to modernize Czechoslovak society at that time. In 1968-1969 that country appeared to have certain conditions for the democratic reform both of the party itself and the system as a whole. Society still believed in socialism's potential. In the party itself there were influential forces capable of democratization. Two-way movement "from below" and "from above" in Czechoslovakia during that period could have created real prerequisites for the party's voluntary relinquishment of its omnipotence and for its incorporation into a new, pluralistic structure as one of the political forces. The possibility was not excluded that two or several parties could have originated here on the platform of socialism that might have been the basis of a system of counterweights that real socialist society lacked. In any event, the ideas of Z. Mlynarz, one of the leaders of party reform, and his "team," that were drafting political reforms in Czechoslovakia developed specifically in this direction.

But as we already know the chance to reform the ruling party was not used. Was it the last or only chance? It would seem that a certain potential for radical party reform still existed in individual countries in the early '70s. During this period, the parties' voluntary relinquishment of their monopoly on power and the democratization of their internal life might have restored their *d-finite* authority in society. Leftist parties might have managed to remain an important political force. However not one of the ruling parties made use of this opportunity. This prompts many researchers, including researchers in Marxist circles, to conclude that parties of the *etatist* type are unreformable, that their activity cannot be reconciled with the needs of civilian society. This conclusion is difficult to refute.

Starting with the '70s it was difficult to halt the weakening of the moral and political position of the ruling parties: they were directly headed for defeat. And this was not by chance. It was rather the natural result of their attempts to preserve a political organization that had outlived its time.

In late 1989 and early 1990, i. e., after the revolutionary events, there were extraordinary congresses of communist and labor parties in practically all East European countries that were supposed to decide their future fate. All of them were in a most complex political situation: the crisis in the parties themselves was intensifying and they were increasingly attacked by opposition forces that were acquiring popularity and influence. So it was that most of the congresses of the communist parties did not become a turning point in their development and could not consolidate them on a new basis. This was prevented by the continuing factionalism in party ranks and by the absence of new ideological reference points. But despite the contradictory situation that persisted in all parties at the beginning of 1990, two tendencies could be discerned

in their development. Some communist parties opted to create a new type of leftist party. Others tried to confine themselves to moderate changes. Reformist forces in the old Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which created the Hungarian Socialist Party, became the first to reform the new party. Next came the Polish United Workers' Party, which summed up its past and decided to abolish itself. The new Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic originated on its basis. The decision to create leftist parties of the new type was one of the most important results of the present stage. This decision meant liberation from illusions concerning the possibility of artificially prolonging the life of an organization belonging to an entirely different age. By creating new parties, communist reformers also tried to address more tangible problems, especially to distance themselves from the party "reinforced concrete" that still retained powerful positions in the parties: to break the obstruction of the apparatus, to cut off the train of responsibility for past mistakes and deformations. However the formation of new leftist parties in Hungary and Poland was not painless. They could not avoid the split of the leftist forces. In Hungary a social democratic party and a communist party originated on the basis of the former Hungary Social Workers' Party. One of them includes Christian democratic ideas in its program.

Other parties—the Bulgarian Communist Party, Czechoslovak Communist Party, the German Socialist Party (the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany), and the League of Yugoslav Communists—were initially dominated by the tendency to preserve certain old ideas in connection with their historical past. However it gradually became apparent that this type of reform no longer pleased many rank-and-file communists.

The mass exodus from the party ranks had continued. Nor did reforms in the given parties inspire confidence in society proper. Measures taken by the German Socialist Party, Czechoslovak Communist Party and Bulgarian Communist Party to purify their leadership, to reveal corruption and abuses by former leaders not only did not strengthen the prestige of these parties but even intensified the opposite process.

The League of Yugoslav Communists is the only party that has as yet escaped such stormy shocks and that still retains—albeit in large measure formally—the role of a ruling party. However the split that occurred at its 14th Extraordinary Congress indicates that this party also faces difficult times ahead. The League of Yugoslav Communists has long been torn between individual republic organizations. It would hardly seem possible to preserve the League of Communists as a national centrist organization. The federalization of the party has gone so far that it will be very difficult in view of the stratification of national-ethnic conflicts in the nation in general. The unevenness of reform processes in individual republics, however, will evidently lead to non-identical party structures in them that are based on non-coincident principles and that have different programs. This unevenness in the development of republic organizations

is felt even now. Thus Slovenian and Croatian communists renounced their monopoly on power and called for the development of political pluralism. Communist parties in a number of other republics continue to adhere to old operating principles. In the near future, Yugoslavia will evidently find it impossible to prevent the emergence of various kinds of socialist parties.

On the whole, however, the time between the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 was for all East European communist parties, as a Bulgarian party leader was compelled to admit, a "time of missed opportunity." On the threshold of the first free elections, these parties were unable to advance a program that corresponded to the aspirations of the broad strata. Most of them were unable to restructure themselves sufficiently resolutely, to cast off the burden of the past that hovered over them and to overcome internal disintegration. Today even moderate reformers are forced to admit: yes, partial restructuring has failed again, yes, a new type of party must be formed. In an effort to break the negative stereotype of society's perception of the communist party, their successors change the party's name, elect new leaders, and carry out structural reorganization. But it proves to be difficult to overcome the masses' lack of confidence in the communists. Incidentally, parties that embarked on a course of reform much earlier are also in a difficult situation. Thus in Hungary the new leftist party—the Hungarian Socialist Party—has also failed to win society's broad support. "We have made many errors in recent time and they (the errors.—L. Sz.) are exacting their vengeance on us," stated L. M. Szabo, a Hungarian Socialist Party figure. "We should have disbanded the party a year ago, formed a new party, and not created the impression of our unity. We did this too late, after people had stopped believing in us." "Too late"—this pessimistic conclusion is applied to communist parties in neighboring countries quite frequently, inter alia, in Marxist circles. Indeed the crisis of East European communist parties or their successors has not been overcome. In some places it has even intensified. Incidentally, even without efforts it is impossible to make the transition to the new formula for leftist forces all at once. Today these forces have only begun the search for their new face and new role in society and this search will be difficult and agonizing.

An entirely new situation is developing in individual East European countries at the present time. In the past only one party claimed to represent the ideas of socialism in every country. Today a plurality of currents, movements, associations and parties proclaiming socialist ideals is gradually forming in individual countries. Some of them are as yet in an amorphous state. Neither the new nor the old leftist forces are sufficiently clear on their program concepts. They do not as yet have a stable social base. But even now the embryos of certain tendencies are discernible in this somewhat muddled development. Thus, three new currents—socialist, communist, and mixed—can be differentiated with a greater or lesser degree of precision. Groupings and parties

belonging to the first current are trying to develop social democratic conceptions, using the theoretical and practical experience of Western social democracy and the national socialist movement that was halted at the end of the '40s. The second group of parties and groupings is trying to preserve its ties with its communist legacy. It accentuates the need for the purity of Marxist ideology, for protecting class principles and the egalitarian sentiments of the masses, and tries to preserve the old structural foundations of communist parties, especially democratic centralism. Finally, the third group of parties tries to synthesize certain Marxist-Leninist principles and social democratic ideas. Through ideological and organizational compromises, they are trying to prevent a split and to unify both leftist and right-wing forces in their ranks.

The quite frequently expressed opinion in Western Europe is that social democrats alone have a future among today's leftist forces in East European countries. The remark of Oskar Lafontaine, prominent West German social democrat—"The specter abroad in Eastern Europe is the specter of social democracy"—is popular. Social democratic ideas indeed find a certain degree of response among the intelligentsia, partly among youth. But at any rate, their attractive force should not be exaggerated at the present time. Thus, Hungarian and Polish socialists who are the successors to the communist parties have not as yet succeeded in attracting the masses to social democratic slogans. Social democratic parties that are forming on an entirely new basis and that are not in any way connected with the old communist parties, as attested to by the experience of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, will possibly be more popular.

However it cannot be thought that parties with a communist orientation have lost all social support. They have their own supporters not only among the elderly population that occasionally finds it difficult to abandon old principles and attachments, but also among part of the working class, especially the part that is connected with large enterprises. Leftist radical traditions are still alive in individual countries. But it is unlikely that these parties will become mass parties in the majority of countries.

On the whole, leftist parties of the new type in East European countries are still in the formative process. This process is primarily characterized by the renunciation of rigorism, both ideological and organizational. Most new and reformed parties try to approach the Marxist-Leninist legacy dialectically, to understand it in the spirit of the new realities. Their striving to eliminate excessive ideological content from their activity, to develop more pragmatic programs are noteworthy. Practically all leftist parties are advancing a program of democratic socialism in which they try to combine traditional socialist values and the idea of transition to a commodity economy. But they also have their own unique understanding of the formula of democratic socialism. Thus PDS ideologues interpret it as the third

path of development between capitalism and authoritarian socialism. But a number of other parties, in particular the Hungarian Socialist Party, and the Polish social democrats very strongly perceive democratic socialism as a program that makes it possible to return to the values of world civilization and to integrate with Western countries. The new program document of the Slovenian Communist Party is specifically called "For the European Standard of Living." It defines ways of incorporating the republic in general European structures. The Bulgarian Communist Party in turn is developing the platform called "the Bulgarian path to Europe. 'We must depart from the 'bloc society' that has developed in our countries," notes P. E. Mitev, its leader. "We must restore severed relations between East and West, i. e., we must effect reintegration."⁴ Many ideologues of the liberal perception of democratic socialism attempt to overcome the old rigid ideological systems and to return to the entire spectrum of the leftist intellectual movement. They view socialism itself as a current, as a movement or as a tendency in the development of mankind. They most often consider the Scandinavian model of development as the ideal of social organization.

Among circles that are usually called "traditionalist" or "fundamentalist," to the contrary, the "democratic socialism" concept is used to preserve the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Not only ideological platforms of leftist forces, but also the organizational basis of their activity are changing. Many parties have renounced the principle of democratic centralism and are trying to organize their work primarily on the basis of democratic unity or consensus. Thus conditions are expanding for a plurality of views, positions and interests within parties, which finds reflection in the formation of party clubs, various currents, and platforms. Factions have begun developing in individual parties and this fact can no longer be considered seditious. We note at the same time that a mechanism for coordinating positions in these parties has not been developed as yet. New parties therefore have a very difficult time reaching general decisions. They also lack the sufficient degree of consolidation required to wage an active political struggle.

Most leftist parties have substantially restructured their central organs that now more closely resemble a party parliament than a closed military headquarters. Their apparatus, which henceforth will perform purely technical functions, is being substantially reduced (by more than half and in some parties by 70-75 percent). Intraparty activity is now beginning to be performed primarily by volunteers. The center of activity is shifting to low-level party organizations that now have a decisive package of rights and that may at their discretion form horizontal structures.

The separation of communist parties and the state has begun and this process will ultimately culminate in the formation of new power in the course of the forthcoming elections. But the majority of leftist parties in individual

countries have already left the army, justice and internal affairs organs that will henceforth become ideologically neutral. Communist parties' repudiation toward the production principle of activity, which reinforced the intervention of party organizations in economic life, has begun and, judging by all appearances, will become universal. Individual leftist parties are abandoning enterprises and are transferring their work to territorial communities where the basic political struggle is today. The mechanism of the indirect influence of communist parties on society—through the creation of discussion clubs and various associations—is gradually being born. However it is a difficult process: these parties' loss of elementary skills of existence without being "propped up" by the state makes itself known. The development of leftist parties is in the direction of their transformation into party-movements in which there is room for both ideological and organizational diversity.

The establishment of the new structure of leftist forces and the formation of each of them is as yet continuing. It can take all manner of different forms. The departure of some leftist forces from the political arena and the emergence of others are not excluded. The split of certain existing parties into several groupings or parties is possible. The "Democratic Forum" current that has formed within the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the "Alternative Socialist Union" in the Bulgarian Communist Party, or a number of factions and platforms in other parties can be transformed into independent parties at any time. The unification of several platforms or movements into a single party is probable in the other instance. Considerable time will be required to create more or less stable party structures, especially after such a shock.

The first free parliamentary elections will be a serious test for leftist parties. Elections to local organs of power are expected in Poland. What can they bring? The elections that have already been held in Poland (in 1989) and very recently in Hungary and the GDR are indicative to a certain degree. Their results indicate that the leftist parties cannot at the present time count on the broad support of society whose sympathies at least now are on the side of the opposition forces. There is reason to believe that in the great majority of the East European countries we will soon be witnessing the creation of a coalition system of power. Communist parties and other leftist forces will more likely be merely one of its participants and even then not a major participant. In some places governments will be formed without the representation of leftist forces at all. This means that those who express socialist ideas will go over to the opposition. If not now, then somewhat later such a fact is possible in a large number of countries. In any case, it is unlikely that socialist forces will exert a dominant influence on policy in the majority of them in the near future. Such is the price that these forces will be forced to pay for long years of sovereignty. This is how a leader of the former Polish Communist Party defined the possible future of leftist forces: "The possibility is not excluded that the next

decade in all Eastern Europe will be under the sign of power of rightwing governments. This will be a reaction to communist failures—both real and exaggerated—that took place in the past.”⁵

In this connection, there is increasing skepticism both in the West and in the East European countries regarding the future of the leftist forces, especially the communist parties. These sentiments were very precisely expressed by M. Djilas⁶, who said: “The end of Marxism has already begun. It no longer exists as an international movement and it will not be restored to life. This is also the end of the perfect Marxist utopian society.”⁷ Many Western Marxists reason in approximately the same spirit. “Yes, this is the end of communism, the fall of systems that were born in 1917,” says M. Jacque, editor-in-chief of *MARXISM TODAY*, the theoretical organ of British communists. “It is the end of systems based on the one-party system, on overcentralized planning, on authoritarianism; systems that are divorced from the Western world.”⁸ How well founded are these conclusions? How can what is happening to the communist parties in Eastern Europe be explained: as a crisis of final decay or a crisis leading to rebirth? One and the same process—the gradual departure of authoritarian political organizations that tried to realize a simplistic communist utopia from the arena—would seem to be taking place in both the East European and Western communist movement. Some of these parties will disappear already tomorrow. Others may survive in political life for an indeterminate time, but they, too, will gradually become a marginal force. Does this mean the end of the leftist vision of social development? In no way! Not only our own experience but Western experience as well show that a civilization cannot exist and renew itself without alternatives. The absolute monopoly of rightwing forces can lead to no less sad consequences than the omnipotence of leftist doctrinaires. Even L. Walesa, one of the best known leaders of the noncommunist movement today, recently declared that society can “stand only on two legs—left and right.” The future, however, belongs to the socialist forces capable of creating a truly democratic organization that can combine the ideals of equality, social protections, and the demands of social, especially economic, progress. The present social atmosphere in most countries is unfavorable to the rebirth of leftist parties—they still bear the burden of mistrust generated by their predecessors. But already in the next few years, all countries will obviously have an increasing need for their activity. This will be inevitable when these countries make the transition to a commodity economy, when the problem of social justice becomes especially pressing. But the possibility is not excluded that at that very moment the leftist forces will face a new serious threat—that when faced with danger they will become a political organization representing the interests of the populist movement. At a time when the market is forming, how can we resist the temptation to become the representative of the interests only of the infringed part of society, how can we avoid the egalitarian bias, how can we prevent the transformation of those who today have

become conservative strata into a receding party? This is a question that will still confront all leftist parties. Their future will depend on how they address it.

3. The dialectics of political pluralism

For the first time in decades of leveling or of diversity strictly dosed and controlled from above, Eastern Europe has embarked on a path of real political pluralism. Social life in individual countries is presently a Brownian motion of scores and possibly even hundreds (after all, not all of them are as yet registered) groupings, currents and parties. In most countries this process has been legalized by the appropriate legislation. In Yugoslavia where a multiparty system does not formally exist, there are already tens of *de facto* quasi-party associations. Thus, prolonged debates regarding the feasibility of political pluralism were summed up spontaneously from below: it already exists. It is hardly possible for anyone to imagine the precise mosaic of the diversity that suddenly originated in all countries: some political organizations emerge, others suddenly disappear or change their name and orientation. The majority of them are in the stage of forming their programs and organizational principles, of searching for their social base. But no matter how confused the new, just born political structure of society, several types of political associations can be discerned in it. Let us first discuss noncommunist parties that existed within the framework of the administrative system. Such parties operated in Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. To be sure, most of these organizations could only conditionally be called parties. All of them became adjuncts of the ruling party. They essentially became departments of it operating under a different sign. Under conditions of burgeoning political activity, however, it suddenly developed that these parties included forces that aspired to independent activity, to life without a lead.

Noncommunist Polish parties—the United Peasants’ Party and the Democratic Party—were the first to embark on the path of rebirth. But the very first manifestation of their independence had painful consequences for the communists. The UPP and the DP started by leaving the Polish United Workers’ Party and by going over to the opposition at the most critical time when the fate of the new Polish government was being decided. While this step can be evaluated in various ways from the standpoint of morality, the policy had its own logic. These parties, which had long been in the unenviable role of instruments of another’s will, evidently believed that the past freed them of further obligations to the Polish United Workers’ Party. This example only showed the total unreliability of coalitions and a multiparty system based on coercion and the inequality of the sides. Soon embarking on the road of independence in the wake of the noncommunist Polish parties were: the Czechoslovak People’s Party, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Slovak Freedom Party; the Liberal Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Peasants’ Party of Germany, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (GDR), and

the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union. Many of them adopted a critical, even oppositional position vis-a-vis the communists. It is noteworthy that many of these parties modernized their program and their organization much faster than the communist parties. The ideas advanced by these parties concerning liberal democracy, individual liberties, a rule-of-law state, antimonopolistic guarantees, mixed property, protection of [free] enterprise, and of the transfer of land to the peasants evoke a definite response from society. We note that some of the noncommunist parties surviving in Eastern Europe have progressive traditions of long standing. Thus, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party are continuers of democratic movements dating back to the end of the 19th century. The Liberal Democratic Party of Germany traces its beginning back to the German People's Party and German Democratic Party which were abolished by Hitler. The Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union originated at the beginning of the century. The rich historical past and traditions are a factor of no small importance that facilitates their activity today. At the same time, many of them also feel the burden of the past which takes the form of inglorious submission and the renunciation of independence that makes it difficult for them to broaden their social base. Therefore, some of the noncommunist parties that have survived the administrative system are trying to make the most decisive changes in an effort to create a new image for themselves in society.

In addition to the old parties, in the East European countries there have appeared a multitude of new movements, associations and parties. Their membership varies from a few score to several tens of thousands. Special note should be taken of the rebirth of parties that once existed in the people's democracies, whose activity was forcibly terminated. Among them the National Land Party and National Liberal Party in Romania, the Small Farmers' Party in Hungary, and the Polish Peasants' Party. Previously abolished social democratic parties are being recreated everywhere. Thus, the newly organized Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia may soon pass the Czechoslovak Communist Party in membership. There is much that indicates that these reborn "historical" parties that once enjoyed considerable weight and popularity can become an influential political force today.

But nevertheless most of the new associations and parties in neighboring countries are appearing for the first time. The Hungarian Democratic Forum and Union of Free Democrats can be named among the best formed new organizations. Most of the others are still in the formative stage. Some of them, however, have already begun to play an active political role. Among them are the German "Democratic Breakthrough" and "Democracy Now," the Free Democratic Party; the Czechoslovak "Rebirth" Club for Social Restructuring, the Christian Democratic Party, the Slovak Independent Democrats' Party, etc. A new type of party is formed with a flexible organizational structure, usually

without intermediate organizational links or with their reduction to coordinating centers; parties that allow broad pluralism of opinions. Much more important to these parties is not the institution of membership, but the ability to influence the position of the electorate at an important time (for example, at election time). A specific feature of the GDR is the formation of a multiparty structure analogous to what already exists in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The largest, most influential entities in East European countries at the given moment, however, are not parties, but are broad democratic movements without the rigid membership institution that include representatives of different social strata and ideological and political currents. Among them: the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the New Forum in the GDR, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, the National Salvation Front in Romania, and Solidarity in Poland. These movements formed on the wave of protest against authoritarianism and dictatorial regimes. While they are as yet of an amorphous nature, the needs of political struggle compel them to take on a few definite organizational structures. The National Salvation Front in Romania has become a temporary institution of power. This fact has created very favorable conditions for its participation in the elections. The Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, which was successful in heading up the people's movement, has already taken upon itself the basic functions of governing the nation. Alternative movements in other countries were initially somewhat weaker. But here, too, opposition forces are becoming united on the same platform. The growing popularity of the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces and the New Forum in the GDR, which have become a serious opponent of the communist parties, can serve as an example.

At the same time, we cannot fail to see contradictions in the development of mass movements. These movements were a decisive force in the destruction of obsolete social mechanisms. They cleared the road to power for new political forces and new leaders. But under peaceful conditions, especially if they are not opposed by a serious political force, their role inevitably declines and centrifugal tendencies begin within them, and that which disunifies various social and national groups comes to the surface. Such was the fate of people's fronts in the people's democracies at one time. It is being repeated to a certain degree in the development of Poland's Solidarity. It originated as a mass protest movement against administrative socialism, which according to some estimates was supported by about 10 million Poles at one time. In recent years it has had fewer than two million supporters and this number continues to decline. The factionalization of Solidarity's ranks intensified when it came to power. This is understandable. After all, from the multitude of orientations developing within it, Solidarity leaders had to choose one, thereby creating a camp of the dissatisfied. The present struggle within Solidarity between its various currents—primarily between syndicalist and party-political currents—has become an

obvious fact. In the near future, it will obviously be impossible to avoid the split of the formerly powerful movement into several parties or into a party and a trade union. It will be difficult for different social directions—forces that occasionally express opposing interests—to live under the same roof. They were previously united by a common enemy: the Polish United Workers' Party. New socialist parties have now formed. Even now there has developed a situation that merits attention: it will be easier for certain forces in the socialist parties and in Solidarity to negotiate with one another than with colleagues in their own organization. This can be the basis for new political unions in the future. Incidentally, such obliteration of boundaries between individual groupings in leftist parties is also taking place among alternative forces in other countries.

Notwithstanding the existence of mass movements in individual countries, the pluralism that has developed in this countries is nevertheless of a fragmentary nature. What is more, as already stated, mass alternative movements are very unstable and in the future may disintegrate into a number of parties and groupings. Under the conditions of fragmented pluralism, any force with political ambitions must seek allies. The process of consolidation and formation of more or less stable blocs among the alternative forces has begun and is developing quite actively. GDR opposition parties were among the first to form their own coalition in preparation for the forthcoming elections. Let us now attempt to imagine the general picture of political life in East European countries. Notwithstanding all their differences, it is also possible to discern one feature that is common to all countries: a weak center; a relatively active movement on the right flank to which the activity of the majority of the newly formed associations is shifting; a very diffuse field "from the left" that is as yet distinguished by a lesser political tonus and is far less settled. In some places, Romania, for example, this space is practically barren. Certain parties such as the Christian Democratic Union in the GDR and the Democratic Forum in Germany are clearly trying to occupy centrist positions, to become a kind of moderator in relations between leftists and right-wingers. However it must be stated that the "center" frequently clearly veers to the right perhaps by virtue of the continuing weakness of leftist parties.

What kind of political currents have surfaced in East European countries? The great majority are: leftist, including the social democratic current; neoliberal, Westernizing; national-patriotic; populist, agrarian; ecological; anarchistic; and Christian democratic. But it is also possible to encounter other orientations, including fascist and even monarchistic. In addition to secular political forces, in some countries, all manner of religious organizations and societies as well as the church are active, to be sure, frequently behind the scenes. In the GDR, it is specifically the Evangelical Church, that was long in opposition to the incumbent regime, that gave asylum and shelter to dissenters, and that created a *de facto* base for forming the foundations of the opposition

movement. It also initiated roundtable talks between the opposition and the communists. In Poland the Catholic Church was also instrumental in promoting the dialog between the Polish United Workers' Party and Solidarity that led to a new political structure in the nation. Even now the powerful, albeit hidden, influence of the bishopric and Catholic social doctrine on the political course of Polish society is felt. It would be no exaggeration to conclude that not a single important decision can be made in Poland if it evokes disagreement on the part of the local Catholic church. Church circles are also exerting a greater influence on political life in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and individual republics of Yugoslavia. What is more, in the face of the factionalization and hostility existing in relations in society between individual forces and political blocs, the church frequently plays a restraining and conciliatory role in its effort to neutralize conflicts. But its own weight and significance as a political arbiter, as the bearer of certain moral and ethical values are enhanced in the process.

Extremist political groupings of a nationalist nature are forming in multiethnic countries—Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania. Most of them are as yet small but quite militant. The program of one of the recently emerging Yugoslav nationalistic parties—the so-called Serbian People's Renewal—calls for the creation of an independent Serbian kingdom. In addition to attempts to revive the Chetnik movement that existed in the '40s, there are attempts to organize "great Croatian," "great Albanian" and similar associations. Considering the urgency of national and ethnic conflicts—and not only in Yugoslavia—the possibility that such movements might develop into mass movements cannot be excluded.

We note a fear-inspiring fact: thoroughly warranted disappointment with former political parties frequently turns into unjustified idealization of alternative movements. Under these conditions, new disappointments may be forthcoming and soon. Of course, among the leaders of new forces there are people who have high moral authority in society, such as V. Havel, L. Walesa, Zh. Zhelev. But in a number of countries, these forces have not as yet brought forth charismatic personalities capable of unifying society at such a critical time. In no country do alternative forces have a sufficient number of cadres capable of managerial work and therefore the new forces will be compelled largely to rely on the old apparatus. And it must be recognized that yesterday's opposition forces are not Martians, nor are they ideal people grown in test tubes. They are part and parcel of the society they have grown up in and they have therefore absorbed its stereotypes. Regarding some of them, it can be explicitly stated that they are the children—albeit illegitimate—of the system, but with the opposite sign, no less than dogmatic communists, and that they are inclined to be intolerant of Bonapartist ways. This is attested to by the irreconcilable attitude of many alternative leaders and those around them toward leftist forces.

It appears that at the given moment the disappointment of society in the new social forces that have entered political life would be dangerous. Certain signs of this disappointment are already seen in individual countries. But under conditions when the masses are losing hope for both old and new movements, the result may be a dangerous vacuum that might be filled either by spontaneous elements or by by no means democratic forces that are still in the wings.

On the whole the present character of political pluralism in Eastern Europe has been very unstable. And this is natural if we consider that its formation has only begun. The skills of political intercourse, dialog, and compromise so necessary for the development of multiparty life have been lost (they were not developed everywhere). Social and national polarization of society, the preservation and, in some places, the intensification of the atmosphere of mutual intolerance between individual groupings, also make themselves known. Incidentally, this process is largely inevitable—in the initial phases of development of a pluralist structure, tendencies toward factionalization, toward the separation of the part from the whole, from the mass, toward increasing individual and collective egoism will necessarily predominate. Such is the path of development of individual political subjects. In this case, it is difficult to avoid the intensification of the political struggle and the emergence of extremism which gives incipient pluralism an explosive nature. At any rate, the dominant tendency today is not to negotiate, but is rather to eliminate a rival at any price. This is frequently the line regarding communist parties or their successors, which incidentally complicates their renewal and limits the potential of leftist reform circles.

The development of pluralism in late 1989 and early 1990 in all countries was influenced by the fact that this was the pre-election period. It was specifically this fact that lent still greater weight to political clashes. The efforts of literally all participants in public life were directed more not to refining their programs or polishing their responses to organizational questions, but toward winning the voter by any means. Attempts to discredit rivals also became frequent. The latter device was tested more than once and not without success by certain forces in the course of the pre-election struggle in Hungary. The approach of the elections forced certain organizations to correct their programs accordingly, to increase their popular appeal, and to pigeonhole anything that would not appeal to the average voter. Only after the pre-election makeup is removed is it possible to see the real face of every political actor participating in this game. We add that it may be entirely different from what it appeared to be to the masses.

Incidentally there are both subjective and objective reasons behind the diffuseness of ideological and political life in individual countries. The fact of the matter is that the old social-class structure that only yesterday supported the building of statist socialism is preserved in

society. What is more, the crisis that grips all neighboring countries today has not only not led to the emergence of more progressive features of this structure but, entirely to the contrary, has strengthened its conservative features. New social groups have ceased to form; integrated social relations on the verge of forming have been disrupted; mass differences and irreconcilability between individual strata have intensified—in a word, structural features of archaic industrial society have come into play. This fact is not seen everywhere at a time when society's democratic impulse has not yet abated, while a certain degree of euphoria about one's own victory still remains. But in countries that embarked on the road of reform earlier—Hungary and Poland—it has already become obvious how difficult it is to build a new political life on an old social base. The formation of more dynamic social groups and interests that would be the source of new political movements is impossible. After all, an economy based on directives is preserved—it continues to support old interests and old ideological and political stereotypes. The result is a vicious circle: the formation of the new political reality is protracted because of the absence of the necessary socioeconomic conditions, but the latter cannot be realized without the creation of an appropriate political course, without altering the content of policy proper. In principle political forces can exist not on the basis of social differences, but on the basis of certain common interests, as is evidenced by the development of the "green" movement. But the whole point is that the surviving social structure characteristic of a precommodity society and its typical system of interests and principles also complicate integration based on common human values. As a result, the new pluralism is also firmly anchored to the surviving foundation of the half-destroyed authoritarian building. What can this result in? Anything at all. As long as there is a socioeconomic basis for administrative socialism, it is difficult to eliminate the ambiguity in society's interests that may acquire an opposite directionality. And this will inevitably be reflected in political life and makes it unpredictable. Thus, forces that favored democracy yesterday may suddenly make a 180-degree turn today and advocate the idea of a powerful authority. It is difficult to forecast political development that is not supported by a socioeconomic base. In any event, Western models of pluralism cannot be mechanically applied to East European countries. Even now one can see many paradoxes here that are simply unthinkable in the West. Thus the syndicalistically minded Solidarity is forming a neo-liberal government that is for the first time trying to carry out economic reform in the style of M. Thatcher notwithstanding the egalitarian mentality of rank-and-file members of the movement. Some leftist forces may be more to the right than the opposition. Thus, the Hungarian Socialist Party goes farther in its demands for economic liberalization, for the introduction of the private sector than the Democratic Forum, for example.

The formation of new parliaments and governments which should be completed by summer of the current

year will bring a certain measure of stability to political life. However even under favorable circumstances, it will take several years before the correlation of political forces in individual countries would acquire at least a relatively stable character. We are still witnessing the replacement of one government by another, the disintegration of certain alliances and coalitions and the formation of others. It is also necessary to consider that in many countries, there is diversity in principle of rather weak movements that can hardly pursue a stable course.

What kind of contribution will alternative forces make to the new nature of public life in these countries? Considering the coalition nature of the new authority, one can proceed from the premise that the political course of society will be formed on the basis of compromises between individual parties and movements. The existing correlation of forces in East European countries and the nature of the dominant ideologies alone make it possible to assume that the immediate future of these countries will be determined by the struggle and interaction of the following political currents—neoliberal, leftist, national-patriotic, and populist that can be in different combinations with one another. Depending on the content of these political unions, there can be three basic variants of the further development of East European countries. Let us begin with the neoliberal variant because Poland has already followed this scenario. A number of other countries also incline toward it. Here is the essence of the neoliberal course: political and ideological pluralism, i. e., the competitiveness of all forces and their programs of development; broad, Western-type democracy with its characteristic division of powers, rule-of-law state, and emphasis on individual rights and civil liberties; the immediate transition to the market with restriction on the state's protective role. Neoliberals consider the return to private ownership, emphasis on enterprise, competition and individualism the only way to the rebirth of society. They essentially reject the possibility of a "third" nonauthoritarian path of development and suggest a return to the solutions developed by Western society. Here is how the essence of the neoliberal conception was reflected by Solidarity's press organ: "We shall have to go through the stage from which we once came, through the stage of selfish capitalism with its struggle between people, with lockouts and unemployment...." The fate of the neoliberal course in Eastern Europe—its victory or defeat—will largely depend on whether the trailblazing countries are successful in carrying out the entire planned series of steps, including reprivatization, price reform, shutting down unprofitable enterprises, combating hyperinflation, and in avoiding profound social shocks in the process. One should also listen to observers who believe that attempts to "jump" into the market are too dangerous for the stability of society. There are those who think it altogether impossible to make the transition to the market under conditions of scarcity and the worsening economic crisis. Many believe that even under favorable conditions it will take many, 15-20 years for the commodity economy to form. In a word, there is an overabundance

of grounds for skepticism concerning radical economic reform. But the neoliberals also have an important argument in their favor: all attempts to creep into the market gradually—in particular in Hungary and Poland in the '80s—have also been unsuccessful.

Political forces opting for the social democratic scenario of development are trying to combine the ideas of equality, social justice and the demands of the market. A mixed economy, equality of all forms of property, participation of work collectives in the management of production and the distribution of goods, state control over the development of a commodity economy, emphasis on social policy—such are the basic features of their program. The social democratic path takes into account to a greater degree the complexity of the social situation in our region and the fact that broad strata are not prepared for life under market conditions. However only the future can show which type of therapy is optimal for the patient: surgery or medication. World experience shows, however, that the social democratic program is more in keeping with the period of prosperity and social stability; the period of crisis resolution and search for new growth incentives, on the other hand, has always been accompanied by the assumption of power by the conservatives. We shall soon see whether Eastern Europe rejects this pattern or whether it will take shape here as well.

In the given context, we must also not fail to mention one other possible variant of development: authoritarianism. Unfortunately the possibility of authoritarianism is not entirely excluded in the majority of countries. Depending on ethnic and concrete specifics of individual countries, authoritarianism may be reflected in various forms—in the dictatorship of one or several political forces, possibly also including the army. Its administrative or party-oriented character is theoretically conceivable. A return to authoritarianism is most likely in the event of the failure of neoliberal or social democratic variants of development. It is not excluded in the event ruling political forces are unable to create constructive coalitions under conditions of unceasing struggle for power or the worsening of crisis conditions in society. Authoritarianism may be the result of populist or national-patriotic movements. It is difficult to separate them. We emphasize that there is a potential social base for a "strong authority" regime in all countries. In one or another country this regime will prove to be the necessary or only means of preserving the stability of a society that is torn by social and ethnic conflicts. But in any event, such a turn of events will only complicate and slow down the transition to a new society.

4. Complexities and contradictions of transition

It would be a major error to assume that a new society is already developing in the countries of Eastern Europe. All of them are in different stages of the period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This period has its own logic and regularities which are still

not entirely clear. It inevitably covers a very long historical period. World practice does not yet have the experience of reform of an etatist party system of the pseudosocialist type. We have therefore embarked on an unknown road that still holds many surprises for us. In this connection it is important to attempt to analyze the basic problems that are arising in East European countries today.

The fact that there is a mass protest movement against the administrative system in all these countries still does not mean that all obstacles to forming a democratic society have disappeared. The braking mechanism continues to exist there, too, and it takes on a slightly different character. In the majority of neighboring countries, Stalinist and neo-Stalinist forces are isolated from power. But we note that everywhere there is a very broad social base of a different kind of conservatism that is based on a mixture of nationalism, chauvinism, and egalitarianism, on stereotypes and prejudices inherited from authoritarian socialism. In addition to this, with the transition of individual countries from the destruction of the past to the creation of the new, the absence or lack of development of traditions of civilian society, the quite low level of political culture of a significant part of the working people, the unevenness of development of individual regions, the multiethnic character of a number of countries, etc., are increasingly beginning to make themselves felt. The disruption of the continuity of historical development in socialist society, the rupture of the thread of general civilization, the loss of previously accumulated traditions, the weakening of the role of spiritual and moral ideals, in a word, of everything that could guarantee the integrity of society, that could take the edge off social shocks are increasingly making themselves felt. Under these conditions, the collapse of superficial administrative relations increases the danger of decay and uncontrollable processes. It is very difficult and even risky to erect a new structure on soil that crumbles underfoot. We add to this the fact that the transition to the democratic system in all countries is made under conditions of socioeconomic crisis that also limits the potential of the reforms. After all, it is necessary to think about not aggravating an already explosive situation by postponing the adoption of radical measures to normalize the economy in some places to this end.

Many difficulties have been created in countries instituting reforms by the lack of a clear vision of the new society that remains to be built and of deeply substantiated tactics and strategy of the transitional period. The old conceptions have been abandoned, but the resulting theoretical vacuum has not yet been filled. Social movement therefore is now more in the blind by trial and error and is frequently generally spontaneous. In principle, there is nothing tragic about spontaneous development; it is specifically self-regulation that the old society lacked so direly. But the logic of the transition period demands political will, possibly extreme pressure as well, clear coordinates and goals, and a vision of the future, without which the creation of new structures may slow down and

even stop. In Western society, these reforms have become a continuous process of spontaneous self-renewal even though it is sometimes necessary to use forceful means. In our countries, the internal source of self-regulation has been lost or more precisely has been destroyed by the administrative system. Therefore society still needs an external jolt to get moving. The new forces coming to power are sometimes weak and inexperienced, lack precise principles, or are simply afraid to resort to unpopular but frequently inevitable measures for fear of losing the support of the masses.

A mass antitotalitarian movement has originated in all countries. No country has as yet formed a sufficiently broad social base for a definite political course. The need to take strict measures to introduce economic regulators can cause social support for the reformers to wane. The problem of consolidating advocates of the new democratic, market-type system is now developing in all countries. In this connection it is necessary to revise old ideas of the leading social forces. Thus there are many who now reflect on the kind of role the working class will play in the forthcoming reforms and on whose side it will take: the social democrats, communists, syndicalists, neoliberals, or the populists. The situation in the working class is ambiguous and its differentiation is increasing. There are whole groups of workers who support the course of democratization and the market. But a significant part of them still fears reforms. The first attempts to introduce market mechanisms in Hungary and Poland have already generated open dissatisfaction and protest by workers, especially collectives at large enterprises, and workers in heavy industry. Will the working class voluntarily be able to make the transition to new forms of life-activity? The fate of East European reforms will depend in large measure on this. We note, however, that the given reforms will lead to the creation of a "service and information society" in which the traditional proletariat with its class ideology will simply disappear, in which workers will already be destined to play an entirely different role. Considering this situation, the possible opposition of workers to new structures or even its linkage to neo-Stalinist or populist forces cannot be entirely excluded.

Illusions about perestroika can also be identified among obstacles to the creation of a new society. One of them concerns the possibility of pluralism, democratism, and self-government. Their attraction for the masses that lived a long time according to totalitarian laws is entirely understandable. However there are no grounds for absolutizing these principles, for viewing them as the sole regulator of development as certain alternative forces do. World experience shows that pluralism, democracy, and self-government can work only in combination with a certain share of centralism and a coordination mechanism. The bias that is already seen in only one direction in individual countries has seriously complicated not only perestroika but the elementary regularization of the life of society.

The further development of the East European countries can also be complicated by extremes in the definition of the avenues of their renewal. In the majority of these countries, the politically active part of society was divided into advocates of the national path of development and "Westerners" [zapadniki]. This division occasionally is more important than all other political differences. Thus among leftist forces and among alternative groupings, there are advocates of both orientations—both Western and national. What is more, life shows the possibility of the most unexpected developments. Advocates of the "national path" can be encountered in communist parties and among recent oppositionists. They emphasize the need to take into account the uniqueness of the East European region and one's own country, emphasize its uniqueness and the independent logic of its development, and show the impossibility of grafting "alien" mechanisms. They advance the idea of a third, original path of development, call for the elaboration of national social forms, some of which dubiously relate to the possibility of incorporating their countries in world integration ties. The views of extreme East European "pochvenniki" [back-to-the soil advocates] are drawing closer to the position of our own "pochvenniki" or "zayedinschiki" who are fond of repeating: "You can't understand Russia with your mind, you can't measure it with a common arshin...."

Of course, not all advocates of the "third path" can be measured by the same yardstick. There are among them obvious nationalist-conservatives who are generally opposed to the market and pluralism and who are prepared to allow a "patriotic dictatorship." But there are also influential moderate forces that are trying to find a new social path of development, to combine traditional market mechanisms, West European democracy, and national specifics. Such an orientation is specifically characteristic of the Hungarian Democratic Forum.

In turn, there are those who favor incorporating society in West European integration mechanisms and the direct use of Western developmental experience among Bulgarian communists and members of the Bulgarian League of Democratic Forces, among Slovenian and Croatian communists and the local opposition; among members of the Hungarian League of Free Democrats and Hungarian socialists, among the Czechoslovak Civic Forum, the socialist wing of Polish leftists and Solidarity. Between them there are also considerable differences in the understanding of social goals and the rate of their realization. They can be differentiated according to personal ambitions and the logic of their struggle for power. But there is also something that unifies the "Westerners." They argue that all attempts to find a third path will inevitably lead society into another blind alley. "Don't invent the bicycle, even one with six wheels," they say. "You have to follow the road of Western society." The Hungarian League of Free Democrats is a typical representative of the Western orientation. "There can be no third path of social development," its program

states. "Our goal is to return to European civilization. We are going from one social system to another. A third system is impossible."

Only social practice can become the weightiest argument in favor of one or another path of development. However it is obvious that any extremes—the refusal to see the logic of development from the general standpoint of civilization, the reluctance to reckon with the specifics and concrete level of development of individual countries—can only lead to the creation of new artificial systems that do not take into account the entire wealth of lines and tendencies inherent in real life. Eastern Europe has already begun turning toward social forms that belong not to some one class, but that have evolved in the course of mankind's development. But it is obvious that institutions that have been tested and have proven their effectiveness under one set of national conditions will operate differently under others. The patterns of development of general civilization are already beginning to assume unique forms in individual countries. This also finds reflection in the development of pluralism, commodity relations, and parliamentary democracy and in the resolution of the ethnic question. East European countries are coming out onto the common road of progress, but with their own baggage of traditions, experience, and stereotypes. To be sure, before they can join the developed societies, they will have to negotiate a very complex and steep crossing.

The basic tests for East European countries are still ahead. The decisive test among them is the transition to the market. As of now the democracy and pluralism that have formed in them are as if suspended in mid-air. And only new economic relations and the commodity economy with its characteristic complex system of forms of property can guarantee that the changes are irreversible. If it cannot be created, the entire superstructure will collapse like a house of cards. It is for this very reason that the problem of forming a market economy has now become the decisive problem in the building of a new society. There are now few who doubt, at least openly, the need to make the transition to economic regulators. Debates about how to make the transition to the market—immediately or gradually—and where to begin are now of secondary importance. To all appearances, the new forces that are coming to power do not intend to postpone this transition. The question of its political forms is more important today. It is known that Western Europe and world civilization as a whole initially followed the road of creating a market base; it frequently formed under the conditions of authoritarian or semiauthoritarian regimes and democratic institutions subsequently formed on its basis. The relatively more rapid progress of political reforms and the democratization of society has been a unique feature of Eastern Europe. This was not by chance, but was a natural result of development according to an upside-down scheme. In socialist society, policy has replaced its entire life including economics which simply never existed in our country in the traditional sense. Under these conditions

the reform of power, and cardinal change in the content and role of policy are the prerequisite to all other reforms. However, the relatively more rapid progress of political change is even now creating considerable problems in all countries. They are the direct consequence of the non-coincidence and frequently the contradiction between the tasks of democracy and the demands of economic effectiveness. In some countries, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the state to stand up to the onslaught of interests aroused by liberalization, which it is very difficult to channel into production. Under these conditions, here and there—even in alternative circles—appeals for the establishment of authoritarian power are beginning to be heard. Both the Hungarian and the Polish experience is already showing that it is very difficult to introduce the market under conditions of democratization. However, attempts to appeal to the "strong hand" are even more dangerous. Until recently, authoritarian regimes existed in all countries of the "socialist world." Martial law was even introduced in Poland for a certain period of time, but it did not by any means lead to the creation of a commodity economy. Analogies with South Korea, with Chile after Pinochet, which achieved economic growth under dictatorships, are entirely inapplicable to us. All the indicated countries even under totalitarianism had something that we still do not have: a real market. Attempts to appeal to authoritarian power in a society that has only thrown off the fetters of dictatorship might cause a protest movement that will sweep away everyone, including "non-authoritarianists." At the same time, the possibility is not excluded that with the transition to the market circumstances may arise that will compel the leadership of one or another country to resort to a power regime of a sort, e. g., to give the government extraordinary powers to carry out the necessary economic measures. But this policy can be successful under two conditions: if the economic reform program enjoys the support of the greater part of society and if all democratic institutions (parliament, an independent press) which must become an obstacle to the unjustified increase in administration by mere injunction, are preserved.

There is one more factor that cannot only seriously influence the events in Eastern Europe, but can also deform their development. We refer to ethnic contradictions and conflicts that have long smoldered hidden from view but that are now coming to the surface. They can have the most serious consequences in the Balkans. The most explosive ethnic cauldron is Yugoslavia where age-old interethnic and interrepublic contradictions have reached a critical point, where they threaten the disintegration of the entire federation. This country's example is very instructive for us. At a time, as a result of delays with overdue reforms, unresolved socioeconomic problems in Yugoslavia began to acquire the form of interethnic conflicts for which a historical foundation existed. But today ethnic irreconcilability has become a factor that hinders reforms on a national scale. Under these conditions, the most developed republics such as Slovenia are trying to abandon a sinking ship in an effort

to find their own course. The aggravation of the interrepublic problem is possible in Czechoslovakia where hidden currents between the two republics have always existed. We add to this the revival of ethnic and chauvinistic feelings in other multiethnic countries. The problem of Bulgaria's Islamic minority has surfaced. Measures taken by the country's leadership to restore justice for its Turkish population have caused an upsurge of Bulgarian chauvinism that can influence the political situation in the nation as a whole. The future fate of Hungarian and German minorities in Romania is a question that is in a suspended state.

There are serious grounds for concluding that on the road to the new integration there will obviously inevitably be a period of factionalization in which individual nations and nationalities will acquire a certain degree of sovereignty and possibly even statehood. At any rate, the time of unitary multiethnic states is past. Not excluded is the possibility that they will develop in the direction of an "asymmetrical federation," i. e., a rather free association of republics with non-identical structures and a different level of development, as some Yugoslav republics suggest. The formation of a confederation in Eastern Europe, moreover not only in the place of former multiethnic countries, is very probable. The formation of a confederation of independent countries in the future is also possible. But the tendency toward rapprochement will be preceded by the tendency to search for [a country's] own originality [samobytnost]. We recall that even Western Europe started its road to integration only when resources of independent national-state development were exhausted.

The character and orientation of social processes in the region depend largely on the general international background, on the position of world powers. In the age of socialist isolationism and the "iron curtain," these factors did not play such a substantial role. Today they can decisively influence the internal political situation in a given country. Let us take, for example, the movement that has begun to unify the two German states. It will soon lead to the emergence of a Central European power with a population of about 80 million people and enormous intellectual and economic potential. The emergence of such a power in whatever form—confederation or union—will alter the development of all European and even world processes. This fact will also influence internal life in neighboring countries, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia and in the USSR as well. Even now among the Polish population, which has always been particularly sensitive to the "German question," old fears relating to the existence of a neighbor that has already started two world wars are being revived especially with the revival of revanchist sentiments on the other side of the border. Such fears leave their mark on internal life: they can lead to increased conservatism, autarkic tendencies, and populist feelings.

THE TIMES has analyzed events in Eastern Europe as follows: "We are witnessing not only the expansion of freedom but also the emergence of new dangers as well."

In the Western press, one often sees the recent enthusiasm over events in Eastern Europe giving way to anxiety. Fears are also expressed in connection with the possible expansion of the zone of national and ethnic conflict in this region and probable social explosions with the transition to the market. D. Heisburg, director of the International Institute of Strategic Research in London has even posed the question: "How can another world war be avoided as a possible consequence of the present destabilization in Eastern Europe?"

It is possible that the basic zone of tectonic change in most countries is still ahead. In this connection even now there is a need to develop an international "stability strategy" in Eastern Europe in general that would help to minimize possible conflicts (between nations as well) and that would create conditions for less painful change. Such a strategy must be developed collectively by Western and Eastern countries. The present situation demands the transition to a policy that transcends blocs, to the formation of an all-European consensus. It is the first time, at any rate since World War II, that processes in Europe and in the world have been so closely interconnected, intertwined, and interdependent. It is unlikely that Eastern Europe today can resolve its problems without the help of Western countries. But their fate will also depend to a certain degree on how processes develop in the Eastern part of the continent.

What kind of system is forming in Eastern Europe? It will hardly be correct to call it democratic socialism, especially if one considers the fact that noncommunist forces are coming to power in many countries, the development of reprivatization processes and, finally, the very fact that the concept "socialism" is beginning to be deleted from constitutions and other state documents. But the society that is forming also cannot be called capitalism. Incidentally, even the leaders of alternative movements are opposed to such an assessment. "The decline of communism is not by any means the victory of capitalism," states B. Generek, one of the leaders of the Poland's Solidarity. It must be considered that the influence of socialist ideas is very strong despite the decline of the communist parties. Even many alternative, noncommunist forces are influenced by socialist ideals even though their perception of them may be different.

The two-colored vision of social development and its division into socialist and capitalist in the orthodox, traditional understanding has exhausted itself. This may perhaps be the principal lesson of the events in Eastern Europe. The bipolar development of civilization is being replaced with a pluralism of societies that it is difficult if at all possible to classify as belonging to one or another system. The society that is forming in the countries of Eastern Europe will be radically different from Stalinist or neo-Stalinist society, but it will also not entirely resemble Western society. This society—at least in the foreseeable future—will be characterized by the much greater regulatory role of the state, by the preservation of certain restrictions on the free market, and by the

significant influence of egalitarianism on policy. However, this means not some third path of social progress, but rather national and concretely historical forms of realization of its common, universal principles.

From the editors: the present issue was already complete when the results of the elections to the GDR People's Chamber, which was a convincing victory for the conservatives, became known. Seats in the People's Chamber were distributed as follows: the conservative Alliance for Germany—193, the Social Democratic Party of Germany—87, PDS (the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany)—65, the Union of Free Democrats (a bloc of liberal parties)—21; other parties—34.

Footnotes

1. NOVOYE VREMYA, 18 January 1990, p. 7.
 2. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 20 December 1989.
 3. POLITYKA, 6 January 1990.
 4. NARODNA MLADZHZH, 16 January 1990.
 5. POLITYKA, 13 January 1990.
 6. A prominent figure in the Yugoslav Communist Party, a comrade-in-arms of Tito, who was expelled from its leadership for "revisionist views."
 7. CHINDUSTAN TIMES, 18 January 1990.
 8. NEWSWEEK, 11 December 1989, p. 60.
 9. TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSCI, 17 November 1989.
- COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1990

Product Specialization of Union Republics Compared

904M00116 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No. 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp. 135-138

[Article by L. Grigoryev: "Who is Feeding Whom?"]

[Text] The functioning of the Federation's national economic complex was subjected to serious tests in 1989 and early 1990. The list of problems in interrelations between republics is long: the closing of a number of ecologically dirty production facilities (*inter alia* at the behest of the local authorities and the population), political ("language" [yazykovyye]) strikes on railroads and at enterprises, and economic paralysis in the Transcaucasus. The movement toward political independence, the emergence of independent republic economic organisms in the Baltic, and periodic arguments about which republic is feeding which intensified the interest in the all-union balance and in regional specialization. The intention of significant political forces in a number of republics to withdraw them from the Federation in the

foreseeable future raises the question of the influence of these processes on the economy of both the "seceding" and the "remaining" republics. In the most general terms, it becomes obvious that all parties stand to lose. Let us examine these problems on the basis of the example of the Baltic republics and the RSFSR.

The nation's interregional specialization of production developed over more than a single decade and in a number of respects was carried to the point of absurdity. We must first of all note the creation of a vast heavy (especially defense) industry in Ural and Siberian cities which proved to be extremely poorly provided with food, consumer goods, and sociocultural institutions. Considering the fact that the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan dominated the raw materials branches, this type of siting led to the unjustified specialization of these regions, made them dependent on consumer goods shipped in from other regions, placed the responsibility for supply on the central government, and increased the load on rail transport and wholesale trade. This deprives local organs of power of any possibility of maneuvering and fosters additional social tension.

Monopolism in the production of a certain, frequently key product has made reproductive chains more vulnerable. This is especially well illustrated by recent events: The closing of "Nairit" in Yerevan and the Slotskiy Pulp and Paper Mill on the Riga coast. In the first instance, the country is left without chloroprene rubber—the raw material used in the manufacture of cables and drive belts. In the second, it is left without pulp, the nation's production of which is declining for ecological reasons, and many types of paper that are produced only by this mill. It was obvious long ago that backups were needed but nothing was done. The siting of ecologically dangerous enterprises in capitals and at resorts, in addition to the systematic development of bottlenecks in the economy, raises anxious doubts about the wisdom of centralized planning. The scattering of monopolistic enterprises among the various republics inevitably imposes the factor of political interrelations between the republics and Center and with one another on economic problems that are already difficult; in a number of cases, the problem takes on an "ethnic coloring." Energetic democratic movements in national republics may close down several "dirty" production facilities and in the event of similar actions in RSFSR cities, reproduction throughout the nation may be thoroughly disorganized.

Measure of Specialization of Union Republics in the Production of Certain Types of Goods

	Share (percent) in population of the USSR in 1989	Difference in shares: share in production minus share in population in percent								
		metal-cutting machine tools	electric power	oil	paper	meat	footwear	television sets	knitted goods	granulated sugar
RSFSR	51.40	-3.40	11.10	39.70	0.33	-1.20	-6.40	-6.10	-12.80	-18.70
Ukraine	18.00	1.70	00.60	-17.10	-12.40	3.30	5.30	17.60	0.30	32.90
Belorussia	3.56	6.94	-1.35	-3.26	-0.36	3.34	2.14	7.24	4.24	-0.56
Moldavia	1.51	-1.51	-0.51	-1.51	1.51	0.29	1.19	-0.61	1.99	1.59
Kazakhstan	5.77	-4.27	-0.57	-1.67	-5.67	1.03	-5.17	-5.77	-0.07	-3.17
Armenia	1.15	3.55	-0.25	-1.15	-0.95	-0.55	1.35	-1.15	4.45	-0.95
Georgia	1.90	-0.30	-1.00	-1.87	-1.40	-1.10	0.30	-1.30	1.30	-1.50
Azerbaijan	2.45	-2.05	-1.05	-0.25	-2.45	-1.75	0.05	-2.45	-0.15	-2.45
Lithuania	1.29	5.11	0.21	-1.29	0.61	2.11	0.11	6.51	2.01	0.71
Latvia	0.94	-0.94	-0.64	-0.94	1.46	1.16	0.36	-0.94	1.36	1.06
Estonia	0.55	-0.55	0.45	-0.55	0.95	0.85	0.25	-0.55	0.65	-0.55
Uzbekistan	6.94	-6.94	-3.94	-6.94	-6.94	-4.94	-6.94	-6.94	-1.34	-6.94
Kirghizia	1.50	-0.80	-0.70	-1.47	-1.50	-0.40	-0.10	-1.50	-0.40	-0.40
Tajikistan	1.78	2.62	-0.68	-1.74	-1.78	-1.28	-0.48	-1.78	-0.98	-1.28
Turkmenia	1.23	-1.23	-0.43	-1.14	-1.23	-0.93	-0.53	1.23	0.63	-0.93

Source: "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 g." [USSR National Economy in 1988], Moscow, 1989, pp 18, 340-343

The present character of interrepublic specialization ultimately reflects the nation's resource map. Almost all cotton is produced in Central Asia; the principal suppliers to the all-union fund are: potatoes—Belorussia; fruits and berries—Moldavia; grapes—Azerbaijan; vegetables—

Uzbekistan. Lithuania and Belorussia are outstanding for their deliveries of meat (for the size of their population), etc. The RSFSR, Ukraine and Belorussia account for 80-90 percent of all raw materials extracted and for 70-95 percent of all machine building (elsewhere this branch is developed

to an appreciable degree only in Armenia and Lithuania). Enterprises producing consumer durables are also primarily concentrated in the same republics. Only Lithuania accounts for an appreciable share of the nation's production of television sets and refrigerators (6.8 and 5.6 percent in 1988) as does Latvia in the case of radios, motorcycles and motor scooters (22 and 10.8 percent). The nucleus of the economic complex is practically concentrated in Russia, in the Ukraine, in Belorussia and Kazakhstan. The other republics have certain natural advantages, a skilled work force, and an infrastructure (Baltic republics) or individual monopolistic enterprises that satisfy the nation's needs. We cite as an example the Riga plant—the only producer of motor cars for electric trains.

Generally speaking, the Baltic republics are an integral part of the all-union division of labor and do not actually have other markets than the Federation in which to sell their light industry products (considering their quality by world standards) and do not have substantial, stable sources of hard currency (with the possible exception of tourism). Analysis of the table shows that the advantage of the Baltic republics in the production of food and light industry products is expressed in only a few percentage points on a national scale. It is specifically this that enables them to regulate their "intraunion export" in the face of the collapse of the nation's consumer market. However, the scale of dependence of republics on the division of labor within the Federation is considerably greater than indicated by production data. First, the refusal of some oblasts and republics to deliver their products without receiving products in return (example: paper from the Slokskiy Mill) shows what the trade of an independent republic with its former partners can become. The expansion of the rights of local Soviets and the acute consumer goods situation in many oblasts and the possibility of exporting raw-material commodities for hard currency will create a new complex of problems for the gosplans of independent republics. Leaving aside the political sympathies and emotions of trade partners, one can predict movement toward a series of bilateral clearing operations (or barter) not only with republics but also with INDIVIDUAL OBLASTS of the Federation: meat for household appliance spare parts, textiles for cotton, etc. This will encourage movement both in the direction of partial autarky and of the establishment of import-replacing enterprises with high production costs.

Second, the entire inventory of production equipment and household appliances in republics has formed within the framework of the Union and hence their modernization and repair are also part of the intraunion division of labor. The mass replacement of the equipment inventory in any Baltic republic, let us assume, on the basis of imports from the West would take years and would require radical and exorbitantly costly—in the billions of dollars—measures plus raising the skill level of the entire work force, especially the "Russian-speaking" work force, which accounts for more than half of the industrial and transport workers.

The possible consequences of the introduction of local currencies are most interesting. While it is difficult to calculate the possible exchange rate of, let us say, the Estonian crown at present, it is possible to imagine some of the more or less obvious consequences. First of all, the payment of wages in crowns, the collection of taxes in crowns, and the sale of goods for crowns inside a republic (and every republic will naturally introduce ITS OWN currency!) will go hand in hand with the delivery of the bulk of raw materials and equipment from the "ruble zone" and with the necessity of corresponding exports. It is difficult to imagine that the "ruble zone" will accept crowns in payment. The need for significant ruble exports for purchases in the Federation's market can be forecast with certainty. Given the very high exchange rate of the crown, large-scale republic imports will lead to the flight of hard currency from the republic and will create the problem of the compensatory exporting of goods or will lead to the decline of its exchange rate. Free exchange of the crown for rubles will create unpredictable fluctuations in its exchange rate. In general the degree of stability of the state exchange rate with one-sided development and a population of 1.6 million persons is a constant headache for local financiers.

Significant complications will arise in the trade of independent republics outside the Federation. First of all, the advantages of an unlimited market and the convenience of uniform customs-tariffs, that will differ from the present all-union custom-tariffs, will be lost. There will also be such problems as competitive trade among the three Baltic republics whose level of development and type of economy are quite similar; the interaction of the three local currencies; differences in the orientation of trade tariffs and the problem of most-favored nation status between republics and with the outside world, especially with the "ruble zone." Finally, the liberalization of foreign trade will inevitably lead to very large-scale smuggling from the Federation through the Baltic to the West. The liberalization of property relations and of commercial legislation can result in a situation where the Baltic republics will play the role of a tax haven and will become a place like Liechtenstein that registers companies operating in the Federation. As in the CEMA, the transition to world prices would mean a direct gain for regions that produce raw materials: Russia, Kazakhstan, etc. In this connection, we must emphasize the tentativeness of recalculating intraunion flows in world prices. The quality and production costs of such goods in our country differ substantially from world quality and costs, especially as regards machine building products. The immediate gain of republics producing raw materials (for themselves at a planned loss) will be short-lived: the practice of the world market shows that countries producing goods with a high share of value added (Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, etc.) ultimately win out in the exchange. What is more, the gradual involvement of manufacturing branches (and regions) in scientific-technical progress can mean quite a high saving on individual types of raw materials so that some of the regions producing them will find themselves facing

the structural unemployment that is classic in the West. Therefore, caution should be used in approaching the RSFSR's tentative gain from calculating interrepublic commodity flows in world prices.

In the long run, the advantage will go to regions that are able to organize the production of sophisticated, high-quality products. But the heightened effectiveness of the Federation's economy will depend not so much on independent decision-making at the republic level as on the scale and depth of economic reform and the development of market relations in the Federation as a whole.

There are practically no economic reasons for erecting barriers between parts of the all-union economic complex. An improved economic mechanism based on the "independence" of enterprises can make it possible for all enterprises to accelerate their development and in particular to find sources for new, highly productive equipment for modernizing the nation's obsolete production apparatus. Interested parties must abandon their political ambitions and begin discussing the problem of new relations, not the contrived question of "who is feeding whom."

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Book on Milton Friedman Reviewed

904M0011H Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 13 Mar 90) pp 143-145

[Review by A. Khandruyev of book "Denezhnyy mir' Miliona Fridmena" (Milton Friedman's 'Money World') by V. M. Usoskin, Moscow, Mysl Publishing House, 1989, 173 pages]

[Text] If we are to believe the ancients that every book has its own destiny, in the given instance the latter can be deemed highly promising. This work appeared just when the inflationary devaluation of the ruble advanced to the forefront the task of forming a monetary-credit mechanism capable of actively counteracting destabilization processes in the Soviet economy. It is also important that the book's publication coincided with the overcoming of the traditional undervaluation of the role of money under socialism, with the enlivened discussion of ways of further intensifying banking reform.

Interest in the monograph is not confined to the significance it has for perestroika processes in our country. Not a single one of M. Friedman's works has been published in the USSR.¹ And this despite the fact that there have been stormy debates about monetarism for many years. One can relate to monetarist doctrine in different ways, but to ignore and scorn it is considered a sign of elementary ignorance in scientific and political circles in the civilized world.

V. Usoskin's research fills a lamentable void. Thanks to him, Soviet readers (despite the fact that the book had quite a modest printing by our standards—9,000 copies and quickly disappeared from the shelves) now have the opportunity to acquaint themselves with a competent account of the evolution of monetarism and its basic characteristics. The author's erudition, impeccable if not elegant style, and virtuosity in the mastery of his material enabled him to lead the Soviet reader into Milton Friedman's bizarre, highly tentative "money world." In so doing, without sacrificing the scientific level of his presentation, he succeeded in solving a most difficult problem—the problem of describing something complex in language that is comprehensible to even a layman. Three kinds of circumstances attest to the fact that it was not entirely easy to do this.

First, monetary analysis is traditionally related to one of the most complex divisions of economic theory. Second, the study of M. Friedman's "Money World" is greatly complicated by the erosion of his initial principles because of the whimsical combination of *a priori* theoretical constructions with a prejudiced empirical interpretation of them. By virtue of this, some say that monetarism brought about a revolution in economic science, while others prefer to speak of the monetarist "cocktail" that combines elements of already known theoretical doctrines. Third, in order to correctly understand monetarism as a competing current of economic thought, it was important to show its place in the structure of theoretical analysis. At the same time, the book notes with justification that the "typology of macroeconomic doctrines is complex and has received little scholarly attention" (p 6).

In our view, the necessity of overcoming these difficulties determined the monograph's architectonics. Beginning with an examination of the historical conditions that led to monetarism, V. Usoskin sequentially reveals its basic principles in their interrelationship with practical economic needs and political principles. Thanks to the well-conceived logic of his presentation and his well-placed emphasis, he was able to pinpoint the coordinates defining the specifics of Friedman's world of monetary relations.

The birth of monetarist doctrine reflected not only and not so much the struggle of opinions about the quantitative theory of money as the continuation of the fundamental dispute between proponents and opponents of Keynesianism. The work cites F. Khan's pronouncement that the differences between these schools are essentially connected not with the interpretation of the role of money in price formation processes but "with the basic description of the economic system" (p 77). The author therefore most justifiably began by analyzing the factors that led to the crisis of the school that synthesizes Keynesianism and neoclassicism. It is specifically from this point of view that he reveals the nature of monetarism and its distinguishing features.

The new version of the quantitative theory of money that M. Friedman and his followers brought forth was the springboard for the development of a monetarist alternative to the Keynesian belief in the omnipotence of state-monopoly regulation. It was not by chance that in the initial stages of formation of the system of monetarist views, the American scholar emphasized their connection with the traditions of the Chicago School whose representatives defended the priority of the values of private enterprise. And only subsequently, after gaining a foothold and occupying an independent place in the structure of macroeconomic analysis, did many monetarists find an inclination to search for compromise with representatives of Keynesianism. Nevertheless, V. Usoskin believes that the differences between them do not boil down to technical details and that they reflect the struggle of the liberal-reform line (Keynesians) and the conservative tradition (monetarists).

While acknowledging that this conclusion is warranted to a certain degree, it is at the same time difficult to agree with the author's accusation that monetarism is conservative. In our review, this reveals dedication to the stereotypes of yesterday when justification of state intervention in economic life was regarded as a more progressive branch of bourgeois macroeconomic analysis whereas the rejection of "activism" was linked to economic and political neoconservatism. It is specifically in this connection that V. Usoskin speaks of the "alliance of conservative economic doctrines" at the beginning of the 1980s. He includes monetarism, supply-side economics and the new classical school in this category (pp 37-49). However, can this type of position be acknowledged as thoroughly justified?

It has already been noted that the terms "conservative" and "liberal" have long had directly opposite meanings in capitalist and socialist countries. To be a conservative in the West means to be dedicated to the ideals of free enterprise whereas the image of a conservative in the political structure of socialist society has been connected with the unconditional defense of the advantages of centralized planning before even a truncated market.

The merit of those who are called "conservatives" in the West is that they, even allowing the advantages of market forces to be absolutized, rightfully sounded the alarm about the inadmissibility of arbitrary changes in economics and politics. It was specifically the insistent attempt to endow the state with basic functions that opened the way to tyranny, to subjectivism, to stripping the economy of the capacity for self-regulation. The latter inevitably fell into a "lethargic sleep" that was protected by an "iron" political order.

Incidentally, the foregoing does not concern the basic line in the analysis of M. Friedman's "Money World." The book's author made a filigree work in revealing the internal connection between monetarism and the traditions of the quantitative theory of money, in explaining the complex interrelationships between the monetary and the real sectors of the capitalist economy. Chapter

two, which sequentially examines the quantitative theory of money both in historical retrospective and in its monetarist interpretation, is of particularly great cognitive interest. At the same time it should be emphasized that V. Usoskin was the first Soviet scientist who succeeded in overcoming the usual sketchiness in the classification of the principal currents of monetary analysis.

In a still earlier work ("The Theory of Money," published in 1976), he embarked on the path of creative modernization and rejected the obsolete division of schools into metallist, nominalist, and quantitative. As a result of this, the researcher was able to see entirely new and unexpected features in the development and enrichment of scientific concepts about money. Despite all strained interpretations and inclinations toward speculation, monetarism is the natural result of many centuries of evolution of monetary analysis. The monograph's only omission is that it skirts the indirect, even somewhat conditional connection of Keynesian and monetarist versions with the almost forgotten traditions of the "banking school" (T. Tooke, G. Fullerton) and the "monetary school" (S. Overstone and R. Torrens), respectively.

The central place in the book is probably occupied by chapter three which presents an in-depth, substantive analysis of the monetarist interpretation of the influence of money in an economic system. As is known, M. Friedman's fundamental theoretical premise is the substantiation of the thesis that the stable growth of the money supply ensures the stable growth of production and prices with a certain lag. It is specifically this postulate that forms the basis of the "iron rule" that the central bank has the obligation of maintaining the stability of the growth of the money supply regardless of changes in economic conditions. We shall return to this "rule" again. Here, however, we note that the author, in revealing M. Friedman's interpretation of the role of money in the economy, analyzes in detail the monetarist theory of inflation, cycles and crises, currency exchange rates, and the balance of payments. The narrow framework of a review precludes detailed discussion of this section of the book which is probably the most complex. But a hasty treatment of it may result in oversimplifications. We only note that the reader occasionally gets the impression that the presentation is inside M. Friedman's "Money World."

Nevertheless, there is the stamp of ambiguity in the evaluations that are offered to the reader. V. Usoskin is generally more inclined to the viewpoint of monetarism's opponents, even though he notes that it has made a certain contribution to macroeconomic analysis. Throughout the entire book, M. Friedman and his followers are rebuked for their arbitrary interpretation of empirical facts, for their contrived hypothesis, for mythologizing the role of money in the economic life of modern society, in the functioning of the monetarist model according to the "black box" principle, etc.

While acknowledging the justification for many critical statements, one would like to partially balance them with the recognition of the merits of the venerable American scholar. In my opinion, his principal merit is that he consistently and uncompromisingly defended the thesis of the exclusive significance of the stability of money in a normal economy. Its destruction means the disintegration of all the mechanisms that form the parts of a market economy into a single whole. Unlike J. M. Keynes, who underestimated the danger of inflation when he was writing "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," M. Friedman theoretically anticipated the inflationary wave of the 1970s and early 1980s and properly made monetary analysis the focus of his doctrine.

Monetarism opened a qualitatively new page in the study of monetary relations and their interrelations with the functioning entire economic system. The line of theoretical analysis proposed by him objectively meant changing the paradigms. But this process cannot be painless. There is always much that is speculative and unstable especially in its initial stages. Before any theory can assume whole form, it must evidently go through the search for alternatives, risky hypotheses, and shaky constructions.

The concluding chapter of the book, which examines monetarist doctrine in its practical aspect, reads very interestingly. Being a convinced opponent of "shock therapy" M. Friedman regards state intervention as a force that destroys the capacity of an economic system for self-regulation. He is more inclined toward indirect forms of influence, especially through the central bank's monetary policy. The already-mentioned "iron rule" organically stems from the basic principles of his doctrine and is closely linked to the interpretation of inflation as an exclusively "monetary phenomenon."

The book quotes many opponents of monetarism who believe that the social costs of stable monetary circulation are too high. At the same time, the book does a good job of revealing the reasons why monetarists' prescriptions for normalizing the economic situation are attractive. Principal among them is the contention that "in the era of permanent inflation, which continuously erodes the purchasing power of the monetary unit and generates serious disruptions in the reproductive process, such a position enjoys invariable popularity" (p 160). In this sense, it can be assumed that the seeds sown by the monetarists will germinate in those socialist countries that are in the grip of the inflation syndrome. The possibility is not excluded, in particular, that the appeal "to strip the government bureaucracy of its authority over the circulation of money" (p 161), that advances in the analysis of the demand and supply of money, in the study of the role of monetary factors in the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables and the behavior of agents of production will find practical application. Thus, we agree with the assessment of monetarism with which the

work concludes: "Rumors about the impending demise" of this doctrine "are in reality seriously exaggerated" (ibid).

In our review, we have deliberately avoided questions as to the nature of monetarism and its distinguishing features. In order to answer them, it is necessary to read attentively and possibly to reread this book. It deserves this

Footnotes

1. This was in particular lamented by Academician A. Aganbegyan in one of his articles (see: "That Difficult, Difficult Road," Moscow, 1989, p 174).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1990

Review of Book on International Barter

904M00111 Moscow: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 148-150

[Review by S. Dzykov of book "Vstrechnaya trgovlya: proshloye ili budushcheye? (O sovremennoy praktike i perspektivakh vstrechnykh operatsiy v mezhdunarodnoy trgovle) [Barter: Past or Future? (Present Practice and Prospective Barter Operations in International Trade)] by T. V. Kobushko and S. A. Ponomarev, Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1989, 176 pages]

[Text] The development of barter has been the object of the economic community's unflagging attention in recent years. Practical specialists are trying to find the most effective ways of using the advantages or neutralizing the shortcomings of this form of international economic relations. Researchers, in turn, are thoroughly interested in identifying the essence of barter operations, the basic reason for the quantitative growth of barter (as much as 20-25 percent of world trade in the '80s), its qualitative changes, and its tangible forms. The reviewed work is probably the first serious attempt in Soviet scientific literature to identify the character and place of this phenomenon in the system of international economic relations. In it the scholars have tried to evaluate the prospective development of barter, *inter alia*, from the standpoint of the practical application of its different forms in of Soviet enterprises and organizations that have entered world markets. It can be noted with satisfaction that this attempt was on the whole successful.

But why does the monograph's title include the somewhat rhetorical question: "past or future?" It seems to us that the readers must be primarily concerned not so much with the fate of barter itself as with the feasibility of its broad application in the foreign economic activity of Soviet enterprises and organizations. The latter question, however, has now ceased to be rhetorical.

The book correctly notes the trend in world economic practice to develop barter in the direction of organizing industrial cooperation and various types of production relations. Conversely, barter transactions and various kinds of commodity exchange operations under our conditions began to eliminate compensatory projects and technology transfer. What is more, even those forms of foreign economic relations that by their very essence should be production relations—direct ties, joint ventures—more and more frequently acquire a barter, commodity exchange character in practice. In other words, classical, if not primitive, barter is, alas, becoming the dream of our latter-day merchants.

In this regard, the reviewed piece of research makes it possible to obtain a quite qualified, even if not always complete explanation (foreign barter experience is nevertheless the basic object) of such an apparently paradoxical situation.

The authors most justifiably begin their study with an attempt to provide a system of concepts and to define the economic nature of the investigated phenomenon since there is already an overabundance of descriptions and detailed analyses of various kinds of barter; suffice it to mention the long list of studies and publications on these questions in the monograph's Remarks. Of the large number of definitions of existing barter operations, they select what corresponds most to the essence of the commercial relations under examination. Its essence rather "consists in financing foreign trade operations not on the basis of proceeds from exports of arbitrary goods in any foreign market for an indefinite period of time, but rather on the basis of earnings from the sale of a specific set of goods in a specific, predetermined market in a fixed period of time" (p. 10). A barter operation is thus one in which the buyer has the possibility of financing part of his purchase from proceeds from the sale of certain goods and/or services with the seller's aid.

The book also presents a precise classification of forms of barter and an analysis of the factors that determine the preferability of their application in international practice. The authors are absolutely correct when they say that views of such trade as a form of transactions that are profitable to only one side (as a rule, the side that is the initiator of the "coordination" of export-import operations) will prove to be insolvent if the interests of the participants are closely scrutinized. To the "importunate" side, which is usually interested in using barter only to economize on currency, the feasibility of the transaction is determined by a simple criterion. Essentially, the sum of price discounts on delivered goods or the sum of markups in prices of purchased goods are less than the marketing costs that would result if the goods were sold in the foreign market without the aid of a partner. At the same time, the "suffering" side that finances these expenditures is not by any means the loser because it gains access to the market in exchange that would otherwise be impossible or difficult and thus finances the marketing of its goods (pp. 33, 35).

Obviously, it is specifically such an understanding of the economic nature of barter, that incorporates the factors of its objective development on the basis of the establishment of long-term commercial and production ties, that is still beyond the majority of our participants in this type of transaction. Unfortunately they predominantly overestimate secondary factors that stimulate the development of barter or more precisely just one of them—the possibility of obtaining scarce goods in the foreign market without spending hard currency. The roots of this approach should of course be sought in the character of the economic system that still exists in our country (this search itself should be the subject of another study). However without mentioning the given feature in the position of Soviet participants in barter transactions, it is difficult to understand their attraction for the (on the whole) moribund forms of such commodity exchange.

The monograph presents a thorough analysis of the administrative and legal regulation of barter, the formation of its corporate [firmennaya] structure, the role of the state and banks, and particular features of price formation (chapters 2 and 3). It makes it possible to take an entirely new look at the prospects for Soviet enterprises to use compensatory agreements, border trade, multilateral forms of commodity exchange transactions, and even classical barter. Thus, for example, the state has been more and more actively assuming regulatory functions in recent years in developing and developed capitalist countries. The avenues vary: the formulation of special target programs for the development of exports by encouraging investments in branches oriented toward overseas sales; the discouragement of irrational imports through measures to coordinate imports with a certain level of exports to counter them; the formation of a specialized information infrastructure, associations of participants in such cooperation, etc. (pp. 38-49). Participating firms create in their structures special subdivisions engaged in counter-transactions or organize daughter companies. Barter exchanges at which partners are selected become a common phenomenon. The increase in the average scale of such transactions and the "enlargement" of their participants, which is connected with the attempt to reduce overhead, has been the tendency of recent years. The appropriate agreements are occasionally arrayed in entire chains where the realization of goods leads to new obligations.

A few critical words in conclusion. In our view, in the analysis of barter problems within the East-West framework (chapter 4), the authors should have analyzed in greater depth those that are to a greater degree connected with the present stage of reform of foreign economic relations in the USSR and should not have confined themselves to evaluating the prospects of cooperation on an exclusively compensatory basis. It appears that barter questions examined in the book also concern prospects for the development of other forms of foreign economic relations such as joint enterprise, productive cooperation, technological cooperation, etc.

At the same time, it is impossible to disagree with the final conclusion: barter must be approached not as just one more campaign, but as an instrument, as a stimulus for increasing the effectiveness of Soviet exports and for ennobling its structure (p 163). At the same time, the final answer concerning the feasibility of each barter operation must be based on a sober assessment of its economic effectiveness. Only in such a case can the decision be made: whether to barter and if yes whether to go backward or forward.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Book on French Nuclear Strategy Reviewed

904M0011J Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 150-152]

[Review by S. Churgov of book "Yadernoye oruzhiye Frantsii i voprosy yevropeyskoy bezopasnosti" [France's Nuclear Weapons and Problems of European Security] by V. M. Manzhola, Kiev, Golovnoye izdatelstvo izdatel'skogo obnyedineniya "Vyshcha shkola," 1989, 168 pages]

[Text] Thirty years have passed since the early morning of 13 February 1960 when, with a nuclear explosion at the Reggane test site, France announced to the world that it had joined the "nuclear club." The operation to prepare and carry out the test entered history under the name Blue Jerboa and marked the beginning of the new policy of Paris of liberating itself from the wardship of Washington and of securing a more independent position within NATO.

Kiev political scientist V. M. Manzhola, having begun her book with an analysis of plans for the development of France's atomic bomb, painstakingly analyzes all the metamorphoses that Blue Jerboa went through in the last 3 decades. We note that the attention of Soviet researchers during this entire period was primarily directed toward the study of American military strategic concepts. It was assumed that the doctrines of other NATO countries were spinoffs from the American concepts. However, the French strategy of nuclear deterrence is a phenomenon that is quite independent, that is national to a greater degree than the British strategy, for example.

The specific features of French military strategy became apparent when its national nuclear forces were still in their infancy. Paris's nuclear program was born as a guarantee of the nation's participation in the formulation of such NATO strategy that would correspond to France's national interests. What is more, as the author justly notes, it "was aimed at undermining Anglo-American 'special relations' that were based on the nuclear cooperation of these countries, which placed Great Britain in a privileged position vis-a-vis other

participants in the NATO alliance" (p 10). The originality of Paris's nuclear doctrine is reflected in the strategy of "deterrence of the strong by the weak." This strategy stems from the thesis of the "equalizing power" of nuclear weapons which, from the point of view of such a nuclear country as France, consists in its "ability to balance and equalize the military-political power of states that differ in their potential, in territorial size, and in geographical location" (p 24).

The work's merits include the fact that military aspects of the problem are analyzed in close connection with its foreign policy aspects. And this is all the more justified because since De Gaulle's day, Paris has viewed nuclear weapons both as a basis of foreign policy and as an instrument of diplomacy. The author identifies three key principles in French foreign political doctrine relating to questions of war and peace. First, the traditional "power" principle, i.e., in the context of the strategy of "deterrence"; second, the noninvolvement of the nation in a conflict that is incompatible with its national interests; third, the creation of an international climate that would diminish and possibly eliminate the danger of war, especially on the European continent (p 40).

An important place in the book is taken up with the analysis of the unique "nuclear nationalism" characteristic of France that stems from the Gaullist doctrine of national grandeur. While the system of Paris's basic policy concepts underwent adjustments by G. Pompidou, V. Giscard d'Estaing, its evolution preserved "in more or less modified form most of the theory and principles of Gaullist doctrine" (p 50). This thesis became something of a reference point to the author.

He views the Elysee Palace's nuclear diplomacy in all its complexity and contradictoriness. On the one hand, Paris's independence in the military-political area has been expressed in its opposition to "Atlantism" and this has made an appreciable contribution to European construction. On the other hand, when the political climate was warming up in the 70s, "France took a negative stance on practically all specific issues relating to disarmament and detente," which, as the book notes, increasingly contradicted its avowed "striving to continue and deepen the policy of detente" (p 109). As the author writes, the nation's course concerning international negotiations on disarmament problems was a unique policy of the "empty chair" (p 74).

We note that elsewhere in the book, "chair" is for some reason replaced by "armchair" (pp 79-84). We will attribute this substitution of metaphors, like the recurrent (if, of course, nonliteral) repetitions that also are found in the monograph, to stylistic carelessness. But unfortunately, the work's shortcomings are not confined to them. The striving for objective analysis betrays the researcher when he uses age-old argument-incantations. Thus, the author maintains that the course "toward France's development of atomic weapons was subordinate to the task of defending the class interests of the French bourgeoisie, of ensuring the nation the rank of a

great power, and of pursuing a more independent foreign policy" (p 11). The thesis of the class nature of nuclear policy is incompatible with the fact that it was supported by the French Communist Party starting in 1977.

Equally stilted in our view is the assessment of the influence of anti-Sovietism on Paris's foreign policy: anti-Sovietism, heated up by Washington's "slander campaign about the Soviet military threat," about the disruption of the military balance in the favor of the USSR," stimulated French theoreticians to search for conceptions justifying the reorientation of French foreign policy toward France's solidarity with the West" (p 131). Real and stereotypical arguments are once again mixed together here. If one speaks seriously about the "disruption of the military balance in favor of the USSR," it is hardly appropriate to call it a "slander campaign." For example, the terms for reducing medium-range weapons under the INF Treaty graphically point to the appreciable superiority of the Soviet Union. The "tank equation" is no less convincing. On the whole, it is now clear that the West's fear of Soviet military might was not groundless.

The author's work would look more innovative if it were not for such "birthmarks." They are few but this "spoonful of tar" compels us to reflect once again on the difficulty of ridding the scientific consciousness of propagandistic stereotypes.

What, then, is V. Manzhola's principal contribution to the development of our knowledge of political science? I think it is her analysis of the concept of "minimal deterrence." It is of both theoretical and practical interest today. Naturally, the idea of building a nuclear-free world remains the goal of the world community. But the concept of "minimal deterrence," which has much in common with the "rational sufficiency" concept, could become the most common denominator that would allow nuclear powers to ensure safety and stability on the planet. France, as is known, has developed this concept to the greatest depth. Therefore, critical analysis of French military doctrines, which is the core of the book, will undoubtedly be beneficial.

Very important is the tendency noted by the author toward strengthening the "European factor" in French foreign policy. "Among French theoreticians," the author writes, "there is growing anti-American sentiment that destabilizes the 'Euro-Atlantic consensus' and there are growing conceptions of a 'European defense' in the Gaullist spirit independent of the USA" (p 141). This idea has special resonance today, at a time when France has not only approved the idea of the "common European home," but has also outlined its contours thereby laying the foundation for a turn from "European defense" toward the creation of the infrastructure of the political government of Europe.

President F. Mitterand recently called for the formation of a "European confederation" which, in the words of

the French chief of state, "will naturally include the USSR. Unfortunately, we cannot as yet say: the USSR first of all."

In this context, V. Manzhola's work, which is helpful in comparing military doctrines and in reducing them to a common denominator, goes beyond the framework of research on purely French and even European military-political realities.

Attentive study of the Kiev scholar's book also compels us to reflect on problems on a different plane. They are the problems of development of republic political science and its contribution to the all-union "intellectual money-box." The reference here is not so much to the Ukrainian Scientific School (it has long recommended itself as having firm research traditions of long standing), but is in general to regional science which, excuse me for saying so, is occasionally called "peripheral."

Are books that are not published in Moscow frequently reviewed in scientific journals? Alas, less and less frequently. The authority of the scientific schools of Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Kiev, and Tallinn is still intact. But, unfortunately, you rarely encounter political science research that has been performed in the capitals of most union republics in Khabarovsk and Valdivostok. Can it be considered natural that the study of world economics and international relations has been concentrated in and monopolized by scientific centers in Moscow? In part, yes. But before our eyes there is also another example: mighty analytical organizations in the American "boon-docks." The same can also be said about the Federal Republic of Germany and a number of other countries.

But why is Moscow the beneficiary of the "braindrain" and why are symptoms of stagnation gradually appearing in regional science? In addition to everything else, the lack of attention to the financing of regional political science research is evidently a factor here. Republic scientific centers are unable to receive current, information-reference materials and foreign periodicals on a regular basis. Some republics do not have a scientific community in which scientists could discuss and test their ideas.

Such a situation is absurd. First, pluralism is a necessary condition to the productive development of science. Second, the rapid growth of national self-awareness, especially among the national intelligentsia, has become one of the distinguishing features of our time. All this dictates the necessity of encouraging republic and regional thought. And the potential for regional political science exists—this is attested to by V. Manzhola's monograph.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1990

List of Books Recently Published

904M0012K Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) p 153

[Text] Bogomolov, A. O., "Tikhookeanskaya strategiya SShA i ASEAN" [U. S. Strategy in the Pacific and ASEAN]. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 172 pages.

Vlast. "Ocherki sovremennoy politicheskoy filosofii Zapada" [Essays on Contemporary Western Political Philosophy]. Responsible editor: V. V. Mshveniyeradze. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 327 pages.

Gakov, V., "Ultimatum: yadernaya voyna i bezyadernyy mir v fantaziyakh i realnosti" [Ultimatum: Nuclear War and a Nuclear-free World in Fantasy and Reality]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1989, 347 pages.

Golanskiy, M. M., "Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye v perspektive. Otsenka ekonomicheskogo potentsiala stran mira" [Economic Development in the Future. Evaluation of the Economic Potential of Countries of the World]. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 143 pages.

"Dolgi i kredity v sovremennoy kapitalisticheskoy ekonomike" [Debts and Credits in a Modern Capitalist Economy]. Leningrad State University Press, 1989, 216 pages.

Dongarov, A. G., "Inostranny kapital v Rossii i SSSR" [Foreign Capital in Russia and the USSR]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1990, 166 pages.

"Zhenshchiny v sovremennom mire. K itogam 10-letiya zhenshchiny OON" [Women in Today's World. On the Results of the UN Women's Decade]. Responsible editor: V. V. Lyubimova. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 359 pages.

Zhukov, Ye. F., "Samofinansirovaniye pri kapitalizme: teoriya i praktika" [Self-Financing under Capitalism: Theory and Practice]. Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1990, 159 pages.

Zigert, V. and Lang, L., "Rukovodit bez konfliktov" [Manage Without Conflict]. Abridged translation from German. Moscow, Ekonomika, 1990, 335 pages.

Zimenzov, R. I., "Konkistadory XX veka. Ekspansiya transnatsionalnykh korporatsiy v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Twentieth Century Conquistadors. Expansion of Transnational Corporations in the Developing Countries]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1990, 224 pages.

Isayev, M. P., "Vneshnyaya politika stran Indokitaya" [Foreign Policy of Countries in Indochina]. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 248 pages.

"Ischeznuvshiye. Metod terrora. Doklad dlya Nezavisimoy komissii po mezhdunarodnym gumanitarnym voprosam" [The Vanished. The Terror Method. A

Report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues]. Translated from English. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1989, 119 pages.

"Kakim byt planu: diskussii 20-kh godov" [What the Plan Should Be Like: Discussions in the '20s]. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1989, 224 pages.

Kiva, A. V., "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoye dvizheniye: teoriya i praktika" [The National Liberation Movement: Theory and Practice]. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 331 pages.

"Na puti k svobode sovesti" [On the Road to the Freedom of Conscience]. Compilers and general editors: D. Ye. Durman and O. Mark (Smirnov). Moscow, Progress, 1989, 494 pages.

"Naseleniye SSSR. 1988. Statisticheskii yezhegodnik" [Population of the USSR. 1988. Statistical Yearbook]. Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1989, 704 pages.

Paniyev, Yu. N., "Strany Latinskoy Ameriki: aktualnyye problemy vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazey" [Latin American Countries: Current Problems in Foreign Economic Relations]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1990, 264 pages.

"Politicheskiye otnosheniya na Vostoke: obshcheye i osobennoye" [Political Relations in the East: the General and the Particular]. Responsible editor: V. F. Li and V. N. Maksimenko. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 200 pages.

Pokhlebin, V. V., "Mezhdunarodnaya simbolika i emblematika. Opyt slovary" [International Symbolics and Emblematics. Experimental Dictionary]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1989, 301 pages.

"Rabochiy klass i inzhenerno-tekhnicheskaya intelligentsiya v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh. Sotsialnaya informatsiya" [The Working Class and the Engineering-Technical Intelligentsia in Socialist Countries. Social Information]. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 267 pages.

Rogov, S. M., "Sovetskiy Soyuz i SShA: poisk balansa interesov" [The Soviet Union and the USA: The Search for a Balance of Interests]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1989, 343 pages.

Sedov, P. L., "Ekonomicheskii ekstremizm i razvivayushchiyesya strany" [Economic Extremism and the Developing Countries]. Moscow, Mysl, 1989, 184 pages.

"Svet i teni 'velikogo desyatiletiya': N. S. Khrushchev i yego vremya" [Light and Shadows of the 'Great Decade': N. S. Khrushchev and His Time]. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1989, 480 pages.

Smolnikov, S. V., "Yest li u Yevropy shans?" [Does Europe Have a Chance?]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1989, 167 pages.

"Sokhranit li chelovechestvo chelovechnost? Doklad Nezavisimoy komissii po mezhdunarodnym gumanitarnym voprosam" [Will Mankind Preserve its

Humanity? Report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues]. Translated from English. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. 1989, 269 pages.

"Statisticheskii yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi. 1989" [Statistical Yearbook of CEMA Member Nations. 1989]. Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1989, 495 pages.

Tereshchenko, V. I., "Problema vybora: politika nauchnykh prioritetov na Zapade" [The Problem of Choice: The Politics of Scientific Priorities in the West]. Kiev, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1990, 156 pages.

Fayerabend, Y., "Tayniki dlya millionov. Gde pryachetsya bogatstvo?" [Hiding Places for Millions. Where is Wealth Concealed?] Translated from German. General editorship and introductory article by A. Yu. Yudanov. Moscow, Progress, 1989, 264 pages.

Khefling, G., "Trevoga v 2000 godu. Bomby zamedlenogo deystviya na nashey planete" [Alarm in the Year 2000. Time Bombs on Our Planet]. Moscow, Mysl, 1990, 271 pages.

"Khozyaystvennoye zakonodatelstvo stran-chlenov SEV" [Economic Legislation of CEMA Member Nations]. Translation. Compiler: V. V. Zalesskiy. Moscow, Progress, 1989, 535 pages.

Chayanov, A. V., "O selskokhozyaystvennoy kooperatsii" [On Agricultural Cooperatives]. Selected chapters and articles. Compilers: S. V. Kiselev, et al. Saratov, Privolzhskoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1989, 176 pages.

Shveytser, V. Ya., "Sovremennaya sotsial-demokratiya. Slovar-spravochnik" [Contemporary Social Democracy. Reference Dictionary]. General editor: A. A. Galkin. Moscow, Politizdat, 1990, 287 pages.

Yakovlev, A. N., "Realizm—zemlya perestroyki. Izbrannyye vystupleniya i stati" [Realism—The Land of Perestroyka. Selected Speeches and Articles]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1990, 544 pages.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Articles in MEMO Not Translated

00000000 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to press 15 Mar 90) pp 1-2

[Text] Summary of Major Articles in Russianpp 3-5

Practice and Lessons of Contemporary Innovative Enterprise (D. Kuzin).....pp 25-35

French Foreign Policy During the Period of "Coexistence" (A. Kozhemyakov)pp 36-47

Between the Hammer and the Anvil (M. Bo).....pp 61-71

The OECD in a Changing World (Interview by Our Paris CorrespondentJ) (Zh.-K. Pey)106-110

The Internationalization of Economics in the Works of Academician Varga and Modern Times (Ye. Khesin)pp 111-115

Informational Aspects of the Theory of Crises and Cycles (L. Grigoryev).....pp 118

Tax Reform in the Federal Republic of Germany (Yu. Yudanov)pp 119-125

How an "Excellent Company" Operates (I. Tselishchev).....pp 126-129

Federal Republic of Germany: Continuation of the Boom? (A. Yassenovskiy).....pp 130-132

France: The Fourth Year of the Rise (V. Biryulev)pp 132-134

The First Meeting With American Professionals (S. Aukutsionek and M. Boyko).....pp 139-142

The Third World: Poverty and the Environment (Ye. Bragina)146-148

Announcements, Advertisements.....pp 154-157

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Publication Data

904M0011L MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90

[Text]English title: WORLD ECONOMICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Russian title: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA

Editor: G. G. Diligenskiy

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of publication: April 1990

Signed to press: 15 March 1990

Copies: 27,000

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

15 Aug. 1990